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Adopting advanced information technologies within the present broad 
application fields requires precise security. However, security problems regarding 
information privacy have occurred frequently over the last 5 years despite the 
contribution of these technologies. To respond to the need for securing 
information privacy, the Information Privacy Law was enacted on April 1, 2005 in 
Japan. One of the responses to this law enforcement is demanding a higher level 
of information risk management and search for more effective tools to be used for 
identity protection and problem-solving. Two examples of these tools include 
RAPID and IRMP. However, there is no established system-development model 
for either of these tools. Further developments to improve the RAPID and IRMP 
remain as new challenges. In this thesis, a new approach on developing a system 
security model to be used for information risk management is proposed. To 
demonstrate this approach, the object-oriented language is used. 
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1. Introduction 
 
With the advent of the digital-age, a coherent information policy is required to 
support the rapid flow of information. Internet technologies have changed the face of 
both business and personal interaction. Introducing a system to the Internet results in 
immediate world scale network exposure. Due to this exposure, information trade is easy 
and fast. However, this exposure also results in security breaches regarding information 
leak, which occur daily throughout the world. In Japan, the total number of such 
problems last year amounted to 2297 instances. Just from January to July of 2005, the 
number of Internet privacy losses already reached 7009 cases 1 . To address this 
vulnerability, the Information Privacy Law was enacted on April 1, 2005 in Japan2. After 
the law was enacted, an onslaught of system security products were released with many 
more on the way3; however, the products will not be effective unless both system 
developers and users have an understanding about what kind of information policy that 
the system requires and how they should deal with the information policy in development 
security systems4. According to the article “The Way to Develop the Secure Information 
                                                 
1 The present state of privacy information breach problem 
http://www.ahnlab.co.jp/virusinfo/security_view.asp?news_gu=03&seq=86&pageNo=4  
2 Ministry of Internal Affair and Communication information privacy law site, 
http://www.soumu.go.jp/gyoukan/kanri/kenkyu.htm  
3 Systemwalker Desktop keeper, Fujitsu http://systemwalker.fujitsu.com/jp/desktop_keeper/ / IPLOCKS 
Information Risk Management Platform, IPLOCKS, 2 pages 
http://www.iplocks.com/images/newsarticles/3customers_final_052705.pdf  
4 Overreacted t o the information privacy law, Yoshiro Tabuchi, NIKKEI BP in Japan, July. 5 2005, 
http://nikkeibp.jp/sj2005/column/c/01/index.html?cd=column_adw 
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Risk Management System”5, based on the analysis of 61 cases of privacy information 
security breach problems published on the Net Security site6, less than 10% of problems 
are actually caused by hacker attacks. Nearly all (90%) problems originate at the design 
stage (41%) and maintenance (52.5%) stage. This demonstrates the lack of regard for 
information risk management at the design and maintenance stage. The same article 
concludes that the problems caused at the design stage are due to a lack of understanding 
on the part of the systems engineer; and security risks compounded as systems near 
completion. The same poor understanding of security and information risk management 
on the part of operators is responsible for delayed responses during maintenance. In 
addition, the report - “Information security: why the future belongs to the quants”7 
indicates that developers should work on quality early in the process, where cost is lower 
as Table 1 shows. A cost to correct at the design stage is the lowest among the all stages. 
On the other hand, a cost at the maintenance stage is the highest; it is almost more 100 
times than the cost at the design stage. In addition, security defects also tend to occur at 
certain design stages more than other stages as depicted in Table 2. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 The way to develop the secure information risk management system, D add ninth Co., Ltd. Oct 1 2002, 
http://www.dadd9.com/tech/sec4manager.html  
6 NetSecurity, Livin' on the EDGE Co., Ltd. & Vagabond Co.,Ltd., , https://www.netsecurity.ne.jp/ 
7 Information security: why the future belongs to the quants, Security & Privacy Magazine, IEEE, 
July-Aug. 2003, Volume 1, Issue 4, Page 24 –32 
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Table 1: Relative Cost to Correct Security Defects by Stage8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Security Defects by Category9 
The categories printed in bold in the above table relate to information leak problems. As 
the above evidences show, it is crucial to be concerned about security issues at the design 
stage in developing systems. To overcome the abovementioned problems, several 
information risk management tools such as RAPID10 and IRSP11 have been developed. 
                                                 
8 Information security: why the future belongs to the quants, Security & Privacy Magazine, IEEE, 
July-Aug. 2003, Volume 1, Issue 4, Page 26 
9 Information security: why the future belongs to the quants, Security & Privacy Magazine, IEEE, 
July-Aug. 2003, Volume 1, Issue 4, Page 29 
10 Information Security Program Development Using RAPID, http://www.nmi.net/rapid.html  
11 Information Risk Management Program, CSC CyberCare, 5 pages 
http://www.csc.com/industries/government/knowledgelibrary/uploads/807_1.pdf  
CATEGORY
ENGAGEMENTS
WHERE
OBSERVED
DESIGN
RELATED
SERIOUS
DESIGN FLAWS*
Administrative interfaces 31% 57% 36%
Authentication/access control 62% 89% 64%
Configuration management 42% 41% 16%
Cryptographic algorithms 33% 93% 61%
Information gathering 47% 51% 20%
Input validation 71% 50% 32%
Parameter manipulation 33% 81% 73%
Sensitive data handling 33% 70% 41%
Session management 40% 94% 79%
Total 45% 70% 47%
STAGE RELATIVE COST
Design 1.0
Implementation 6.5
Testing 15.0
Maintenance 100.0
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RAPID is used for defining necessary business processes and developing guidelines to 
develop a security system. IRSP provides information risk management programs to 
support and improve existing client security systems. However, these tools identify only 
the management steps needed to enforce the existing security system and do not expand 
on the methodology and models necessary for developing new systems. In developing 
new systems, which require a significant information policy, the methodology, approach, 
system modeling, and system model verification must be clearly outlined. This outline 
significantly helps a systems engineer to work on quality at the early stage in developing 
systems. 
 
This thesis focuses on an information risk assessment, method of developing 
information policy, modeling system and system model verification, all of which must be 
considered in the design stage. Newly developed systems must be forward compatible 
with new technologies for threats that may occur during the maintenance stage. It is 
required for the design to have the following: 
- Suitable for the addition of various security components 
- Re-useable security components for various systems 
- Provide common understanding among system developers 
Object-oriented design is the most suitable design methodology to overcome the 
aforementioned requirements, and as the premiere meta-modeling language for analysis 
and design in the software engineering community, the Unified Modeling Language 
(UML)12 will be used. For example, modeling the systems with UML creates a common 
                                                 
12 OMG (Object Management Group) official site, Unified Modeling Language, http://www.uml.org/ 
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understanding for both developers and user domain experts. A better understanding of 
how the user systems function facilitates the detection of security problems early in 
system development.  
 
The following are benefits of using the system developing approach and 
methodology involving the information risk management model discussed in this thesis. 
9 Prioritizes security risk solutions: Information risk assessment helps 
developers to realize highly required security issue and provide risk solutions. 
9 Secures the privacy information: A well-grounded countermeasure and its 
security solution based on a risk assessment make systems to be secure. 
9 Reduces errors: Information risk management, modeling systems, systems 
model verification at the design stage reduce security defects efficiently and 
effectively. 
9 Facilitates updates for new security threats: A system modeling with UML 
facilitates developers to update and reuse components in systems, and 
provides high compatibility to other systems. 
9 Provides understandable system design documents: Information risk 
management with simple concept and design document using UML provides 
well understanding to any developers and stakeholders.  
 
In this thesis, information risk management is introduced with current security 
studies and a new model, which is developed herein. Next, following the presentation of 
this new model for information risk management, 20 current security breach issues will 
be analyzed and assessed using the risk management assessment method. Then, three 
worst-case security breach issues will be addressed. Third, information policies will be 
developed using countermeasures in response to the worst-case security breaches, and 
then security mechanisms based on these information policies will be shown. Fourth, 
system modeling will be performed with UML. Fifth, security mechanisms based on 
 6
dynamic information policies developed in this thesis will be verified. In addition, 
validation of the system model is shown. A state chart diagram in a case without policy, 
with static policy, and with dynamic policy is developed. The cases are then validated 
with UPPALL13. UPPALL is an integrated tool environment for modeling, validating and 
verifying real-time systems modeled as networks of timed automata. Finally, this thesis 
will conclude by demonstrating how to develop the secured system model discussed in 
this thesis. This thesis contributes to systems engineering by providing a framework for 
handling security issues faced by enterprises managing secure information. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13 UPPAAL homepage, http://www.uppaal.com/  
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2. Background 
 
2-1. Review of Existing Studies 
 
In this report, outlining a methodology and modeling for developing systems to 
prevent information leaks are the main themes. Such an effort is significant for systems 
engineers in developing systems and similar studies are available. In this section, three 
similar existing studies are reviewed. Their approaches are analyzed and an outstanding 
methodology with model-based risk assessment is used in developing systems. 
 
1. Information Flow Analysis of Component-Structured Applications, Peter Herrmann, 
200114 
The diversity and complexity of information flow between components pose the threat of 
leaking information. Security analysis must be performed in order to provide suitable 
security solutions. Systems are audited for vulnerabilities, threats, and risks. Based on the 
audit, effective safeguards are selected, designed, and configured. However, since 
information flow analysis tends to be expensive and error-prone, object oriented security 
analysis and modeling is utilized. It employs a UML-based object-oriented modeling 
techniques and graph rewriting in order to make the analysis understandable and to assure 
its accuracy even for large systems. Information flow is modeled based on Myers’ and 
                                                 
14 Computer Security Applications Conference, ACSAC 2001 Proceedings 17th Annual 10-14, Dec. 2001, 
Page 45 – 54 
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Liskov’s15 decentralized label model combining label-based read access policy models 
and declassification of information with static analysis. 
 
2. Developing Secure Networked Web-Based Systems Using Model-based Risk 
Assessment and UMLsec, Siv Hilde Houmb / Jan J¨urjens, 200316 
Despite a growing awareness of security issues in networked computing systems, most 
development processes used today still do not take security aspects into account. This 
paper shows a process for developing secure networked systems based on CORAS 
framework1718, whose concept is a model based risk assessment using UMLsec. UMLsec 
is an extension of the Unified Modeling Language (UML) for secures systems 
development. Enterprise information such as security policies, business goals, policies 
and processes are supported through activities in a model-based integrated development 
process. Security requirements at a more technical level can be expressed using UMLsec. 
Additionally, a support-tool for a mechanical analysis of such requirements is provided. 
 
 
 
                                                 
15 Decentralized Model for Information Control Flow In Proc. 16th ACM Symposium on Operating 
Systems Principles, A. C. Myers and B. Liskov. A, Saint-Malo, France, 1997 
16 Software Engineering Conference, Tenth Asia-Pacific 2003, 2003, Page 488 - 497 
17 Towards a UML profile for model-based risk assessment, S.-H. Houmb, F. den Braber, M. S. Lund, and 
K. Stolen, In J¨urjens et al. 
18 Business Component-Based Software Engineering, chapter Modelbased Risk Assessment in a 
Component-Based Software Engineering Process, K. Stølen, F. den Braber, T. Dimitrakos, R. Fredriksen, B. 
Gran, S. Houmb, Y. Stamatiou, and J. Aagedal, The CORAS Approach to Identify Security Risks, Kluwer, 
2002, Pages 189–207 
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3. Model-based Risk Assessment to Improve Enterprise Security, Jan Øyvind Aagedal / 
Folker den Braber / Theo Dimitrakos§ / Bjørn Axel Gran / Dimitris Raptis‡ / Ketil Stølen, 
200219 
This paper attempts to define the required models for a model-based approach to risk 
assessment. CORAS is applied to provide methods and tools for precise, unambiguous, 
and efficient risk assessment of security critical systems since traditional risk assessment 
is performed without any formal description of the target of evaluation or results of the 
risk assessment. CORAS provides a set of models to describe the target of assessment at 
the right level of abstraction, and medium for communication between different groups of 
stakeholders involved in a risk assessment. In one step of the risk treatment, a 
strengthening of the security requirements is suggested to handle identified security 
problems. In addition, many risk assessment methodologies are presented, such as 
HazOP20 and FMEA21. HazOP is applied to address security threats involved in a system, 
and FMEA is applied to identify potential failure in the system’s structure. All 
components in the system’s structure are expressed by UML. Many approaches are taken 
into account in developing systems. The following table is a brief comparison of the 
approach in this thesis to the three aforementioned approaches. 
 
 
                                                 
19 Model-based Risk Assessment to Improve Enterprise Security, Enterprise Distributed Object Computing 
Conference, 2002. EDOC '02. Proceedings. Sixth International, Sept. 2002, Page 51 – 62 
20 Security Assessments of Safety Critical Systems Using HAZOPs, R. Winther, O. A. Johnsen, and B. A. 
Gran, 20th International Conference on Computer Safety, Reliability and Security SAFECOMP 2001, 
Hungary, 2001 
21 FMEA Risk Assessment, http://www.tangram.co.uk/TI-HSE-FMEA-Risk_Assessment.html  
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Title # Survey Risk Analysis Security Solution Design Tool 
1 No Common Criteria22 Information Flow UML Java Beans-based components 
2 No CORAS framework  UMLsec 
MDR23 
UML CASE tool 
Poseidon24 
(Does not apply) 
CORAS 3 No HazOp, FMEA  UML N/A 
This 
Thesis Yes 
Risk Assessment 
extending with DOD25
standard (new) 
Information policy 
and its procedure 
(new) 
UML UPPAAL26 
Table 3: Comparison of the Approach of This Thesis to Other Approaches 
All approaches are very useful and powerful in developing secure systems; however, the 
approach in this thesis may be well suited and used widely and easily for recent systems 
since the concept of this approach is very simple and its security mechanisms are based 
on countermeasures from current information leak problems. 
 
2-2. Information Risk Management 
 
What is information risk management? According to an article27 regarding 
information risk management provided by the Nomura Research Institution 28 , 
                                                 
22 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, I International Standard ISO/IEC, 
SO/IEC, 1998 
23 Meta-Data Repository, MDR homepage, http://mdr.netbeans.org  
24 UML CASE tool Poseidon, Gentleware homepage, http://www.gentleware.com  
25 Department of Defense home page, http://www.defenselink.mil/ 
26 UPPAAL homepage, http://www.uppaal.com/  
27 Understanding Information Risk Management, Nomura Research Institution, 2002, 95 pages 
http://www.nri.co.jp/opinion/chitekishisan/2002/pdf/cs20020910.pdf  
28 Nomura Research Institution home page, http://www.nri.co.jp/english/index.html 
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information risk management are those policies which reduce risk inherent in information 
processing. As enterprises invest in information-oriented systems, databases such as 
customer information databases have resulted in enterprises maintaining and using 
greater quantities of information. Poor information management may result in 
information leaks and hacker attacks, resulting in considerable loss and damage to the 
enterprises. For example, the information of 900,000 clients of Yahoo! BB in Softbank, 
which is one of the largest high-speed Internet connection services, was leaked by an 
ex-employee’s misuse of its database system29. The leaked information almost spread to 
the Internet. The company paid $10 to each client as a self-imposed penalty for this lapse 
in security. Total financial losses reached $9 million. While insider culprits must pay for 
their crimes, the responsible company must create an environment where such events are 
defended against. The following figure represents information risk. The upper left graph 
in the figure shows the probability of risk occurrence in each given process; the bottom 
left graph shows the magnitude of assets involved in the information for each given 
process. The information risk level is determined by the combination of the probability 
and assets. For instance, a combination of high probability of risk exposure and high asset 
value will be the highest risk level; on the other hand, a combination of low probability of 
risk exposure and low value of assets will be the lowest risk level. In the case of the 
aforementioned security breach, the probability of risk exposure is once every 3 years; 
this probability is low. However, the value of information assets is extremely high. Thus, 
the risk level will be middle or high. The risk level may be between unacceptable risk and 
                                                 
29 The Japan Times; Softbank leak extortionist won't serve time; July 10, 2004; 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/print/news/nn07-2004/nn20040710a4.htm 
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undesirable risk. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Depicting for Information Risk30 
In response to emergent security problems, many government agencies in Japan 
and the United State now require information security management certification. In Japan, 
ISMS (Information Security Management System) was issued last year31. It has become a 
standard certification for information risk management. In the United State, Congress 
passed the Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 (FISMA)32, which 
provides the overall information risk management framework for ensuring the 
effectiveness of information security controls that support federal operations and assets33. 
                                                 
30 Understanding Information Risk Management, Nomura Research Institution, 2002, Page 94, 
http://www.nri.co.jp/opinion/chitekishisan/2002/pdf/cs20020910.pdf  
31 Information Security Management System (ISMS) home page, http://www.isms.jipdec.jp/  
32 Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 (Title III of E-Gov), Computer Security 
Resource Center, http://csrc.nist.gov/policies/  
33 Improving Oversight of Access to Federal Systems and Data by Contractors can Reduce Risk, Wanja 
Eric Naef, GAO, April 2005, 28 pages 
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Information risk management is required in developing systems. It has become the center 
of public attention in the last few years. As a result of this demand, many information risk 
management tools have been introduced. Among these tools, RAPID and IRSP are 
notable. RAPID is useful for defining necessary business processes and developing 
guidelines to improve existing security systems. It will fit security systems into existing 
systems. The processes are 1) risk assessment, 2) security problem identification and 
awareness review, 3) security program creation and support. IRSP provides an 
information risk management program to support and improve client security systems. 
The program defines certain client security policies and provides static and dynamic 
protection. Protection schemes are as follows: 
 
Static Protection 
A rule and definition of security standards, security architecture, security service, 
recovery interface, and other additional security needs based on countermeasures from 
personal, physical, administrative, communications, and technology. 
 
Dynamic Protection 
Security protection program involving vulnerability alert processes, vulnerability 
assessment processes, monitoring services, and anti-virus programs plan based on 
information security best practices.  
 
After analyzing the both types of protection, the program shows certain security 
compliance standards and specifications based on the static protection. In addition, the 
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program assembles best protection practices and creates the proper program based on the 
dynamic protection. 
 
However, these tools do not provide any strict methodology or approach to 
develop new systems with information risk management policies. Certain system models 
or system development methodologies and approaches must be formally provided to 
remedy this deficiency. This deficiency in current information risk management tools is 
the motivation for this thesis. In conjunction with the concepts and ideas from the 
abovementioned tools and three existing methodologies, a new system development 
approach and methodology for information risk management will be introduced in this 
thesis. An overview of the system development model is as follows. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Overview of Information Risk Management Model 
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Risk management is used to identify risks involved in security breaches and 
prioritize security solutions for the risks in any field. This will be described in detail in 
chapter 3. Information policy consists of the rules developed for the target system in 
order to reduce or prevent the risk. Security mechanism is the procedures used to 
accomplish the information policy. Security mechanisms will be invoked in the subject 
system. This process will be shown in chapter 4. In this thesis, some examples following 
this cycle will be shown in detail. 
 
 
2-3. Systems Modeling 
 
Modeling is a powerful technique to develop a system effectively and efficiently, 
and it offers many benefits to any participant of system development such as stakeholders, 
system developers, and users. According to Mark Austin’s lecture notes for the University 
of Maryland systems engineering program34, the benefit of using modeling are as follows.  
- Assistance in Communication 
- Assistance in Coordination of Activities 
- Ease of Manipulation 
- Efficient Trial-and-Error Experiments 
- Reduction of Development Time 
- Reduced Cost 
- Risk Management 
 
                                                 
34 ENSE 622 Lecture notes, Mark Austin, University of Maryland, 2004, Page 78 – 79 
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The system model provides experiments, rules, and useful information for 
designing, developing, and implementing the system. By applying the model, cost, time, 
and risk will be dramatically reduced. For this reason, the modeling process will be the 
main concern regarding information risk management in systems engineering. 
 
2-3-1. Meta Model 
 
What is the system model? How is it developed? Meta Model Architecture will 
be introduced in order to answer these questions. Meta modeling is generally described 
using a four-layer architecture. These layers represent different levels of data and 
metadata. Figure 1 shows an example of the layers used for modeling a target system. 
Figure 3: Meta Model Architecture35 
                                                 
35 Using Metamodels to Promote Data Integration in an e-Government Application Scenario, Adriana 
Figueiredo, Aqueo Kamada, IEEE, 2003, Page 4 
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The four layers are: 
 Information: The information layer refers to actual instances of information. For 
example, there are two instances of data representing “Jose” and “Milton” as teachers, 
and four instances of data representing “Nori”, “Jon”, “Mari”, and “Carn”. 
 Model: The model layer (also known as the metadata layer) defines the information 
layer, describing the format and semantics of the objects, and the relationship among 
the objects. For example, the metadata specifies the “Person” class, and its instances, 
which are “Teacher” and “Student”. Relationships between objects are defined such 
as “Teach (Teacher Æ Student)” and “Learn (Student Æ Teacher)”. 
 Metamodel: The metamodel layer (also known as the meta-metadata layer) defines 
the model layer, describing the structure and semantics of the model. For example, 
the meta-metadata specifies a system design that describes its structure and data-flow. 
The metamodel can also be thought of as a modeling language used to describe 
different kinds of systems. 
 Meta-metamodel: The meta-metamodel layer defines the metamodel layer, describing 
the structure and semantics of the meta-metadata. It is the modeling language that is 
used to define different kinds of metamodels. Typically, the metametamodel is 
defined by the system that supports the metamodeling environment. 
 
This thesis will focus on developing the M1 layer, which is a model involving 
meta-data and meta-objects to develop the system model targeting secured systems with 
information policy to prevent threats of security breach. 
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2-3-2. UML 
 
UML is the one of standard metadata models and modeling language. A wide 
variety of object-modeling methodologies were developed during the 1980s, such as 
OMT, Booch, and OOSE. Although these modeling methodologies were similar, the 
language and notations used to represent them were different. Moreover, the visual 
modeling tools that implemented these modeling methodologies were not interoperable, 
and UML quickly become standard modeling language; it lets the modeling take higher 
level of abstraction so that the model can be updated easily and re-used for other systems. 
UML is a standardized modeling language consisting of an integrated set of diagrams, 
developed to help system and software developers accomplish the following tasks36: 
¾ Specification 
¾ Visualization 
¾ Architecture design 
¾ Construction 
¾ Simulation and Testing 
¾ Documentation 
 
UML was originally developed with the idea of promoting communication and 
productivity among the developers of object-oriented systems. Currently, all of UML is 
updated for UML2.037. UML2.0 has resolved many of the shortcomings in the previous 
version UML, such as lack of diagram interchange capability, inadequate semantics 
                                                 
36 Excerpted UML 2 for Dummies, Michael Jesse Chonoles, James A. Schardt, July 2, 2003, Page 14,15 
37 UML 2.0, The Current Official Version, http://www.uml.org/#Articles  
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definition and alignment with MOF. UML2.0 has the following features38: 
¾ Improved semantics in the class diagrams  
¾ Support for large systems and business modeling  
¾ Diagram interchange capabilities  
¾ Aligned with MOF (Meta Object Facility) and MDA (Model Driven 
Architecture) 
 
UML2.0 architecture39 is as follows. 
Figure 4: UML 2.0 Architecture 
UML 2.0 will be used since this meta-language is the most extensible and compatible 
with any system. 
                                                 
38 Excerpted UML 2.0 in a Nutshell, Dan Pilone, Neil Pitman, Page 10 – 12 
39 Excerpted UML 2.0 in a Nutshell, Dan Pilone, Neil Pitman, Page 19 
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The system model development process flow using UML is presented as 
follows.  
 
 
Figure 5: Process Flow to Develop the System Model 
First, outline requirements and rules for the system to prevent security breach are 
described. Second, the system model with usage of UML is developed. UML is the most 
powerful meta-language to design a system model. The language is understandable, easy 
to handle, and re-useable for other similar system models. Finally, the system model 
should be verified. Many verification technologies have been presented recently. 
UPPALL is one of the powerful verification tools for a system. One scenario from the 
design will be selected, and it will be verified using UPPALL. Completing verification 
for the system model will not be performed since the purpose of this thesis is to introduce 
the system model development process concerning information risk management, not to 
complete the development of the system. Some sample designs and verifications of the 
particular scenario shown through this thesis will suffice. The focus here will be on 
analyzing current security breaches and risk assessment, and developing information 
policies for preventing unacceptable security breaches. Completing the system 
development will be taken into account for future work. 
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3. Risk Assessment using the Current Security Issues 
 
Risk assessment is one of the main components of the information risk 
management model. In this chapter, common risk assessment concepts will be used for 
the model, and then improved to be suited for information risk management in this thesis. 
Finally, the risk level of current security breaches will be determined and security 
breaches involving unacceptable risk will be addressed; in addition, some suggestions for 
preventing security breaches will be presented. 
 
3-1. Risk Assessment Methodology 
Figure 6: Information Risk Profile40 
How is information risk levels measured for each security breach? How is the 
risk assessed? According to the “The Executive Guide to Information Security”41, the risk 
                                                 
40 Excerpted from The Executive Guide to Information Security, Mark Egan, Symantec Press, Nov 2004, 
figure 5-1, Page 109 
41 The Executive Guide to Information Security, Mark Egan, Symantec Press, Nov 2004, Page 104 – 110 
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level is the set of assets in the organization and system, threat to the asset, and 
organization or system vulnerability. In this book, the risk level is assessed using the 
summary matrix involving a brief description of risk assessment measurements, which 
are the asset, threats, and vulnerability. The assessment is deployed for each set of the 
three risk assessment measurements. However, it is not a quantitative method; this 
method results in imprecise assessment. The method should be more quantitative and 
provide more precise assessment so as to apply the information risk model in systems 
engineering. As the figure on the previous page shows, each risk assessment 
measurement may have certain assessment value determined by the system developer and 
stakeholder; the risk is a function of assets, threats, and vulnerabilities. The threat of the 
security problem, the vulnerability involved in the system and organization, and the 
assets in the system and organization should be assessed as opposed to only described. 
The risk assessment process should be analytical since the information risk management 
must be a systematic process by which an organization identifies, reduces, and controls 
its potential risks and losses. At this point, the definition42 of each risk measurement may 
be shown in the following table. 
Threat 
The capacity and intention of an adversary to undertake actions that is detrimental to 
an organization’s interests. It cannot be controlled by the owner or user. The threat may 
be encouraged by vulnerability in an asset or discouraged by an owner’s 
countermeasures. 
Vulnerability Any weakness in an asset or countermeasure that can be exploited by an adversary or competitor to cause damage to an organization’s interests.  
Asset 
Anything of value (people, information, hardware, software, facilities, reputation, 
activities, and operations). The more critical the asset is to an organization 
accomplishing its mission, the greater the effect of its damage or destruction. 
Table 4: Terms for Risk Measurement 
                                                 
42 National Infrastructure Protection Center; Risk Management: An Essential Guide to Protecting Critical 
Assets; November 2002, Page 8 – 9 
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A new risk assessment process to suit information risk management in systems 
engineering will be shown in this thesis. Each risk assessment measurement is 
determined as follows: 
-  The asset assessment: The magnitude and effect of the potential loss in systems and 
organization 
(What is the likely effect if an identified asset when it is lost or harmed by one of the 
identified unwanted events?) 
 
-  The threat assessment: The probability of loss in systems and organization 
 (How likely is it that an adversary can and will attack those identified assets?) 
 
-  The vulnerability assessment: The magnitude of the exploitable situations.  
(What are the most likely vulnerabilities that the adversary will use to target the 
identified assets?) 
 
Developers, including systems engineers, analysts, and security managers should identify 
and evaluate the value for each risk assessment measurement. The magnitude is measured 
by verbal ratings such as high, middle, and low. The risk assessment steps are shown 
here: 
 
Step 1. Asset Assessment: 
Identify and focus confidential information involved in organization and system process. 
The assets include customer information, business and technology know-how, 
government secret information, and home security information. For each individual asset, 
identify undesirable events and the effect that the loss, damage, or destruction of that 
asset would have on the organization and system process.  
 
Step 2. Threat Assessment: 
Focus on the adversaries or events that can affect the identified assets. Common types of 
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adversaries include criminals, business competitors, hackers, and foreign intelligence 
services. Certain natural disasters and accidents are taken into account even though they 
are not intentional.  
 
Step 3. Vulnerability Assessment: 
Identify and characterize vulnerabilities related to specific assets or undesirable events. 
Look for exploitable situations created by lack of adequate security, personal behavior, 
lack of information management, maltreated privilege documents, and insufficient 
security procedures. Typical vulnerabilities include the absence of guards, poor access 
controls, lack of stringent process and software, and unscreened visitors in secure areas. 
 
Step 4. Risk Assessment: 
Combine and evaluate the former assessments in order to give a complete picture of the 
risk to an asset of confidential information in organization and system process. The risk is 
assessed in terms of how each of these ratings (high, middle, low) interacts to arrive at a 
level of risk for each asset. The terms used in the rating may be imprecise. In situations 
where more precision is desired, a numerical rating on a 1 to 10 scale can be used. The 
numerical scale is easier for systems analysts and developers to replicate and combine in 
an assessment with other scales.  
 
How each risk assessment is evaluated has already been presented. For the next 
procedure, risk level for an asset will be required. How can the risk level be assessed? For 
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this question, the DOD 43  (Department of Defense) standard definitions 44  for the 
probability that an undesired event will occur and the severity level are used since the 
definitions have been adapted for many companies; moreover, the definition is the United 
State government standard. It may be required for any government information systems. 
The definition is shown in the following table. 
Probability Level Specific Event 
A: Frequent Likely to occur frequently 
B: Probable Will occur several times 
C: Occasional Likely to occur sometime 
D: Remote Unlikely but possible to occur 
E: Improbable So unlikely it can be assumed occurrence may not be 
experienced 
Table 5: Probability Levels of an Undesired Event 
Severity Level Characteristics 
I: Catastrophic Death, system loss or severe environment damage 
II: Critical Severe injury, severe occupational illness, major system 
or environment damage 
III: Marginal Minor injury, minor occupational illness, or minor 
system or environmental damage 
IV: Negligible Less than minor injury, occupational illness, or less 
than minor system or environmental damage 
Table 6: Severity Levels of Undesired Event Consequences 
This process results in a matrix that pairs and ranks the most important assets with the 
threat scenarios most likely to occur. The risk level will be determined by the following 
matrix on the next page. 
 
 
 
                                                 
43 Department of Defense home page, http://www.defenselink.mil/  
44 Combating Terrorism Threat and Risk Assessment Can Help Prioritize and Target Program Investments, 
GAO. April 1998, Page 7 
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Severity level Probability of 
occurrence I. 
Catastrophic
II. Critical III. Marginal IV. Negligible
A. Frequent I A II A III A IV A 
B. Probable I B II B III B IV B 
C. Occasional I C II C III C IV C 
D. Remote I D II D III D IV D 
E. Improbable I E II E III E IV E 
 
Risk Level 1: Unacceptable (reduce risk through countermeasures) 
Risk Level 2: Undesirable (management decision required) 
Risk Level 3: Acceptable with review by management 
Risk Level 4: Acceptable without review 
Table 7: Risk Assessment Matrix45 
 This is the risk assessment definition of DOD widely used for many companies. 
The definition should be modified to suit the information risk assessment. The probability 
of occurrence is useful for the information risk assessment as well. However, the 
definition of severity level should be modified as follows since the information risk 
assessment deals only with the information risk such as leaking confidential information 
and privilege documents, and misuse of technical know-how and home security 
information.  
Security Level Characteristics 
I: Catastrophic Enormous number of secret information, severe 
potential to misuse and result in severe environment 
damage 
II: Critical Secret information for particular area and fields, high 
potential to misuse for only limited area, major system 
or environment damage 
III: Marginal Confidential information, low potential to misuse, mi 
minor system or environmental damage 
IV: Negligible Less than minor and unclassified information injury, 
less than minor system or environmental damage 
Table 8: Security Levels of Undesired Event for an Asset in Information Risk Assessment 
                                                 
45 Combating Terrorism Threat and Risk Assessment Can Help Prioritize and Target Program Investments, 
GAO. April 1998, Page 8 
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To asset information risk management, security level will be used instead of severity 
level. The risk assessment matrix can be used for the information risk assessment since it 
has been accepted by many companies; moreover, the matrix is still useful for the 
information risk assessment. 
 
 The probability of the unwanted event occurrence clearly increases with 
increasing threat and increasing vulnerability. In this thesis, the simple formula for the 
probability over a given time interval is: 
Threat * Vulnerability 
Each assessment measurement of the threat and vulnerability is shown by a numerical 
rating (1 to 10). The threat and vulnerability rating will be shown in the section of each 
assessment. The following matrix is used to determine the probability of the unwanted 
event occurrence with the numerical rating. 
The probability of 
occurrence 
Numerical rating for threat 
and vulnerability 
A. Frequent 81 or more 
B. Probable 61 – 80 
C. Occasional 41 – 60 
D. Remote 21 – 40 
E. Improbable 20 or less 
Table 9: Rating for the Probability of Occurrence 
A security level rating corresponds to an asset raging for the confidential information in 
organization and system process based on the following matrix. 
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Security Level Numerical rating for asset 
I: Catastrophic 10 
II: Critical 7 – 9 
III: Marginal 4 – 6 
IV: Negligible 1 – 3 
Table 10: Rating for the Security Level 
Step 5. Identification of Countermeasure Options: 
Provide the risk acceptance authority with countermeasures, or group of countermeasures, 
which will lower the overall risk to the asset at an acceptable level. By evaluating the 
effectiveness of possible countermeasures against specific adversaries, the systems 
engineer can determine the most cost-effective options. In presenting countermeasures to 
the risk acceptance authority, the systems engineer or security analyst should provide at 
least two countermeasure packages as options. Each option should also include the 
expected costs and amount of risk that the decision-maker would accept by selecting a 
particular option. The graphical representation for the information risk assessment is 
shown as follows. 
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Figure 7: Structure of Workflow for Information Policy Setting 
In this report, information policy will be used for the security requirement of the case 
study. The information policy will be formatted based on assessment of asset, threat, and 
vulnerability in the organization and system process regarding confidential information. 
Many information policies can be created. However, only information policies relating to 
the system development will be focused in this thesis. The information policies relating to 
the organization will not be the focus of this thesis since the information policy for the 
system is the main target of this thesis. 
 
 
3-2. Security Risk Assessment 
 
To acquire crucial security requirements, 20 security breaches involving 
information risk for the last 3 years are assessed using the aforementioned risk 
Information Risk Assessment
Asset Assessment Threat Assessment Vulnerability Assessment
Information Risk Assessment Matrix
Countermeasure options
Information Policy
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assessment methodology. A summary of the 20 selected recent security breaches is shown 
in Appendix 146. All the security breaches are related to the leaking and misuse of 
confidential information issues.  
 
Security breach problems are picked up from the news, information technology 
security issues, and governmental sites on the Internet. Security breach problems can be 
categorized by main threats and the magnitude of information asset. The main threats are 
outsider, insider, and unintentional misuse. The magnitudes are caution level, limited 
level (leak of less than 5,000 customers’ information), medium level (leak of 5,000 – 
50,000 customers’ information, and large level (leak of more than 50,000 customers’ 
information). Two security breach problems are deployed in the main threat type and 
magnitude of information asset as follow. 
 
Table 11: Category Table for Security Breaches 
Caution Level: A precaution for information loss.  
Limited Level: Involves only information risk in limited businesses and local areas. 
Medium Level: Involves medium scale information risk in higher populated areas or 
cities. 
Large Level: Involves large-scale information risk in nations or worldwide.  
 
                                                 
46 Summary of the 20 selected recent security breach, Annex 1 (Summary Security Prob) ver 2.0.doc 
Possible Limited or Medium or Large or
Caution less 5,000 5,000 - 50,000 more 50,000
Outsider [SB-04], [SB-15] [SB-12], [SB-14] [SB-02], [SB-03] [SB-06], [SB-11]*, [SB-16]
Insider --- [SB-01], [SB-08] [SB-07], [SB-10] [SB-11]*, [SB-13], [SB-20]
Unintentional or design fault [SB-05], [SB-09] [SB-17], [SB-18] [SB-19] ---
*[SB-11] caused with both of outsider and insider
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There is no caution level of security breach by insiders; furthermore, large-scale 
information risk does not occur unintentionally. A large-scale information risk occurs by 
only an intentional insider or outsider attacks. 
 
Each assessment measurement is represented by the numerical value 1 to 10. The 
rating method may vary among different companies. It is based on discipline, historic 
data, and security managers’ or stakeholders’ decisions. In this report, a sample rating 
method is shown for each assessment section. The higher numbers are more necessary as 
security requirements.  
Table 12: Each Assessment Rating 
Asset Assessment 
The asset assessment is followed through the steps presented in the previous 
section. A rating for asset assessment utilizes the aforementioned magnitude of 
information assets. The asset assessment is shown in the following table. Limited, 
medium, and large level will be low, medium, and high or severe rating. Caution level 
rating cannot be identified since its security breach does not occur. The rating may be 
limited, medium or large. 
 
 
 
 
Severe
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Low Medium High
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Case No. Day Location Assets Undesirable events Assess.
[SB-1] Boeing 
Co. privileged 
documents 
Jun, 2004 Boeing Co. 
USA 
- Company 
credit, 
reputation 
 
- Loss of confidence with government 
contracts due to unfair act to the 
competition. 
- Occurrence of moral hazard in the 
company due to neglecting market rule. 
Low 
3 
[SB-2] Hacker 
penetrates 
T-mobile systems 
Jan, 2005 T-mobile 
systems, 
USA 
- Customer 
Data 
 
- Loss of confidentiality due to 
unauthorized outsider access 
- Loss of existing customers due to 
unsecured server control 
Medium
6 
[SB-3] Hacker 
posts credit card 
information 
Dec, 
1999 
eUniverse 
Inc., USA 
- Customer 
Data 
 
- Loss of confidentiality due to 
unauthorized outsider access 
- Loss of existing customers due to 
unsecured server control 
Medium
6 
[SB-4] Identity 
Thieves can lurk 
at Wi-Fi spots 
Feb, 2005 Hotspot, 
USA 
- Customer 
itself 
 
- Loss of confidentiality due to 
unauthorized outsider access 
- Loss of market confidentiality due to 
unsecured wireless connection 
N/A 
[SB-5] Intuit 
plugs leaks to 
double click 
Mar, 
2000 
Web sites, 
USA 
- Private 
information in 
cookies 
 
- Loss of confidentiality due to poor 
design of web site. N/A 
[SB-6] More than 
145,000 people 
face identity theft 
threat 
Feb, 2005 Los Angeles, 
USA 
- Personal 
Information 
 
- Loss of personal asset and private 
information due to unawareness High 
8 
[SB-07] Leaked 
24,632 
customers’ 
information 
Feb, 2005 NTT 
Docomo, 
Japan 
- Customer 
Data 
 
- Loss of confidentiality due to 
unauthorized insider access 
- Loss of existing customer due to poor 
control in secured room 
Medium
6 
[SB-08] 
Raytheon 
Company 
published 
employment 
policy 
Feb, 1999 Raytheon, 
USA 
- Privileged 
Information 
 
- Loss of confidentiality due to spread 
of the company’s bad reputation 
- Deterioration of ability to compete due 
to leak of company’s secret information 
Low 
2 
[SB-9] Security 
Breach at 
Buy.com 
Oct, 2000 Buy.com, 
USA 
- Customer 
Data 
 
- Loss of confidentiality due to poor 
web design N/A 
[SB-10] Medical 
privacy breach in 
Univ. Michigan 
medical system 
Feb, 1999 Detroit, USA- Customer 
Data 
 
- Loss of confidentiality due to 
unauthorized insider access 
- Loss of existing customers due to poor 
database server control 
Medium
6 
[SB-11] Leaked 
over 100,0000 
customers’ 
information of 
the store in 
Rakuten Internet 
market. 
April, 
2005 
Mainichi 
News in 
Japan 
- Customer 
Data 
- Virtual store 
tenant 
information 
- Loss of confidentiality due to 
ex-employee insider access and moral 
hazard 
- Loss of existing customers (buyers). 
Resulted in loss of virtual store tenants. 
Severe
10 
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[SB-12] Leaked 
the nuclear plant 
security 
information 
through “Winiy” 
in the Internet. 
February, 
2005 
Mainichi 
News in 
Japan 
- Privileged 
documents 
(published 
information) 
- Loss of home security information 
- Information could be utilized by 
terrorists (However, all documents are 
published through other media already 
and are not secret documents) 
Low 
3 
[SB-13] Lost a 
computer 
back-up tape 
holding 200,000 
clients’ account 
data of Bank of 
America. 
March 3, 
2005 
Enterprise IT 
Plante.Com
- Customer 
Account data.
- Computer 
back up data 
- Loss of confidentiality due to 
ex-employee insider access and moral 
hazard 
- Loss of bank clients 
- Decrease of bank client deposit 
Severe
10 
[SB-14] Leaked 
5,000 personnel 
student 
information in an 
elementary 
school in 
Shizuoka, Japan 
April 21, 
2005 
IT 
Hoken.Com
- Student 
information 
 
- It could be used to commit crimes 
involving children 
- It could be exploited by a vice trader Low 
3 
[SB-15] Stolen 
documents with 
personnel 
information from 
a business car of 
water works in 
Kanagawa, Japan 
August 
16, 2005 
IT 
Hoken.Com
- Waterworks 
information 
- Resident 
information 
- Loss of confidentiality due to 
employee carelessness 
- It could be exploited by a vice trader 
- It could be exploited by a thief N/A 
[SB-16] Leaked 
61,876 members’ 
information in 
sophisticated 
hacker attack on 
Adecco web site. 
June 27, 
2005 
IT 
Hoken.Com
- Member 
information 
 
- Loss of confidentiality due to poorly 
designed web server, resulting in 
decreased number of registered 
members 
- It could be exploited for commercial 
use by a vice trader 
- Spam mail could be sent to members 
High 
7 
[SB-17] Kitaguni 
bank accidentally 
issued other 
customers’ 
detailed account 
statement on 
ATM 
August 4, 
2005 
IT 
Hoken.Com
- Bank 
account 
information 
- Loss of confidentiality due to poor 
program implementation 
- It could be exploited by a thief Low 
2 
[SB-18] Nagoya 
Toyota car 
dealership lost 
138 personnel 
and 67 enterprise 
customers’ list. 
June 6, 
2005 
IT 
Hoken.Com
- Customer list - It could be exploited by a vice trader 
- It could be exploited by a rival shop 
Low 
2 
[SB-19] Leaked 
member 
information by 
e-mail operation 
error 
July 9, 
2004 
IT 
Hoken.Com,
- Member 
information 
- It could be exploited by a vice trader 
Medium
4 
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SB-20] Softbank 
leak extortionist 
was caught but 
not imprisoned 
July 10, 
2004 
The Japan 
Times 
Customer 
account 
information 
- Loss of confidentiality due to 
ex-employee insider access and moral 
hazard 
- Loss of existing customers due to poor 
customer information control 
- It could be exploited by a vice trader 
High 
9 
Table 13: Asset Assessment Worksheet 
Threat Assessment 
For the next step, the threat assessment is shown as follows. The threat is 
considered in terms of adversaries. It must be determined if an adversary has the intent 
and capability to cause an unwanted event, and its history of successful attacks against 
the assets also must be reviewed in order to assess whether the adversary poses a threat. A 
higher rating for threat assessment should be delivered to a major adversary, an ultimately 
tricky attack, or an easier target in a current information security affair. The weight of 
these factors will be determined based on a survey of information leak problems 
published on the IT Hoken.com47. The followings are rules for weighing factors. 
 
 Weight is determined by a frequency of item in a factor.  
 Weight range is 1 to 10. Max weight is delivered if the same item causes all 
cases. 
 “Other” item weight is 1 since this item is not significant. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
47 Hoken.com homepage, http://www.it-hoken.com/cat_aeieoieioeie.html   
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For instance, adversary weight has three items: insider, outsider, and 
unintentional misuse. The frequency of insider in a factor is 149. The weight for this item 
is determined by the following equation. 
 
 Adversary Weight (Insider) =  
Frequency of insider (149)*9 / Total number of cases (289) + 1 = 5.6 
 
Using the same formula, outsider weight will be 3.5 and unintentional misuse weight will 
be 2.9. A weight for other factors is also determined with the same fashion. Thus, the 
weight for all items of three factors is shown in the rating table on the following page. 
The overall rating for threats is calculated by the weights of the three items. The 
following equation may be suitable to determine the overall rating. The rating range must 
be 1 to 10. 
 
Threat Rating =  
Adversary Weight * Trick Weight * Target Weight * 10 / Max Total 
Weight (36.9) 
 
The threat rating of each security breach problem is determined using the rating table. 
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Table 14: Rating Table for Threat Assessment 
Threat rating with an insider (adversary), usage of memory device (trick), and a bank 
(target) is 9 (5.6*2.8*2.2*10 / 36.9). The threat rating of each security breach is as 
follows. 
 
Case No. Undesirable events Adversary Intent Capability History Threat 
[SB-1] 
- Loss of confidence with government 
contracts due to unfair act to the 
competition. 
- Occurrence of moral hazard in the 
company due to neglecting market rule. 
Employee Yes Yes Infrequent Medium4 
[SB-2] 
- Loss of confidentiality due to 
unauthorized outsider access 
- Loss of existing customers due to 
unsecured server control 
Outsider Yes Yes Infrequent Medium4 
Adversary Trick
Item # of Case Weight Item # of Case Weight
Insider 149 5.6 Memory device 59 2.8
Outsider 80 3.5 Web site 52 2.6
Unintentional 60 2.9 Documents 48 2.5
Total 289 Wrong Operation 32 2.0
Stolen device 25 1.8
Stolen computer 21 1.7
System Error 19 1.6
Target Malicious program 15 1.5
Item # of Case Weight System Implementation 14 1.4
Credit 42 2.3 Others 4 1.0
Bank 38 2.2 Total 289
Online service 35 2.1
Communication 35 2.1 36.9
Government agency 22 1.7
Medical Institution 20 1.6
Lifeline 20 1.6 Total Weight = Adversary weight*Trick weight*Target weight
School 17 1.5 Rating = Total Weight * 10 / Max Total Weight
Travel agency 15 1.5
Brokerage firm 13 1.4
Insurance 13 1.4
Car shop 9 1.3
Department Store 4 1.1
Others 6 1.0
Total 289
*Information Leaking Problems List, IT Hoken.com, http://www.it-hoken.com/cat_aeieoieioeie.html
9
Max Total Weight
Rating
(Insider / Memory device / Bank)
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[SB-3] 
- Loss of confidentiality due to 
unauthorized outsider access 
- Loss of existing customers due to 
unsecured server control 
Outsider Yes Yes Infrequent Medium6 
[SB-4] 
- Loss of confidentiality due to 
unauthorized outsider access 
- Loss of market confidentiality due to 
unsecured wireless connection 
Thief / 
Outsider Yes Yes No 
Medium
4 
[SB-5] 
- Loss of confidentiality due to poor design 
of web site. Poor design web site / 
Advertise
No Yes No Low 3 
[SB-6] 
- Loss of personal asset and private 
information due to unawareness 
Fraudulent 
web site Yes No Intermittent 
Medium
6 
[SB-7] 
- Loss of confidentiality due to 
unauthorized insider access 
- Loss of existing customer due to poor 
control in secured room 
Contract 
Employee Yes Yes Infrequent 
High 
9 
[SB-8] 
- Loss of confidentiality due to spread of the 
company’s bad reputation 
- Deterioration of ability to compete due to 
leak of company’s secret information 
Employee No No Intermittent Low 2 
[SB-9] 
- Loss of confidentiality due to poor web 
design 
Unchecked 
database 
design 
No Yes Infrequent Low 3 
[SB-10] 
- Loss of confidentiality due to 
unauthorized insider access 
- Loss of existing customers due to poor 
database server control 
Insider Yes Yes Infrequent Medium5 
[SB-11] 
- Loss of confidentiality due to ex-employee 
insider access and moral hazard 
- Loss of existing customers (buyers). 
Resulted in loss of virtual store tenants. 
Ex-employee Yes Yes Infrequent High 8 
[SB-12] 
- Loss of home security information 
- Information could be utilized by terrorists 
(However, all documents are published 
through other media already and are not 
secret documents) 
Employee No Yes Infrequent Medium4 
[SB-13] 
- Loss of confidentiality due to ex-employee 
insider access and moral hazard 
- Loss of bank clients 
- Decrease of bank client deposit 
Outsider or 
Insider Yes Yes Infrequent 
Medium
6 
[SB-14] 
- It could be used to commit crimes 
involving children 
- It could be exploited by a vice trader 
Outsider Yes No Infrequent Low 2 
[SB-15] 
- Loss of confidentiality due to employee 
carelessness 
- It could be exploited by a vice trader 
- It could be exploited by a thief 
Thief Yes No Infrequent Medium4 
[SB-16] 
- Loss of confidentiality due to poorly
designed web server, resulting in decreased
number of registered members 
- It could be exploited for commercial use
by a vice trader 
- Spam mail could be sent to members 
Outsider Yes Yes Infrequent Medium6 
[SB-17] 
- Loss of confidentiality due to poor 
program implementation 
- It could be exploited by a thief 
Poor 
implementati No Yes Infrequent 
Low 
3 
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on 
[SB-18] 
- It could be exploited by a vice trader 
- It could be exploited by a rival shop Thief Yes No Infrequent Low 3 
[SB-19] 
- It could be exploited by a vice trader Poor 
operation No No Infrequent 
Low 
2 
[SB-20] 
- Loss of confidentiality due to ex-employee 
insider access and moral hazard 
- Loss of existing customers due to poor 
customer information control 
- It could be exploited by a vice trader 
Ex-employee Yes Yes Infrequent High 8 
Table 15: Threat Assessment Worksheet 
The security problems [SB-07], [SB-11] and [SB-20] involve greater threats than others 
since it is due to malicious insiders, which have recently become the highest threat. In 
Japan, 80% of information leak problems are caused by an insider such as ex-employee, 
outsourcing, and entrusted trader48. 
 
For the next step, the vulnerability assessment is shown as follows. Vulnerability 
is a weakness in the system. To determine its rating is difficult since the rating requires 
detailed information and analysis for a target system, which are not provided in articles 
and the news. In this report, the rating will be determined as follows. It is defined that a 
vulnerability rating is dependent on how much existing countermeasures in a security 
breach problem satisfies the 10 suggestions in section 3.3. The vulnerability rating is 
increased by 1 for an incomplete suggestion. For example, in the case of [SB-17], 3 
suggestions are not considered properly; thus, a vulnerability rating of this case will be 
3.0. Other ratings of security breaches before revision are shown in a table on the next 
page. A maximum and minimum rating is 7.5 and 1.5 before the revision. It is desirable 
                                                 
48 Inner Guard Master, IGM homepage, http://innerguardmaster.jp/ 
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that the rating is converted into 1 to 10 using the convert table shown as follows. As a 
result, a 1 to 10 rating will be assigned to the security breach problems. 
Table 16: Rating Table for Vulnerability Assessment 
Certain existing countermeasures are obtained as available in the following table.  
Case No. Undesirable events Vulnerabilities Existing Countermeasures Vul. 
[SB-1] 
- Loss of confidence with 
government contracts due 
to unfair act to the 
competition. 
- Occurrence of moral 
hazard in the company due 
to neglecting market rule. 
- No penalty regulation against 
competition rule 
- High competition 
- Low employee moral 
- None 
Medium
4 
[SB-01] △ △ × × × 4.0
[SB-02] △ × × × △ 4.0
[SB-03] △ △ × × △ × 4.5
[SB-04] △ × × 2.5
[SB-05] △ × △ 2.0
[SB-06] △ × × × 3.5
[SB-07] × × × × × × × △ 7.5
[SB-08] × × 2.0
[SB-09] × × 2.0
[SB-10] △ △ × × × × × × 7.0
[SB-11] △ × × × × × × × 7.5
[SB-12] × △ 1.5
[SB-13] △ × × 2.5
[SB-14] × × × △ 3.5
[SB-15] × × 2.0
[SB-16] × × × × × × × 7.0
[SB-17] × × × 3.0
[SB-18] × × 2.0
[SB-19] △ × 1.5
[SB-20] × × × × × × × 7.0
×: 1 up into vulnerability rating
△: 0.5 up into vulnerability rating
Convert Table for 1 to 10 rating Interval for revision: 0.67 = (7.5 - 1.5) / (10 - 1)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1.5 - 2.17 - 2.83 - 3.5 - 4.17 - 4.83 - 5.5 - 6.17 - 6.83 - 7.50
10: Inspect docum
ents leaving
the prem
ises Rating
before
revision
1 to 10 rating
Rating before revision
6: A
ccountability
7: Putting the above points to
use in design phase
8: A
w
areness of users,
em
ployees, and organizations
9: C
reate penalties that
overw
eight the hacker’s
benefits
2: A
pply econom
y m
echanism
3: C
onsider storage device
4: Separation of Inform
ation
Privilege
5: Least Privilege
1: C
orrect identification and
access control
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[SB-2] 
- Loss of confidentiality 
due to unauthorized 
outsider access 
- Loss of existing customers
due to unsecured server 
control 
- Absence of security for U.S. 
secret service e-mail 
- The e-mail contained too much 
private information 
- Low consideration of the 
importance of customer 
information 
- Standard secured system 
(sys.) 
Medium
4 
[SB-3] 
- Loss of confidentiality 
due to unauthorized 
outsider access 
- Loss of existing customers
due to unsecured server 
control 
- Absence of security for 
CDUniverse web server 
- Standard secured system 
(sys.) 
Medium
5 
[SB-4] 
- Loss of confidentiality 
due to unauthorized 
outsider access 
- Loss of market 
confidentiality due to 
unsecured wireless 
connection 
- Wireless connection caused 
lower security 
- Absence of customer literacy 
regarding internet security 
- Access permitted by user 
name and password (sys.) 
Low
2 
[SB-5] 
- Loss of confidentiality 
due to poor design of web 
site. 
- Poor website design 
- Absence of proper web design 
technique in terms of security 
weakness 
- There are no criteria for 
developing any website obtained 
advertisements. 
- Some warnings regarding 
the problems are available 
on the internet. (org.) 
- Some web site developers 
aid in finding the problem. 
(org.) 
Low
1 
[SB-6] 
- Loss of personal asset and 
private information due to 
unawareness 
- Absence of internet user 
literacy regarding internet 
security 
- Unclear use of users’ 
information for the internet user
- Some warnings regarding 
use of user information 
provided may be available 
but not emphasized (org. & 
sys.) 
Medium
4 
[SB-7] 
- Loss of confidentiality 
due to unauthorized insider 
access 
- Loss of existing customer 
due to poor control in 
secured room 
- Poor access control 
- Lack of stringent system 
review 
- Lack of analysis of access logs
- Screened visitors in secure 
areas (sys.) 
- Standard secured system 
(sys.) 
Severe
10 
[SB-8] 
- Loss of confidentiality 
due to spread of the 
company’s bad reputation 
- Deterioration of ability to 
compete due to leak of 
company’s secret 
information 
- No penalty regulation against 
the act  
- Low employee moral 
- Low royalty for the 
organization 
None 
Low
1 
[SB-9] 
- Loss of confidentiality 
due to poor web design 
- Poor web design 
- Lack of stringent service 
contract review 
None 
Low
1 
[SB-10] 
- Loss of confidentiality 
due to unauthorized insider 
access 
- Loss of existing customers
due to poor database server 
control 
- Unscreened visitors in secure 
areas 
- Poor access control 
- Poor password control 
- Absence of employee literacy 
for computer security 
- Access permitted by 
username and password 
(sys.) High
9 
[SB-11] 
- Loss of confidentiality 
due to ex-employee insider 
access and moral hazard 
- Loss of existing customers
- Lack of stringent system 
review 
- Low employee moral 
- Access permitted by 
username and password 
(sys.) 
Severe
10 
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(buyers). Resulted in loss of 
virtual store tenants. 
- Poor employee information 
access control 
- Lack of concern for the 
importance of customer 
information 
- Lack of analysis of access logs
[SB-12] 
- Loss of home security 
information 
- Information could be 
utilized by terrorists 
(However, all documents 
are published through other 
media already and are not 
secret documents) 
- Lack of employee awareness 
- Lack of employee information 
and computer literacy 
 
- None 
Low
1 
[SB-13] 
- Loss of confidentiality 
due to ex-employee insider 
access and moral hazard 
- Loss of bank clients 
- Decrease of bank client 
deposit 
- Poor back up data control 
- Lack of stringent system 
review 
- Poor stored data access control 
in the system 
- Encrypted back up data 
(sys.) 
- Required access code for 
the back data (sys.) 
Low
2 
[SB-14] 
- It could be used to commit 
crimes involving children 
- It could be exploited by a 
vice trader 
- Poor control of computer 
disposal 
- Lack of knowledge about 
computers 
- None 
Medium
4 
[SB-15] 
- Loss of confidentiality 
due to employee 
carelessness 
- It could be exploited by a 
vice trader 
- It could be exploited by a 
thief 
- Lack of awareness of 
employees 
- None 
Low
1 
[SB-16] 
- Loss of confidentiality
due to poorly designed web 
server, resulting in
decreased number of
registered members 
- It could be exploited for
commercial use by a vice
trader 
- Spam mail could be sent
to members 
- Poor web system design 
- Poor access control 
- Lack of stringent system 
review 
- Lack of analysis of access logs
- Lack of awareness of 
employees 
- Privileged information 
(sys.) 
- Access permitted by 
username and password 
(sys.) 
 
Severe
10 
[SB-17] 
- Loss of confidentiality 
due to poor program 
implementation 
- It could be exploited by a 
thief 
- Poor program implementation
 
- None 
Low
3 
[SB-18] 
- It could be exploited by a 
vice trader 
- It could be exploited by a 
rival shop 
- Lack of awareness of 
employees 
- Poorly controlled privileged 
documents 
- None 
Low
1 
[SB-19] 
- It could be exploited by a 
vice trader 
- Lack of employee information 
and computer literacy 
- Lack of awareness of 
employees 
- None 
Low
1 
[SB-20] 
- Loss of confidentiality 
due to ex-employee insider 
access and moral hazard 
- Loss of existing customers
due to poor customer 
information control 
- Lack of stringent system 
review 
- Low employee moral 
- Poor employee information 
access control 
- Access permitted by 
username and password 
(sys.) High
9 
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- It could be exploited by a 
vice trader 
- Lack of concern for the 
importance of customer 
information 
- Lack of analysis of access logs
Table 17: Vulnerability Assessment Worksheet 
Higher vulnerability is caused by poor access control, poor web service design, low user 
literacy regarding Internet security, lack of analysis of event log and lack of documents 
privilege. 
 
For the final step, the previous assessments are assembled so as to determine the 
risk for each security problem with the use of the abovementioned matrix49. The 
information risk assessment is as follows. 
Case 
No. Undesirable events Asset Threat Vulnerability Countermeasure options
50 Risk
Low 
3 
Medium
4 
Medium
4 
[SB-1] 
- Loss of confidence 
with government 
contracts due to unfair 
act to the competition. 
- Occurrence of moral 
hazard in the company 
due to neglecting 
market rule. 
Negligible Improbable 16 
- Enforced agreement in order to 
have fair business competition 
(org.) 
- Create a penalty that outweighs 
the benefit of the documents 
(org.) 
- Raised employee business moral
(org.) 
Risk 
Level
4 
Medium
6 
Medium
4 
Medium
4 
[SB-2] 
- Loss of confidentiality 
due to unauthorized 
outsider access 
- Loss of existing 
customers due to 
unsecured server 
control 
Marginal Improbable 16 
- Improve accountability in order 
to trace any hacker’s action (sys.)
- Tightly constrain user privileges
(sys.) 
- Inform the customers of any 
accident (org.) 
Risk 
Level
3 
[SB-3] 
- Loss of confidentiality 
due to unauthorized 
outsider access 
- Loss of existing 
customers due to
Medium
6 
Medium
6 
Medium
5 
- Improve accountability in order 
to trace any hacker’s action (sys.)
- Tightly constrain user privileges
(sys.) 
Risk 
Level
3 
                                                 
49 Table 4: Risk Assessment Matrix, Page 16 in this text. 
50 “(sys.)” means a countermeasure for systems, and “(org.)” means a countermeasure for organization or 
employees. 
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 customers due to 
unsecured server 
control Marginal
Remote 
30 
- Inform the customers of any 
accident (org.) 
- Regulate higher penalty than 
hacking benefit (org.) 
 
N/A Medium4 
Low 
2 
[SB-4] 
- Loss of confidentiality 
due to unauthorized 
outsider access 
- Loss of market 
confidentiality due to 
unsecured wireless 
connection  
Improbable  
8 
- Warning to input credit card 
number, its password and any 
private information through the 
wireless access (org.) 
- Encrypt any transaction (sys.) 
- Do not keep access connection 
while not in use (org.) 
Risk 
Level
3 or 4
N/A Low 3  
Low 
1 
[SB-5] 
- Loss of confidentiality 
due to poor design of 
web site. 
 Improbable 3 
- Any web designer must 
understand how to prevent this 
problem (org.) 
- Web browser or web developer 
aid software should obtain 
something to fix the problem 
automatically (sys.) 
Risk 
Level
3 or 4
High 
8 
Medium
6 
Medium
4 
[SB-6] 
- Loss of personal asset 
and private information 
due to unawareness 
Critical Remote 24 
- Awareness. Users should know 
how personnel information is 
used correctly. (org.) 
- Certain internet security 
inspection is required in order to 
censor illegal web sites. (sys.) 
Risk 
Level
2 
Medium
6 
High 
9 
Severe 
10 
[SB-07] 
- Loss of confidentiality 
due to unauthorized 
insider access 
- Loss of existing 
customer due to poor 
control in secured room 
Marginal Frequent 90 
- Censor not only contents but 
also the amount (sys.) 
- Check out any media brought 
out from secured area. (sys. & 
org.) 
- Create a penalty that outweighs 
the benefit of secret information. 
(org.) 
Risk 
Level
1 
Low 
2 
Low 
2 
Low 
1 
[SB-08] 
- Loss of confidentiality 
due to spread of the 
company’s bad 
reputation 
- Deterioration of 
ability to compete due 
to leak of company’s 
secret information 
Negligible Improbable 2 
- Awareness of its confidential 
organization information (org.) 
- Obligate certain penalty for the 
act (org.) 
Risk 
Level
4 
N/A Low 3 
Low 
1 
[SB-9] 
- Loss of confidentiality 
due to poor web design 
N/A Improbable 3 
- Design customer service strictly 
and properly (sys.) 
- Classify confidential and 
non-confidential user information 
(sys.) 
Risk 
Level
3 or 4
[SB-10] 
- Loss of confidentiality 
due to unauthorized 
insider access 
- Loss of existing 
customers due to poor 
database server control 
Medium
6 
Medium
5 
High 
9 
- Improve accountability in order 
to trace any insider hacker’s 
action (sys.) 
- Censor not only contents but 
also the amount (sys.) 
Create secure room (sys & org )
Risk 
Level
2 
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Marginal Occasional 45 
- Create secure room (sys. & org.)
- Review any access control to 
confidential and non-confidential 
information (sys. & org.) 
- Create a penalty that outweighs 
the benefit of obtaining customer 
information (org.) 
 
Severe 
10 
High 
8 
Severe 
10 
[SB-11] 
- Loss of confidentiality 
due to ex-employee 
insider access and 
moral hazard 
- Loss of existing 
customers (buyers). 
Resulted in loss of 
virtual store tenants. Catastrophic Probable 80 
- Censor not only contents but 
also the amount (sys.) 
- Create a penalty that outweighs 
the benefit of obtaining customer 
information (org.) 
- Create certain secure room (sys. 
& org.) 
- Improve accountability in order 
to trace any insider hacker’s 
actions (sys.) 
Risk 
Level
1 
Low 
3 
Medium
4 
Low 
1 
[SB-12] 
- Loss of home security 
information 
- Information could be 
utilized by terrorists 
(However, all 
documents are 
published through other 
media already and are 
not secret documents) 
Negligible Improbable 4 
- Review any access control to 
confidential and non-confidential 
information (sys. & org.) 
- Inspection of any documents 
which are removed from 
government office (org.) 
- Provide exclusive computer to 
use outside of office (sys. & org.)
Risk 
Level
4 
Severe 
10 
Medium
6 
Low 
2 
[SB-13] 
- Loss of confidentiality 
due to ex-employee 
insider access and 
moral hazard 
- Loss of bank clients 
- Decrease of bank 
client deposit 
Catastrophic Improbable 12 
- Review any access control to 
privileged data including back up 
data (sys. & org.) 
- Inspection of any documents 
which are removed from the 
company (org.) 
- Use exclusive computer and 
authentication with biometric 
information (sys. & org.) 
Risk 
Level
3 
Low 
3 
Low 
2 
Medium
4 
[SB-14] 
- It could be used to 
commit crimes 
involving children 
- It could be exploited 
by a vice trader Negligible Improbable 8 
- Awareness of its confidential 
organization information (org.) 
- Review computer disposal 
process 
- Provide exclusive computer 
without store device 
Risk 
Level
4 
N/A Medium4 
Low 
1 
[SB-15] 
- Loss of confidentiality 
due to employee 
carelessness 
- It could be exploited 
by a vice trader 
- It could be exploited 
by a thief 
 Improbable 4 
- Awareness of its confidential 
organization information (org.) 
 Risk 
Level
3 or 4
[SB-16] 
- Loss of confidentiality 
due to poorly designed 
web server, resulting in 
High 
7 
Medium
6 
Severe 
10 
- Censor not only contents but 
also the amount (sys.) Risk Level
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 decreased number of 
registered members 
- It could be exploited 
for commercial use by a 
vice trader 
- Spam mail could be 
sent to members 
Critical Occasional 60 
- Create a penalty that outweighs 
the benefit of obtaining customer 
information (org.) 
- Tightly constrain user privileges
(sys.) 
- Improve accountability in order 
to trace any insider hacker’s 
actions (sys.) 
1 
Low 
2 
Low 
3 
Low 
3 
[SB-17] 
- Loss of confidentiality 
due to poor program 
implementation 
- It could be exploited 
by a thief Negligible Improbable 9 
- Provide sufficient 
implementation effort and time 
(sys. & org.) 
Risk 
Level
4 
Low 
2 
Low 
3 
Low 
1 
[SB-18] 
- It could be exploited 
by a vice trader 
- It could be exploited 
by a rival shop 
Negligible Improbable 3 
- Awareness of its confidential 
organization information (org.) 
- Review control of confidential 
information in a business process 
(sys. & org.) 
Risk 
Level
4 
Medium
4 
Low 
2 
Low 
1 
[SB-19] 
- It could be exploited 
by a vice trader 
Marginal Improbable 2 
- Awareness of its confidential 
organization information (org.) Risk 
Level
3 
High 
9 
High 
8 
High 
9 
[SB-20] 
- Loss of confidentiality 
due to ex-employee 
insider access and 
moral hazard 
- Loss of existing 
customers due to poor 
customer information 
control 
- It could be exploited 
by a vice trader 
Critical Probable 72 
- Improve accountability in order 
to trace any insider hacker’s 
action (sys.) 
- Censor not only contents but 
also the amount (sys.) 
- Create secure room (sys. & org.)
- Review any access control to 
confidential and non-confidential 
information (sys. & org.) 
- Create a penalty that outweighs 
the benefit of obtaining customer 
information (org.) 
Risk 
Level
1 
Table 18: Risk Assessment and Countermeasure Options Worksheet 
 
[SB-7], [SB-11], [SB-16], and [SB-20] involve unacceptable risks. The targets of the 
information policy are sophisticated insiders, fraudulent web sites, employees and users. 
The following are graphical representations of risk assessment for security breaches. 
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Figure 8: Graphical Representative of Probability of Risk Occurrence 
The risk exposure is determined with multiplication of threat and vulnerability. [SB-07] 
security breach is the highest probability of risk exposure since it involves the highest 
security threat among security breaches and its vulnerability is too high to prevent 
security threats. It is required to review the target system of [SB-07].  
Figure 9: Graphical Representative of Information Asset 
Information assets of [SB-04], [SB-05], [SB-09], and [SB-15] are not identified. The 
information assets have a possible range from 1 to 10 information asset levels. 
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Figure 10: Graphical Representative for Risk Level 
The risk level of each security breach problem is presented in the above figure. Some 
information assets whose assessments are not identified have a possible risk level range 3 
to 4. These security breaches will never reach to risk level 1 or 2, so the security breaches 
are negligible. As the above figure shows, only [SB-07], [SB-11], [SB-16], and [SB-20] 
are necessary to prevent. Two countermeasures for systems will be focused on since this 
thesis deals with the methodology in developing systems. Therefore, the following 
countermeasures will be considered to create information policy to reduce the risk of the 
problems [SB-7], [SB-11], [SB-16], and [SB-20]. 
 
 Countermeasure 1: Censor not only content but also its amount 
 Countermeasure 2: Improve accountability in order to trace any insider hacker’s 
actions 
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3-3. Suggestions for Preventing Security Breach  
 
Based on the risk assessment presented in the previous section, the following 
suggestions to prevent security breaches are derived to determine information policy51 as 
follows. 
 
1: Correct identification and access control 
Execution of Resource access process is essential as explained in the following lines. The 
process is 1) Identification, 2) Authentication, and 3) Authorization. Definition of each 
term is as follows52.  
Identification: The process of announcing or revealing identity that is simply who you 
are.  
Authentication: Allowing the people identified to access the resource.  
Authorization: Determining whether someone has permission to take the requested course 
of action. 
 
2: Apply economy mechanism 
If the cost to break the system could be more than a benefit attacker supposes to get for 
that, the system may be secure enough. 
 
3: Consider storage device  
In many cases of security breach, an insider utilizes a storage device for stealing 
                                                 
51 Suggestions 1 to 7 are related to the developing system while suggestions 8 to 10 are related to 
organizational matters. 
52 Excerpted from Computer Security, Dieter Gollmann, 1999, Page 19 – 24 
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confidential information. The storage device is not usually used for transferring the data 
to other machines since LAN (Local Area Network) is available for that. It may not be 
necessary for a computer to have the storage device except to back up the data53. 
Moreover, if it is desired to keep document integrity, proving a CDR with one write and 
read only storage device will help to achieve it. 
 
4: Separation of Information Privilege 
It is necessary to specify certain access right of each information. The access rights are as 
follows. 
Read: Learn data and its meaning. 
Copy: Duplicate data 
Modify: Change data 
Append: Add data 
Delete: Mark data to be removed 
Expunge: Destroy data that have been marked for removal 
 
5: Least Privilege 
Only least privileges must be provided to a user. Any more privilege than someone needs 
to accomplish the specific task should be not provided.  
 
6: Accountability 
Record all events that happened in a computer. The event will be used for analyzing and 
recognizing past, present, and even future threat. Then, the implementation of 
                                                 
53 Countermeasure for leaking information problem, http://www.quality.co.jp/CPN.html  
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information policy and security mechanism in systems is taken into account. 
 
7: Putting the above points to use in design phase 
Use of the aforementioned points for the design model can help us make tremendous 
steps forward in building systems that resist failure54. 
 
8: Awareness of users, employees, and organizations 
System users and employees in an organization should recognize how much security 
breaches impact their assets. Moreover, users should know how typed personnel 
information would be used.  
 
9: Create penalties that overweight the hacker’s benefits 
Create a penalty that is greater than the suspect's gains from the information assets. 
 
10: Inspect documents leaving the premises 
Any confidential documents brought out from an office must be inspected. Secure rooms 
should be considered to keep the confidential documents secret. 
 
 
 
                                                 
54 The way to develop the secure information risk management system, D add ninth Co., Ltd., Oct 1 2002, 
http://www.dadd9.com/tech/sec4manager.html 
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4. Static and Dynamic Information Policies 
 
In this chapter, how information policy and security mechanism are created is 
demonstrated. At first, the definition of information policy is presented. Then, examples 
of information policy are shown corresponding to the two aforementioned 
countermeasures. Information policy refers to certain rules to prevent security breaches, 
and security mechanism is a procedure to accomplish the information policy. Information 
policy can be categorized into “static” and “dynamic”. Static information policy is still 
useful to reduce a security risk; however it is limited in its prevention of highly 
sophisticated trick, and it is hard to determine the appropriate value to control a security 
mechanism in complex systems. Dynamic policy is more suited to preventing 
sophisticated trick and it changes parameters with its security mechanism.  
 
4-1. Definition 
 
The definition of information policy in terms of systems engineering is presented 
in this section. Information policy is a rule to prevent security breaches regarding 
confidential information such as customer information, technical know-how and home 
security information. Information security policy can be categorized methodically into 
static information policy and dynamic information policy. Static information policy is an 
invariable rule to prevent security breach. For static information policy, it does not matter 
which input occurs. While static information policy does not change parameters in its rule 
during a specified period, dynamic information policy does; dynamic policy is a variable 
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rule to prevent security problems regarding confidential information. Thus, for dynamic 
information policy, it matters which input occurs constantly. The following figure shows 
a methodical categorization of information policy with its property and some available 
technologies. 
Figure 11: Methodical Categorization of Information Security Policy 
Any information policy is categorized with “static” or “dynamic” methodically, 
and certain property and technology are delivered for it. The property55 is a security 
aspect that will be taken into account in systems. The properties are in the following 
table. 
 
 
                                                 
55 Excerpted from Computer Security, Dieter Gollmann, 1999, Page 5 – 9 
Technologies
TechnologiesProperty
Information Security Policy
Dynamic
Static
Confidentiality
Integrity
Confidentiality
Integrity
Accountability
Availablity
Access Control
Intermediate Control
Cryptography
Access Control
Intermediate Control
Intrusion Detection
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Property Description Applied for 
Confidentiality Prevention of unauthorized disclosure of information Static/Dynamic
Integrity Prevention of unauthorized modification of information Static/Dynamic
Availability Prevention of unauthorized withholding of information or resources Dynamic 
Accountability Audit information must be selectively kept and protected Dynamic 
Table 19: Security Properties 
Many technologies are available to prevent the security breach. In this thesis, 
only technologies used for information policy are presented. An information policy may 
make use of multiple technologies. 
 
Access Control (Static/Dynamic)56 
The very nature of “access” suggests that there is an active subject accessing a 
passive object with some specific access operation, while a reference monitor grants or 
denies access. Typical subjects are users or processes. Typical objects are files or 
resources, like memory, printers, or nodes in a computer network.  
Figure 12: Access Control Model 
Access control consists of its access mode and access control matrix defined access right 
for each user.  
 
Object Access Control List 
Userinf.Custm.Name User: Read, Write Operator: Read 
Userinf.Custm.Password User: Write, Append  
Table 20: Access Control Matrix 
                                                 
56 Excerpted from Computer Security, Dieter Gollmann, 1999, Chapter 3: Access Control 
Subject Access Request Reference Monitor Object
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Intermediate Control (Static/Dynamic) 
Control through certain mediation such as group permission, protection ring, and 
privilege and security level. The followings intermediate controls are presented in 
Computer Security57. This technology supports the access control abovementioned to be 
enforced. Various intermediate controls are proposed as follows. 
 
- Groups and negative permissions: Groups simplify the definition of access control 
policies. Users with similar access rights are collected in groups and groups are 
given permission to access objects. All access permissions could not be always 
mediated through group membership. Certain user access permission may be 
deployed negatively.  
 
- Protection Rings: Protection rings are a particularly simple example for an 
intermediate layer between subject and objects. Each subject or process and each 
object is assigned a number, depending on its importance. For example, these 
numbers could be 0, 1, 2, 3 and processes receive their number according to the 
rule: 
0: Operating system kernel 
1: Operating System 
2: Utilities 
3: User processes 
 
Figure 13: Protection Rings 
                                                 
57 Excerpted from Computer Security, Dieter Gollmann, 1999, Page 38 – 43 
3
2
1
0
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- Privileges Control: Typically, privileges are associated with operating system 
functions and relate to activities like system administration, backup, mail access, or 
network access. A collection of an application-specific operation (procedures) is 
called a role. Subjects derive their access rights from the role they are performing. 
Role-based access control has its focus on the users and on the jobs users performs.  
 
- Security Level Control: Security levels are another security attribute, like protection 
rings, used to label subjects and objects as the basis for expressing security policy. 
As a simple example, consider the following four linearly ordered security levels, 
"unclassified", "confidential", "secret" and "top secret".  
 
Cryptography (Static)58 
Two entities A and B communicate over an unsecured channel. The adversary is a hacker 
who has full control over this channel, being able to read their information, delete 
information, and insert malicious information. The entities A and B trust each other. They 
want protection from the hacker. Cryptography allows them to construct secure logical 
channel over an insecure physical connection. For the Internet network systems, the 
traffic between clients and servers is a new point of the attack.  
 
Intrusion Detection (Dynamic)59 
Once the system has been installed and is operational, its security mechanisms should 
                                                 
58 Excerpted from Computer Security, Dieter Gollmann, 1999, Chapter 12: Cryptography 
59 Excerpted from Computer Security, Dieter Gollmann, 1999, Page 97 
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prevent illegal user actions. However, the protection mechanisms may not be adequate or 
flawed. It is advantageous to have further mechanisms, which allow detecting security 
violations or other suspicious events when they are happening or after they have 
happened. It is important to keep the audit log in a secure place. Attackers who are able to 
change the audit log are in a perfect position to hide their traces. The following is an 
example of a description of this methodical categorization. An information policy is as 
follows: 
 
Information Policy: “Document privilege for a user is delivered based on user’s security 
level” 
 
Security level in this information policy will be not changed by the input, which 
occurs, so the information policy is static. The property of the information policy is kept 
confidential to prevent the document privilege from lower security level users. For this 
information policy, access control and intermediate control are the most suitable 
technology. Thus, this information policy will be classified as follows. 
 
Policy # Type Property Technology 
0 Static Confidentiality Access Control Intermediate Control 
Table 21: Classification for A Sample Information Policy 
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4-2. Static Information Policy 
 
Static information policy has been widely used for security systems. Operating 
systems such as UNIX and Windows provides static information policy regarding 
document privileges. For instance, NTFS (New Technology file system)60 is designed for 
multiple users, which is supposed to use different types of document privileges; it 
supports file-level security, compression and auditing. It also supports large volumes and 
powerful storage solutions such as RAID. Moreover, it provides the ability to encrypt 
files and folders to protect sensitive data. This policy can be described as follows. 
 
Policy # Type Property Technology 
0 Static 
Confidentiality 
Integrity 
Accountability 
Access Control 
Intermediate Control 
Cryptography 
Table 22: Classification for NTFS 
In chapter 3, two countermeasures are presented to reduce unacceptable risk 
involving security breaches, [SB-07], [SB-12], and [SB-13]. In this section, static 
information policy will be developed with the aforementioned countermeasures. 
 
 Countermeasure 1: Censor not only contents but also the amount 
Information Policy 1: Operator(i) is allowed to access the contents n(i) times per a day. 
Administrator(j) is allowed to access the contents m(j) times per a day. Administrator or 
security manager determines control value of n and m. 
                                                 
60 New Technology File System designed for Windows NT, 2000, XP, http://www.ntfs.com/  
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Classification: 
Policy # Type Property Technology 
0 Static Confidentiality Access Control Intermediate Control 
Table 23: Classification for Information Policy 1 (Static) 
Each operator and administrator is able to have a certain maximum number of 
accesses per day. However, configuration for those numbers is very complicated because 
of the enormous number of operators and administrators. Furthermore, it is crucial to 
determine the appropriate number of accesses for each employee. It may be determined 
by the administrator's experiments or decided by the stakeholder. When the amount of 
tasks changes, this number will no longer apply and will need to be updated. 
 
 Countermeasure 2: Improve accountability in order to trace any insider hacker’s 
action 
Information Policy 2: Deploy certain security level l for each object. Screen an event logs 
involved object with security level L or higher.  
 
Classification: 
Policy # Type Property Technology 
0 Static Accountability Intermediate Control 
Table 24: Classification for Information Policy 2 (Static) 
It is necessary to reduce the size of huge event logs, and distinguish more 
important event logs from less important event logs. This contributes to improving 
accountability since the system administrator is able to focus on the more important event 
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logs, resulting in the reduction of his effort and time. Event logs of lower security level 
will be omitted with this static policy; thus, only event logs with higher security level will 
remain. However, the size of event logs is still large. It is better if only anomaly event 
logs with higher security level remain, so user’s anomaly access event logs should be 
detected. 
 
Are the abovementioned static information policies sufficient to prevent any 
security problems? Recent security breaches were already discussed in the previous 
chapter. Let’s think about security breach problems [SB-07]. In this case, an authorized 
operator accessed and stole customer information, even though access control functioned 
properly with the access control matrix. This problem occurred because the system did 
not concern the object or subject behavior. Moreover, control will become more 
complicated since some operators might need to access large quantities of customer 
information depending on their position. In addition, their tasks change every day. It is 
almost impossible to find the appropriate number of accesses. To prevent current security 
breaches with static information policy is definitely limited; a more flexible and suitable 
information policy is required. For this reason, a dynamic information policy is proposed. 
This method considers object behavior, and then dynamically changes information policy, 
and performs the defined procedure. It is a more suited information policy for current 
security breaches caused by misuse and anomalous attacks. It will be presented in the 
next section. 
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4-3. Dynamic Information Policy 
 
Dynamic information policy has become more important since hackers have 
become more sophisticated, and it is also required to detect any misuse and anonymous 
attacks. The static information policy is able to be default information policy, but it is not 
enough to prevent current security breaches. How dynamic policy is defined and 
designed corresponding to two countermeasures for [SB-7], [SB-12] and [SB-13] is 
shown in this section. 
 
4-3-1. Sample Dynamic Policy 1 (Dynamic/ Confidentiality, Availability/ Access Control, 
Intrusion Detection/ [SB-7],[SB-12]) 
 
To solve the problem, maximum access number will be defined based on an 
operator tasks and average number of accesses. However, as the size of the operator’s 
task increases, the proper maximum access number should increase. If the maximum 
access number is unchanged, the system availability will worsen. Contrary to this case, 
when the task is smaller, an excessive access number will exist, and thus system risk will 
increase. The maximum access number should be defined by dynamic control to prevent 
the security breaches of [SB-7] and [SB-12].  
 
A) Statement 
Rule engine checks the parameter c in recorded access event log to object o 
every x minutes. The rule engine generates statistical analysis data s for each user ith in dth 
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date. Then, the rule engine determines the maximum number of accesses N corresponding 
to warning level L with s during a certain past period y according to procedure p. The 
system performs defined rules according to the maximum number of accesses N and the 
warning level L when the rule engine detects that the warning level L is changed. 
 
B) Audited Variables 
Parameters: c(i) 
  c1(i): User Id (Numeric/) 
  c2(i): User Type (Character/Operator, Admin) 
  c3(i): Check time (time/) 
  c4(i): First access time (time/) 
  c5(i): Last access time (time/) 
  c6(i): Number of accesses between c4 and c5 (Numeric/) 
 
Statistical analysis data: s(i, d) = f(c1(i),c2(i),c3(i),c4(i),c5(i),c6(i)) 
  s1(i, d): User Id (Numeric/) 
  s2(i, d): User Type (Character/Operator, Admin) 
  s3(i, d): Sum of number of accesses per day (Numeric/) 
 
Object: o 
  o1: Customer Information Object 
 
C) Behavioral Variables 
Check interval time x:  A specified number of minutes (1 minute, 2 minutes, 5 minutes 
and so on) 
Estimating period y:  A specified period (1 week, 1 month and so on) 
Estimating Date dy:  A specified date, interval of dyths is y (dyth – (dy-1)th = y) 
 
D) Procedure 
N(i, dy) = p1(i, dy) Estimate the base number of accesses for dyth’s week or 
month.  
σ(i, dy) = p2(i, dy) Estimate the unit of extra number of accesses for dyth’s week 
or month. 
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This first procedure is to determine the average number of accesses and standard 
deviation on last y days from dyth. 
average(s3(i, dy)) = Σ(s3(i, dy-k)) [k = 1,2…y] / y 
v(i, dy) = Σ(s3(i, dy-k+1) - average(s3(i, dy)))2 [k = 1,2…y] / y 
σ(i, dy)= √v(i, d) 
 
This second procedure is to determine the average number of accesses and standard 
deviation on last y days from dyth without excessive access numbers. The excessive 
access numbers are more than the average access number + 2σ. 
re_average(s3(i, dy)) = Σ(s3(i, dy-k)) / y, where s3(i, dy-k) =< average(s3(i, 
dy)) + 2*σ(i, dy) [k = 1,2…y] 
re_v(i, dy) = Σ(s3(i, dy-k) - re_average(s3(i, dy)))2 / y, where s3(i, d+k) < 
average(s3(i, d)) + 2*σ(i, d)" [k = 1,2…y] 
re_σ(i, dy)= √re_v(i, dy) 
N(i, dy) = re_average(s3(i, dy)) 
σ(i, dy) = re_σ(i, dy) 
 
Therefore, the base number of accesses and the unit of extra number of accesses 
are calculated with the parameters audited on the last period. The maximum access 
number of each warning level consists of these numbers. It is defined as follows. 
 
Max Access Number (l) = N(i, dy) + n(l)* σ(i, dy),  
[n(l=W1)=3, n(l=W2)=4, n(l=W3)=5, n(l=W4)=6] 
 
The following table on the next page shows the defined rule according to the warning 
levels. 
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Table 25: Rule for each Warning Level for Sample Dynamic Information Policy 1 
When the warning level is changed, the system performs the abovementioned 
functions. The rules may be changed by the system policy or stakeholders. The following 
example demonstrates this procedure. The maximum number of accesses for the (dy) 
period is already set using the audited data in the (dy-1) period (Apr 10, 2005 to Apr 16, 
2005). The dynamic policy for the (dy) period is shown in the following table. 
Figure 14: Audit Data for the Sample Dynamic Information 1, Day 1 in the (dy) Period 
Admin (user id=2) is warned as the warning level 1, and then it will be reported 
to his/her manager at 16:30 since the number of accesses reaches between W1 and W2 
level.  
 
 
 
W0
W1
W2
W3
W4
N(i, dy)+3*σ(i, dy) =< c6(i) < N(i, dy)+4*σ(i, dy) 
N(i, dy)+4*σ(i, dy) =< c6(i) < N(i, dy)+5*σ(i, dy) 
N(i, dy)+5*σ(i, dy) =< c6(i) < N(i, dy)+6*σ(i, dy) 
The defined rule
Warning to user (i) and send its status to Manager
Warning to user (i) and send its status to Manager. For more 
access, user (i) needs the manager's authorization.
Warning to user (i) and send its status to Manager. For more 
access, user (i) needs the manager's authorization.
N(i, dy)+6*σ(i, dy) =< c6(i)
If the number is detected
Canceled user (i) authorization. 
c6(i)  < N(i, dy)+3*σ(i, dy) Normal level
i = 1,2 d = Apr 17, 2005 Evaluated number based on last week data (y=7)
c1(i) c2(i) c3(i) c4(i) c5(i) c6(i) N+3*σ(i) N+4*σ(i) N+5*σ(i) N+6*σ(i)
1 Ope 9:15 9:00 9:14 5 < 210
2 Admin 9:15 9:05 9:15 10 < 391
1 Ope 9:20 9:00 9:18 7 < 210
2 Admin 9:20 9:05 9:15 20 < 391
--- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
1 Ope 16:30 9:00 16:26 100 < 210
2 Admin 16:30 9:05 16:25 400 >= 391 < 421
1 Ope 18:00 9:00 17:59 120 < 210
2 Admin 18:05 9:00 18:03 420 >= 391 < 421
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Figure 15: Audit Data for the Sample Dynamic Information 1, Day 2 in the (dy) Period 
No access number exceeds the max access number on the day.  
Figure 16: Audit Data for the Sample Dynamic Information 1, Day 3 in the (dy) Period 
The operator (user id=1) is warned and must report to his/her manager at 15:05 
since the number of accesses reached between the maximum access number of W1 and 
W2 level. Operator (user ID=1) is warned and must report to his/her manager. The 
manager is then required to send the operator permission to access more customer records 
at 15:10 since the number of accesses reached between the maximum access number of 
W2 and W3 level. For the other days, it will be controlled according to the defined rule. 
At the end of the (dy) period, the maximum number of accesses for the next period 
(dy+1) is determined as follows. The following table is a cross table of the number of 
accesses in the (dy) period. The number of accesses is formatted with user ID and type 
i = 1,2 d = Apr 18, 2005
c1(i) c2(i) c3(i) c4(i) c5(i) c6(i) N+3*σ(i) N+4*σ(i) N+5*σ(i) N+6*σ(i)
1 Ope 9:15 9:01 9:14 5 < 210
2 Admin 9:15 0 < 391
1 Ope 9:20 9:00 9:18 7 < 210
2 Admin 9:20 9:18 9:19 20 < 391
--- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
1 Ope 18:00 9:01 17:55 120 < 210
2 Admin 18:00 9:18 17:57 200 < 391
1 Ope 19:05 9:01 18:45 150 < 210
2 Admin 19:05 9:18 18:50 240 < 391
i = 1,2 d = Apr 19, 2005
c1(i) c2(i) c3(i) c4(i) c5(i) c6(i) N+3*σ(i) N+4*σ(i) N+5*σ(i) N+6*σ(i)
1 Ope 9:00 8:00 8:59 14 < 210
2 Admin 9:00 8:30 9:00 20 < 391
1 Ope 9:05 8:00 9:04 18 < 210
2 Admin 9:05 8:30 9:04 25 < 391
--- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
1 Ope 15:05 8:00 15:02 220 >= 210 < 245
2 Admin 15:05 8:30 15:03 230 < 391
1 Ope 15:10 8:00 15:08 250 >= 210 >= 245 < 280
2 Admin 15:10 8:30 15:07 250 < 391
1 Ope 18:05 8:00 18:03 270 >= 210 >= 245 < 280
2 Admin 18:05 8:30 18:00 280 < 391
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and is ordered by the day of the (dy) period. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 17: Cross Table of The Number of Accesses in the (dy) period 
Some statistical data are determined with usage of the data in the above table through the 
first procedure as follows. 
Table 26: Statistical Analyzed Max Number of Accesses I 
As the second procedure, the statistical data are recalculated without excessive access 
numbers, which is more than the average + 2*σ.  
Table 27: Statistical Analyzed Max Number of Accesses II 
For example, the user ID 1 has one excessive access number 270 (>258) on Apr 
19, 2005. The statistical data for the user ID 1 will be recalculated without the excessive 
access number on this day. Recalculated statistical data are in the above table. For the 
user ID 2, the same method will be applied. Finally, the maximum number of accesses for 
i = 1 dy: from Apr 17, 2005 to Apr 23, 2005 i = 2 dy: from Apr 17, 2005 to Apr 23, 2005
d s1(i) s2(i) s3(i) d(j) s1(ui) s2(ui) s3(ui)
04/17/2005 1 Ope 120 04/17/2005 2 Admin 420
04/18/2005 1 Ope 150 04/18/2005 2 Admin 240
04/19/2005 1 Ope 270 04/19/2005 2 Admin 280
04/20/2005 1 Ope 150 04/20/2005 2 Admin 260
04/21/2005 1 Ope 135 04/21/2005 2 Admin 330
04/22/2005 1 Ope 150 04/22/2005 2 Admin 290
04/23/2005 1 Ope 95 04/23/2005 2 Admin 280
i = 1 dy: from Apr 17, 2005 to Apr 23, 2005 i = 2 dy: from Apr 17, 2005 to Apr 23, 2005
153 300
2642 3058
52 56
257 412Average+2σAverage+2σ
Standard Deviation Standard Deviation
Ave:
Variance
Ave:
Variance
i = 1 dy: from Apr 17, 2005 to Apr 23, 2005 i = 2 dy: from Apr 17, 2005 to Apr 23, 2005
134 280
414 767
21 28
R_Variance
R_Standard Deviation
R_Ave
R_Variance
R_Standard Deviation
R_Ave
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each warning level will be determined by the abovementioned rules. The result is shown 
in the following table. 
Table 28: The Final Estimated Statistical Analyzed Max Number of Accesses 
The dynamic policy changes according to the historical access number of each 
user. Statistically, the possibility of an access number going beyond the warning level 1 
(W1: > N(i,dy) + 3σ(i,dy)) is less than 0.135%. The possibility of going beyond warning 
level 4 will be less than 1*10-9 %: statistically, it is almost impossible that this will occur 
even if the user accesses the object (user customer information) intensively. Unusual 
activity must occur intentionally if the access number exceeds the maximum number of 
accesses. The defined rule provides the system reaction at every change of the warning 
level. This enables the system security manager to detect misuse and anomalous attacks 
before serious problems happen. Moreover, sending a warning message incites fear in the 
hackers, and discourages them from invading the system. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The warning level indicator for next week (i = 1) The warning level indicator for next week (i = 2)
< 197 W0 < 364 W0
197 W1 364 W1
218 W2 392 W2
239 W3 420 W3
260 W4 448 W4N(1,dy)+6σ(1,dy)
N(2,dy)+3σ(2,dy)
N(2,dy)+4σ(2,dy)
N(2,dy)+5σ(2,dy)
N(2,dy)+6σ(2,dy)
N(1,dy)+5σ(1,dy)
N(1,dy)+4σ(1,dy)
< N(1,dy)+3σ(1,dy)
N(1,dy)+3σ(1,dy)
< N(2,dy)+3σ(2,dy)
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4-3-2. Sample Dynamic Policy 2 (Dynamic/ Availability, Accountability/ Intermediate 
Control, Intrusion Detection/ [SB-12], [SB-13]) 
 
As shown in the previous dynamic information policy, historical event logs play 
a very important role in the system in order to achieve a suitable dynamic information 
policy. However, the historical event log of the entire system can be an enormous amount 
of data. It is extremely hard to find an event log containing only the necessary 
information among the huge enormous amount of event log data. This results in not 
detecting crucial misuse and anomalous activities recorded in the logs. Many unnecessary 
logs become camouflaged to hide the traces of the hacker’s activities. For example, in the 
case of [SB-12] and [SB-13], it took a very long time to trace the hacker’s activities 
among the huge amount of event logs in their system. The hackers were not sophisticated 
and their access tracks were recorded in the event log, so it was possible to detect their 
activities before the problem occurred. However, the organization did not realize the 
importance of detecting the event log since this activity requires much time and effort. 
Moreover, the event log was traced a few weeks after the secret information was stolen. 
The event log was too huge to trace properly. In addition, some important traces of 
questionable activities were missed. It is crucial to detect misuse and anomalous activities 
effectively and efficiently. To solve this problem, a static information policy may be 
proposed in order to detect only important event logs. For instance, only highly 
confidential object access logs and unauthorized user access logs are separated from other 
event logs since these event logs may be very important in detecting the misuse activities. 
The highly confidential object access logs are too large; misuse and anomaly activities 
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can be detected more easily but it still takes a considerable amount of time. Moreover, 
authorized users can be malicious hackers. In fact, authorized hackers, called insiders, 
have recently become more of a threat. The static information may contribute to a 
decreased effort to censor the event log, but it may work only for a few cases; moreover, 
the organization may miss an important event log. The information policy to separate the 
significant event logs from other event logs should be determined dynamically based on 
some current conditions such as access frequency of a subject, frequency of access to the 
object, and occupational rate of the subject per certain time interval. The second dynamic 
information policy with the abovementioned ideas is as follows. 
 
A) Statement 
 A rule engine checks audited logs involved in a system every x minute. The rule 
engine generates statistical data, access frequency and occupation rate si for user i, and 
confidential rate so for object o. Audit level L for user i (subject) and o (Object) is 
determined by procedure p corresponding to the access frequency, occupation rate si of a 
subject, and frequency of access to the object so. The system performs defined rules 
according to the audit level L for the user i and target o every y time interval. 
 
B) Audited Variables 
Parameters: a(i), b(o) 
  a1(i): User Id (Numeric/)                                                  
  a2(i): User Type (Character/Operator, Admin) 
  a3(i): Last access time (time/) 
  a4(i): Check time (time/) 
  a5(i): Number of accesses between a3 and a4 (Numeric/) 
 
  b1(o): Object Type (Numeric/) 
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  b2(o): Object Confidential (Numeric/) 
  b3(o): Last access time (time/) 
  b4(o): Check time (time/) 
  b5(o): Number of accesses to the object between b3 and b4 (Numeric/) 
   
Statistical analysis data: si(i) = f(a1(i),a2(i),a3(i),a4(i),a5(i)) 
si1(i, d): User Id (Numeric/) 
si2(i, d): User Type (Character/Operator, Admin) 
si3(i, d): Sum of Number of accesses in a day (Numeric/) 
si4(i, d): Max of occupation rate in a day (Numeric/) 
(si4(i, d) = max( (c5(i)*100) /Σc5(i) [i: all users] of x time interval in a 
day)) 
 
Statistical analysis data: so(i) = f(b1(o),b2(o),b3(o),b4(o),b5(o)) 
so1(o): Object Type (Numeric/) 
so2(o): Object Confidential (Numeric/1, 2 and 3) 
(The confidential object should be determined depending on certain 
organization policy. For convenience purposes, it is determined by 1, 2, 
and 3 on this report) 
so3(o): Sum of Number of accesses to the object in a day (Numeric/) 
 
C) Behavioral Variables  
Check interval time x:  A specified number of minutes (30 minutes, 1 hour, 2 hours 
and so on) 
Estimating period y:   A specified period (1 day, 2 days, 1 week and so on) 
 
D) Procedure 
The event log generally involves subject and object. The subject is an entity to 
access the object like user. On the other hand, the object is an entity to be accessed by the 
subject like customer information. The audit level of each event log will be determined 
by the following equation.  
L(i, o, dy) = k1*p1(i, dy)*p3(o, dy) + k2*p2(i, dy)*p3(o, dy) 
Estimate the audit level from Feb 10, 2003 to Feb 18, 2003. 
(k1 and k2 are adjusted coefficients determined by security managers, 
stakeholders, or organization policy. ) 
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This procedure is to determine the audit level of each event with the 
abovementioned statistical data, the access frequency of a subject, occupation rate of a 
subject and frequency of access to the object in a period of certain dyth. As the first 
procedure, the maximum number of accesses p1 of each user in a period y is determined 
as follows. 
p1(i, dy) = max(si3(i, dy) in a y period) = max(si3(i, dy-k+1)) [k = 1,2…y] 
 
As the second procedure, the average of the maximum occupation rate p2 of each user in 
a period y is determined as follows.  
p2(i, dy) = average(si4(i, dy) in a y period) = Σ(si4(i, dy-k+1)) [k = 1,2…y] / y  
 
As the third procedure, the maximum frequency of access to the object in a period y is 
determined as follows.  
p3(o, dy) = max(so2(o, dy)*so3(o, dy) in a y period) = max(so2(o, 
dy-k+1)*so3(o, dy-k+1)) [k = 1,2…y] 
 
Finally, the audit level is determined by the abovementioned equation using p1, 
p2 and p3. The value of k1 and k2 are adjusted coefficients. These values should be 
determined by experiment in the organization and its policy. The sample value for the 
adjusted coefficients will be determined using demo data from this report. Using the 
abovementioned equation, the audit level will be various numeric values. When applying 
the defined rule, it should be simplified as level 1, level 2, and level 3. The simplified 
audit level and defined rule corresponding to the audit level is presented on the following 
table.  
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Table 29: Rule each Audit Level for Sample Dynamic Information Policy 2 
 
An example of the aforementioned dynamic policy 2 is presented as follows. The 
table on the next page is a sample of 100 historical event logs. The sample data is 
generated randomly following an interface of the dynamic policy 261. This imaginary data 
is used to show an example of a procedure in the dynamic policy 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
61 See page 42, “B) Audited Variables”. 
A1
A2
A3
L(i, o, dy)  = 2-8 Ordinary important even log. It may be checked if it is able to 
be made effort by the administror
The audit level The defined rule
L(i, o, dy)  = 0-2 Less important event log. It may be neglected
L(i, o, dy) = 8 - Crucial event log, it must be checked every y period.
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Figure 18: Sample Event Log from Apr 18 to Apr 19 in 2005 
Sample Event Log (i = 1,2…5, o = 1,2…4) / Apr 18, 2005 / x = 60 m
a1(i) a2(i) a3(i)/b3(o) a4(i)/b4(o) b1(o) b2(o)
2 Ope 9:00 10:00 1 1
3 Ope 9:09 10:00 2 2
3 Ope 9:18 10:00 4 3
1 Admin 9:27 10:00 1 1
3 Ope 9:34 10:00 3 2
4 Custm 9:37 10:00 2 2
2 Ope 9:46 10:00 2 2
5 Custm 9:52 10:00 2 2
3 Ope 9:52 10:00 1 1
4 Custm 10:00 11:00 2 2
3 Ope 10:02 11:00 4 3
2 Ope 10:12 11:00 2 2
5 Custm 10:17 11:00 2 2
4 Custm 10:25 11:00 2 2
3 Ope 10:27 11:00 3 2
5 Custm 10:29 11:00 2 2
2 Ope 10:29 11:00 2 2
2 Ope 10:32 11:00 3 2
3 Ope 10:41 11:00 2 2
5 Custm 10:46 11:00 1 1
4 Custm 10:56 11:00 1 1
3 Ope 11:04 12:00 3 2
2 Ope 11:11 12:00 1 1
5 Custm 11:14 12:00 2 2
3 Ope 11:20 12:00 4 3
2 Ope 11:20 12:00 1 1
4 Custm 11:30 12:00 2 2
5 Custm 11:37 12:00 1 1
4 Custm 11:45 12:00 2 2
4 Custm 11:48 12:00 2 2
5 Custm 11:53 12:00 1 1
2 Ope 11:59 12:00 1 1
4 Custm 12:00 13:00 2 2
1 Admin 12:08 13:00 1 1
3 Ope 12:13 13:00 4 3
2 Ope 12:16 13:00 3 2
5 Custm 12:26 13:00 2 2
3 Ope 12:26 13:00 2 2
4 Custm 12:28 13:00 1 1
3 Ope 12:33 13:00 2 2
4 Custm 12:34 13:00 1 1
2 Ope 12:38 13:00 3 2
4 Custm 12:46 13:00 2 2
2 Ope 12:49 13:00 4 3
3 Ope 12:59 13:00 2 2
3 Ope 13:04 14:00 2 2
2 Ope 13:07 14:00 3 2
4 Custm 13:12 14:00 1 1
2 Ope 13:13 14:00 2 2
3 Ope 13:22 14:00 2 2
3 Ope 13:31 14:00 1 1
3 Ope 13:41 14:00 4 3
1 Admin 13:48 14:00 1 1
2 Ope 13:51 14:00 1 1
3 Ope 13:57 14:00 3 2
2 Ope 14:00 15:00 1 1
2 Ope 14:10 15:00 2 2
2 Ope 14:18 15:00 2 2
2 Ope 14:19 15:00 2 2
2 Ope 14:24 15:00 3 2
4 Custm 14:33 15:00 2 2
2 Ope 14:37 15:00 2 2
5 Custm 14:47 15:00 2 2
4 Custm 14:50 15:00 2 2
3 Ope 14:54 15:00 2 2
2 Ope 14:58 15:00 2 2
Sample Event Log (i = 1,2…5, o = 1,2…4) / Apr 19, 2005 / x = 60 m
a1(i) a2(i) a3(i)/b3(o) a4(i)/b4(o) b1(o) b2(o)
3 Ope 9:05 10:00 4 3
4 Custm 9:11 10:00 1 1
2 Ope 9:17 10:00 2 2
2 Ope 9:25 10:00 3 2
5 Custm 9:32 10:00 2 2
2 Ope 9:42 10:00 3 2
4 Custm 9:48 10:00 2 2
2 Ope 9:56 10:00 1 1
4 Custm 9:58 10:00 2 2
5 Custm 9:59 10:00 2 2
4 Custm 10:09 11:00 2 2
2 Ope 10:10 11:00 4 3
4 Custm 10:18 11:00 2 2
3 Ope 10:21 11:00 3 2
3 Ope 10:24 11:00 2 2
2 Ope 10:30 11:00 3 2
3 Ope 10:39 11:00 4 3
5 Custm 10:48 11:00 1 1
2 Ope 10:52 11:00 3 2
4 Custm 10:55 11:00 2 2
3 Ope 11:05 12:00 2 2
2 Ope 11:11 12:00 4 3
2 Ope 11:19 12:00 3 2
4 Custm 11:23 12:00 1 1
3 Ope 11:26 12:00 2 2
5 Custm 11:31 12:00 2 2
1 Admin 11:38 12:00 2 2
5 Custm 11:45 12:00 1 1
2 Ope 11:51 12:00 4 3
3 Ope 11:53 12:00 3 2
2 Ope 12:02 13:00 2 2
2 Ope 12:02 13:00 2 2
2 Ope 12:11 13:00 2 2
2 Ope 12:19 13:00 1 1
2 Ope 12:21 13:00 1 1
2 Ope 12:23 13:00 3 2
2 Ope 12:31 13:00 2 2
2 Ope 12:40 13:00 2 2
4 Custm 12:47 13:00 2 2
2 Ope 12:51 13:00 2 2
2 Ope 12:58 13:00 2 2
3 Ope 13:07 14:00 3 2
5 Custm 13:11 14:00 2 2
3 Ope 13:18 14:00 2 2
5 Custm 13:26 14:00 1 1
3 Ope 13:33 14:00 2 2
4 Custm 13:41 14:00 1 1
4 Custm 13:45 14:00 1 1
5 Custm 13:54 14:00 2 2
3 Ope 13:55 14:00 3 2
3 Ope 14:04 15:00 1 1
3 Ope 14:09 15:00 3 2
3 Ope 14:10 15:00 1 1
4 Custm 14:12 15:00 1 1
2 Ope 14:17 15:00 3 2
1 Admin 14:19 15:00 4 3
4 Custm 14:29 15:00 2 2
3 Ope 14:35 15:00 2 2
2 Ope 14:35 15:00 2 2
2 Ope 14:37 15:00 3 2
2 Ope 14:37 15:00 4 3
4 Custm 14:44 15:00 2 2
4 Custm 14:51 15:00 2 2
2 Ope 14:54 15:00 2 2
3 Ope 14:58 15:00 1 1
2 Ope 15:03 16:00 4 3
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Every log has the subject, object and time stamp. For the purpose to simplify the 
dynamic policy, only auditing variables are shown on the table, and every one-hour (x = 
60 minutes) the logs are checked by the rule engine to generate statistical variables. The 
audit level is determined with the statistical variables in two days (y = 2, dy = Apr 18, 
2005 to Apr 19, 2005). The following is the audited variables grouped by user i and the 
statistical data 1 si(i) corresponding to the audited variables in the period, Apr 18 2005 
and April 19 2005. 
Table 30: Audit Data 1 for the Sample Dynamic Information 2, Day 1 in the (dy) Period 
 
i = 1,2…5, d = Apr 18, 2005, x = 60 minutes
a1(i) a2(i) a3(i) a4(i) a5(i) a1(i) a2(i) a3(i) a4(i) a5(i)
1 Admin 9:27 10:00 1 1 Admin 13:48 15:00 0
2 Ope 9:46 10:00 2 2 Ope 14:58 15:00 7
3 Ope 9:52 10:00 4 3 Ope 14:54 15:00 1
4 Custm 9:37 10:00 1 4 Custm 14:50 15:00 2
5 Custm 9:52 10:00 1 5 Custm 14:47 15:00 1
1 Admin 9:27 11:00 0 1 Admin 15:38 16:00 3
2 Ope 10:32 11:00 3 2 Ope 15:38 16:00 4
3 Ope 10:41 11:00 3 3 Ope 14:54 16:00 0
4 Custm 10:56 11:00 3 4 Custm 15:46 16:00 2
5 Custm 10:46 11:00 3 5 Custm 15:56 16:00 1
1 Admin 9:27 12:00 0 1 Admin 16:27 17:00 2
2 Ope 11:59 12:00 3 2 Ope 16:51 17:00 5
3 Ope 11:20 12:00 2 3 Ope 16:56 17:00 3
4 Custm 11:48 12:00 3 4 Custm 16:42 17:00 2
5 Custm 11:53 12:00 3 5 Custm 16:03 17:00 1
1 Admin 12:08 13:00 1 1 Admin 17:30 18:00 1
2 Ope 12:49 13:00 3 2 Ope 17:51 18:00 4
3 Ope 12:59 13:00 4 3 Ope 17:28 18:00 2
4 Custm 12:46 13:00 4 4 Custm 17:10 18:00 2
5 Custm 12:26 13:00 1 5 Custm 17:38 18:00 2
1 Admin 13:48 14:00 1
2 Ope 13:51 14:00 3
3 Ope 13:57 14:00 5
4 Custm 13:12 14:00 1
5 Custm 12:26 14:00 0
 74
Table 31: Statistical Data 1 for the Sample Dynamic Information 2, Day 1 in the (dy) 
Period  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 32: Audit Data 1 for the Sample Dynamic Information 2, Day 2 in the (dy) Period 
Table 33: Statistical Data 1 for the Sample Dynamic Information 2, Day 2 in the (dy) 
Period 
 
si1(i) si2(i) si3(i) si4(i) si4(1, time) si4(2, time) si4(3, time) si4(4, time) si4(5, time)
1 Admin 9 30% 10:00 11% 22% 44% 11% 11%
2 Ope 34 64% 11:00 0% 25% 25% 25% 25%
3 Ope 24 50% 12:00 0% 27% 18% 27% 27%
4 Custm 20 31% 13:00 8% 23% 31% 31% 8%
5 Custm 13 27% 14:00 10% 30% 50% 10% 0%
15:00 0% 64% 9% 18% 9%
16:00 30% 40% 0% 20% 10%
17:00 15% 38% 23% 15% 8%
18:00 9% 36% 18% 18% 18%
i = 1,2…5, d = Apr 19, 2005, x = 60 minutes
a1(i) a2(i) a3(i) a4(i) a5(i) a1(i) a2(i) a3(i) a4(i) a5(i)
1 Admin --- 10:00 0 1 Admin 14:19 15:00 1
2 Ope 9:56 10:00 4 2 Ope 14:54 15:00 5
3 Ope 9:05 10:00 1 3 Ope 14:58 15:00 5
4 Custm 9:58 10:00 3 4 Custm 14:51 15:00 4
5 Custm 9:59 10:00 2 5 Custm 13:54 15:00 0
1 Admin --- 11:00 0 1 Admin 15:14 16:00 1
2 Ope 10:52 11:00 3 2 Ope 15:39 16:00 5
3 Ope 10:39 11:00 3 3 Ope 15:58 16:00 3
4 Custm 10:55 11:00 3 4 Custm 15:47 16:00 6
5 Custm 10:48 11:00 1 5 Custm 15:57 16:00 1
1 Admin 11:38 12:00 1 1 Admin 16:45 17:00 1
2 Ope 11:51 12:00 3 2 Ope 16:54 17:00 3
3 Ope 11:53 12:00 3 3 Ope 16:42 17:00 2
4 Custm 11:23 12:00 1 4 Custm 16:36 17:00 4
5 Custm 11:45 12:00 2 5 Custm 16:59 17:00 2
1 Admin 11:38 13:00 0 1 Admin 17:14 18:00 1
2 Ope 12:58 13:00 10 2 Ope 17:45 18:00 2
3 Ope 11:53 13:00 0 3 Ope 17:40 18:00 2
4 Custm 12:47 13:00 2 4 Custm 17:33 18:00 2
5 Custm 11:45 13:00 0 5 Custm 16:59 18:00 0
1 Admin 11:38 14:00 0
2 Ope 12:58 14:00 0
3 Ope 13:55 14:00 4
4 Custm 13:45 14:00 2
5 Custm 13:54 14:00 3
si1(i) si2(i) si3(i) si4(i) si4(1, time)si4(2, time)si4(3, time) si4(4, time) si4(5, time)
1 Admin 5 14% 10:00 0% 40% 10% 30% 20%
2 Ope 35 83% 11:00 0% 30% 30% 30% 10%
3 Ope 23 44% 12:00 10% 30% 30% 10% 20%
4 Custm 26 38% 13:00 0% 83% 0% 17% 0%
5 Custm 11 33% 14:00 0% 0% 44% 22% 33%
15:00 7% 33% 33% 27% 0%
16:00 6% 31% 19% 38% 6%
17:00 8% 25% 17% 33% 17%
18:00 14% 29% 29% 29% 0%
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The following are the audited variables grouped by user o and the statistical data 
2 so(o) corresponding to the audited variables in the period, Apr. 18, 2005 and Apr. 19, 
2005. The access frequency to the object so2(o) is determined by a numeric value 
corresponding to the object’s role. For the purpose to be simplified, the following objects 
and their confidential levels are shown in the below table.  
 
Object Type Object Role Confidential Level 
1 Customer unclassified Information 1 
2 Customer confidential Information 2 
3 Operator Information 2 
4 Administrator Information 3 
Table 34: Object Confidential Level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 35: Audit Data 2 for the Sample Dynamic Information 2, Day 1 in the (dy) Period 
 
 
Table 36: Statistical Data 2 for the Sample Dynamic Information 2, Day 1 in the (dy) 
Period  
o = 1,2…4, d = Apr 18, 2005, x = 60 minutes
b1(o) b2(o) b3(o) b4(o) b5(o) b1(o) b2(o) b3(o) b4(o) b5(o)
1 1 9:27 10:00 3 1 1 14:00 15:00 1
2 2 9:52 10:00 4 2 2 14:58 15:00 9
3 2 9:34 10:00 1 3 2 14:24 15:00 1
4 3 9:18 10:00 1 4 3 13:41 15:00 0
1 1 10:56 11:00 2 1 1 15:56 16:00 5
2 2 10:41 11:00 7 2 2 15:38 16:00 5
3 2 10:32 11:00 2 3 2 14:24 16:00 0
4 3 10:02 11:00 1 4 3 13:41 16:00 0
1 1 11:59 12:00 5 1 1 16:13 17:00 2
2 2 11:48 12:00 4 2 2 16:42 17:00 10
3 2 11:04 12:00 1 3 2 16:56 17:00 1
4 3 11:20 12:00 1 4 3 16:27 17:00 0
1 1 12:34 13:00 3 1 1 17:51 18:00 2
2 2 12:59 13:00 6 2 2 17:38 18:00 4
3 2 12:38 13:00 2 3 2 17:30 18:00 4
4 3 12:49 13:00 2 4 3 17:41 18:00 1
1 1 13:51 14:00 4
2 2 13:22 14:00 3
3 2 13:57 14:00 2
4 3 13:41 14:00 1
so1(i) so2(i) so3(i) so2*so3(i)
1 1 26 26 Customer Information 1 (Unclassified)
2 2 47 94 Customer Information 2 (Confidential)
3 2 18 36 Operator Information
4 3 9 27 Admistrator Information
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Table 37: Audit Data 2 for the Sample Dynamic Information 2, Day 2 in the (dy) Period 
 
Table 38: Statistical Data 2 for the Sample Dynamic Information 2, Day 2 in the (dy) 
Period  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
o = 1,2…4, d = Apr 19, 2005, x = 60 minutes
b1(o) b2(o) b3(o) b4(o) b5(o) b1(o) b2(o) b3(o) b4(o) b5(o)
1 1 9:56 10:00 2 1 1 14:58 15:00 4
2 2 9:59 10:00 5 2 2 14:54 15:00 6
3 2 9:42 10:00 2 3 2 14:37 15:00 3
4 3 9:05 10:00 1 4 3 14:37 15:00 2
1 1 10:48 11:00 1 1 1 15:57 16:00 2
2 2 10:55 11:00 4 2 2 15:58 16:00 12
3 2 10:52 11:00 3 3 2 15:39 16:00 1
4 3 10:39 11:00 2 4 3 15:03 16:00 1
1 1 11:45 12:00 2 1 1 16:54 17:00 4
2 2 11:38 12:00 4 2 2 16:59 17:00 6
3 2 11:53 12:00 2 3 2 16:21 17:00 2
4 3 11:51 12:00 2 4 3 15:03 17:00 0
1 1 12:21 13:00 2 1 1 17:14 18:00 1
2 2 12:58 13:00 8 2 2 17:40 18:00 5
3 2 12:23 13:00 1 3 2 16:21 18:00 0
4 3 11:51 13:00 0 4 3 17:45 18:00 1
1 1 13:45 14:00 3
2 2 13:54 14:00 4
3 2 13:55 14:00 2
4 3 11:51 14:00 0
so1(i) so2(i) so3(i) so2*so3(i)
1 1 21 21 Customer Information 1 (Unclassified)
2 2 54 108 Customer Information 2 (Confidential)
3 2 16 32 Operator Information
4 3 9 27 Admistrator Information
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Table 39: Summary of the Statistical Variables in the Period 
Table 40: Procedure Output Statistical Variable in the Period 
The audit level is determined by the variables p1(i), p2(i) and p3(i) in the above 
table and the following equation.  
L(i, o, dy) = k1*p1(i, dy)*p3(o, dy) + k2*p2(i, dy)*p3(o, dy) 
 
The coefficient k1 and k2 may be adjusted depending on certain experiments in a 
target system, and security manager’s, or stakeholder opinion to reach a suitable audit 
level for the target system. The audit level range is from 0 to 10. In this report, the 
following values are estimated as k1 and k2 coefficient values. 
  k1 = 0.0012 
i = 1 dy: from Apr 18, 2005 to Apr 19, 2005 , y = 2 i = 2 dy: from Apr 18, 2005 to Apr 19, 2005 , y = 2
d si3(1) si4(1) d(j) si3(2) si4(2)
04/18/2005 9 30% 04/18/2005 34 64%
04/19/2005 5 14% 04/19/2005 35 83%
i = 3 dy: from Apr 18, 2005 to Apr 19, 2005 , y = 2 i = 4 dy: from Apr 18, 2005 to Apr 19, 2005 , y = 2
d si3(3) si4(3) d(j) si3(4) si4(4)
04/18/2005 24 50% 04/18/2005 20 31%
04/19/2005 23 44% 04/19/2005 26 38%
i = 5 dy: from Apr 18, 2005 to Apr 19, 2005 , y = 2
d si3(5) si4(5)
04/18/2005 13 27%
04/19/2005 11 33%
o = 1 dy: from Apr 18, 2005 to Apr 19, 2005 , y = 2 o = 2 dy: from Apr 18, 2005 to Apr 19, 2005 , y = 2
d so3*so4 d(j) so3*so4
04/18/2005 26 04/18/2005 94
04/19/2005 21 04/19/2005 108
o = 3 dy: from Apr 18, 2005 to Apr 19, 2005 , y = 2 o = 4 dy: from Apr 18, 2005 to Apr 19, 2005 , y = 2
d so3*so4 d(j) so3*so4
04/18/2005 36 04/18/2005 27
04/19/2005 32 04/19/2005 27
dy: from Apr 18, 2005 to Apr 19, 2005 , y = 2
p1(i) p2(i) p3(o)
1 9 22% 1 26
2 35 73% 2 108
3 24 47% 3 36
4 26 34% 4 27
5 13 30%
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  k2 = 0.065 
According to the equation, audit level will be deployed for each combination of 
the subject i and object o in the period. The audit levels are shown in the following table. 
Table 41: The Final Estimated Statistical Analyzed Audit Level 
According the table, the event log, which involve User ID = 2 and Object Type = 
2, is the most crucial event log. It is assessed as the crucial audit log level “A3”. The 
crucial event log will be grouped by A3 audit level, thus the event logs are screened as 
follows. 
Figure 19: The Crucial Event Log on Apr 18, 2005 
The crucial event logs will be moved to read only media to protect them from 
being modified or erased by hackers. The amount of event log is decreased from 100 to 
L(i, o, dy) I=1,2…5, o=1,2…4 / dy: from Apr 18, 2005 to Apr 19, 2005 / x= 60 minutes, y = 2
i , o L i , o L i , o L i , o L
1, 1 0.7 1, 2 2.7 1, 3 0.9 1, 4 0.7 A1
2, 1 2.3 2, 2 9.7 2, 3 3.2 2, 4 2.4 A2
3, 1 1.5 3, 2 6.4 3, 3 2.1 3, 4 1.6 A3
4, 1 1.4 4, 2 5.8 4, 3 1.9 4, 4 1.4
5, 1 0.9 5, 2 3.8 5, 3 1.3 5, 4 1.0
Crucial Event Log (i = 2, o = 2) / Apr 18, 2005 / A3
a1(I) a2(i) a3(i)/b3(I) a4(i)/b5(I) b1(i) b2(i) Level
2 Ope 9:46 10:00 2 2 A3
2 Ope 10:12 11:00 2 2 A3
2 Ope 10:29 11:00 2 2 A3
2 Ope 13:13 14:00 2 2 A3
2 Ope 14:10 15:00 2 2 A3
2 Ope 14:18 15:00 2 2 A3
2 Ope 14:19 15:00 2 2 A3
2 Ope 14:37 15:00 2 2 A3
2 Ope 14:58 15:00 2 2 A3
2 Ope 15:01 16:00 2 2 A3
2 Ope 15:14 16:00 2 2 A3
2 Ope 15:30 16:00 2 2 A3
2 Ope 15:38 16:00 2 2 A3
2 Ope 16:05 17:00 2 2 A3
2 Ope 17:23 18:00 2 2 A3
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15 for Apr 18, 2005; the dynamic policy contributes to decrease the even log by 85%.  
Figure 20: The Crucial Event Log on Apr 19, 2005 
 On Apr. 19, 2005, the event log size will decrease from 100 to 14; it is 86% 
decrease. If the same information policy is applied for similar event logs, the event log 
size will decrease. It will be possible to check and analyze the important event logs and 
will help the engineers to reduce their amount of work. 
 
 As shown in this section, this dynamic policy contributes to discriminate between 
more important log information and less important log information with the dynamic 
usage of statistical techniques depending on users’ behavior and object confidentiality, 
and show more crucial event log information. This results in reducing engineers’ tasks 
and ensuring that they will give their attention to checking the crucial event log. 
 
In this chapter, both static and dynamic information policies were presented. 
With regard to current security breaches, the static information policy by itself does not 
have the capability to solve the problems. Dynamic policy is able to play a main role in 
Crucial Event Log (i = 2, o = 2) / Apr 19, 2005 / A3
a1(I) a2(i) a3(i)/b3(I) a4(i)/b5(I) b1(i) b2(i) Level
2 Ope 9:17 10:00 2 2 A3
2 Ope 12:02 13:00 2 2 A3
2 Ope 12:02 13:00 2 2 A3
2 Ope 12:11 13:00 2 2 A3
2 Ope 12:31 13:00 2 2 A3
2 Ope 12:40 13:00 2 2 A3
2 Ope 12:51 13:00 2 2 A3
2 Ope 12:58 13:00 2 2 A3
2 Ope 14:35 15:00 2 2 A3
2 Ope 14:54 15:00 2 2 A3
2 Ope 15:26 16:00 2 2 A3
2 Ope 15:31 16:00 2 2 A3
2 Ope 16:27 17:00 2 2 A3
2 Ope 17:09 18:00 2 2 A3
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solving current security breaches. The two dynamic policies shown in this section are 
very useful and easy to understand. Following the approach shown in this section, other 
dynamic policies will be created easily. The two dynamic policies in this chapter will be 
taken into account regarding the system model in the next chapter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 81
5. Developing the Security Model with UML 
 
The security model preventing three cases of security breach [SB-07], [SB-12] 
and [SB-13] presented in the chapter 3 will be developed through the sample credit card 
online system. Some components, objects and classes, are re-used for other system 
models. At the beginning, the sample system boundary, use case and scenario are 
presented in order to show the sample system overview. For next section, system 
structure models are presented. The system models show structural model design for the 
security model such as class and object diagrams with usage of UML 2.0. The model is 
capable for the static and dynamic information policy preventing the security breach 
[SB-07], [SB-12] and [SB-13]. For the final section of this chapter, some system behavior 
models are presented such as activity diagrams, and state chart diagrams. Through the 
behavioral system models, the security model will be readily usable as some ideas are 
re-useable for other systems requiring benefited security. The behavioral system models 
are also capable for the static and dynamic policy.  
 
5-1 Sample System Overview  
 
5-1-1. System Boundary 
 
Personal credit card information is the most targeted privacy information for 
outsider and insider hackers since many people utilize online credit card shopping and the 
Internet is used for many of the transactions. As shown in chapter 3 of this thesis, the 
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higher risk security breach occurs through insider and outsider hacking. For security 
model demonstration purposes, the credit card online system is the suitable. The sample 
system will be shown on the next page. The following are the boundaries for the system: 
 
Outline Requirement 
 Customer is able to access his credit card account via the Internet to refer his credit 
card statement 
 Customer may change the credit card account password 
 Operator is able to access the customer's information from LAN in headquarters 
office and the web site in a branch office 
 Operator may send a letter concerning customer's credit statement   
 Operator may consult user's credit statement  
 Operator may modify, add, and delete customer's information 
 Administrator is able to access the customer's information from LAN in headquarters 
office and the web site in a branch office      
 Administrator may access to the customer information for maintenance  
 The system sample involves security breach threats, customers could be malicious 
outsider hackers, operators and administrators could be malicious insiders  
 A Dynamic Policy Engine Server will be included so as to provide the two dynamic 
policies presented in the previous chapter. 
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 Figure 21: Sample Credit Card Online System 
5-1-2. Use Case 
 
Use cases are useful in order to examine all actors, and the relationships between 
the actors and the system. The use case diagram for the system concerned the security 
model is presented below: 
 
- Customer: A Credit Account Owner 
- Operator: Credit Card Online System Operator  
- Administrator: Credit Card Online System Administrator 
A Branch
Customer
Internet Credit Card Online System
Operator
Administrator
Dynamic Policy 
Engine Server
<<Include>>
Operator
Administrator
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Figure 22: Use Case for the Secured System Model 
5-1-3. Scenarios 
 
A scenario is a particular activity path for the system. The scenario demonstrates 
the system flow and system purposes. Scenarios for each use case component are 
presented below: 
 
A-1. Normal Transaction with Customer 
A.1-1. Customer accesses the credit card online system via web site. 
A.1-2. Credit card online system shows the authentication window. 
A.1-3. The customer enters his/her “account No.”, “account password” and “web access 
Customer
Administrator
Operator
A) Operating 
Customer Credit 
Account
Operating via 
HTML
D2) Dynamic 
Information 
Policy 2
Operating via 
LAN
<<Include>>
E) Limited 
Access to 
Customer Credit 
Account
<<Extend>>
Condition:
Any Employee (Operator, Administrator)
Extension point:
Detecting over max number of access to the customer credit account
D1) Dynamic 
Information 
Policy 1
<<Include>>
B) 
Authentication 
and 
Authorization
<<Include>>
C) Auditing 
Event Log
<<Include>>
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password” and submits to the system. This event will be recorded. 
A.1-4. The customer is approved to access the online system. This event will be recorded. 
A.1-5. Store the following information into the working memory in the system, “account 
No.”, “access IP address”, “access thread ID”, “login time”, and "expiration time", and 
add this information into the returning data to the customer. 
A.1-6. The online system shows the customer account statement via the web site. 
A.1-7. Customer checks his/her own credit card account statement. The access is allowed 
only for his or her own account and followed with the access control matrix provided by 
the customer information object. 
A.1-8. The customer disconnects from the connection to the online system. This event 
will be recorded. 
A.1-9. The online system disconnects the customer service and shows the service ending 
windows. 
 
A-2. Normal Transaction with Operator and Administrator 
A.2-1. Operator or administrator accesses the credit card online system via web site or 
LAN. 
A.2-2. Credit card online system shows the authentication window. 
A.2-3. The operator or administrator use his/her “user ID” and “biometric data” to access 
the system. This event will be recorded. (The access is allowed from only exclusive 
computers for this system.) 
A.2-4. The operator or administrator is approved to access the online system. This event 
will be recorded. 
A.2-5. Store the following information into the working memory in the system, “user ID”, 
“access IP address”, “access thread ID”, “login time”, and "expiration time", and add this 
information into the returning data to the operator or administrator. 
A.2-6. The online system shows the online system main menu to handle the customer 
information via web site or LAN. 
A.2-7. The operator or administrator consults customer information with its “account 
No.”. This event will be recorded. 
A.2-8. The system shows the customer information corresponding to the “account No.”. 
A.2-9. A.2-7 and A.2-8 may be repeated. 
A.2-10. The operator or administrator disconnects from the connection to the online 
system. This event will be recorded.  
A.2-11. The online system disconnects the service and shows the service ending windows. 
This event will be recorded. 
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A-3. Invalid Authentication with Customer 
A.3-1. Customer accesses the credit card online system via web site. 
A.3-2. Credit card online system shows the Authentication window. 
A.3-3. The customer enters his/her “account No.”, “account password” and “web access 
password” into the system. This event will be recorded. 
A.3-4. The input data is invalid to access the online system. This event will be recorded. 
A.3-5. A.3-3 and A.3-4 transactions are repeated 2 times. 
A.3-6. The customer account status will move to "Prohibited" state. 
A.3-7. The customer needs to call the customer center to verify the customer 
authentication information and recover his/her account status normally. 
 
A-4. Invalid Authentication with Operator and Administrator 
A.4-1. Operator or administrator accesses the credit card online system via web site or 
LAN. 
A.4-2. Credit card online system shows the Authentication window. 
A.4-3. The operator or administrator uses “user ID” and “biometric data” to access the 
system. This event will be recorded. (The access is allowed from only exclusive 
computers for this system.) 
A.4-4. The biometric information is invalid to access the online system. This event will 
be recorded. 
A.4-5. A.4-3 and A.4-4 transactions are repeated 2 times. 
A.4-6. The operator or administrator account status will move to "Prohibited" state. 
A.4-7. The operator or administrator needs to call the security manager to check if there 
is any malicious usage, fix the problem and recover his/her account status normally. 
 
B-1. Authentication and Authorization with Customer 
B.1-1. Retrieve “account No.”, “account password” and “web access password” from the 
Authentication window. 
B.1-2. Match the input authentication data, “account password” and “web access 
password” with the authentication data in customer information database corresponding 
to the customer “account No.”. 
B.1-3. If both of the authentication data match, the system approves the customer to 
access the system. 
B.1-4. If both of the authentication data do not match, the system sends an invalid 
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authentication message to the customer. 
 
B-2. Authentication and Authorization with Operator and Administrator 
B.2-1. Retrieve “user ID” and “biometric data” from the authentication window. 
B.2-2. Match the authentication data, “biometric data”, and the authentication in 
employee information database corresponding to the employee “user ID”. 
B.2-3. If both of the authentication data match, the system approves the operator or 
administrator to access the system.  
B.2-4. If both of the authentication data do not match, the system sends an invalid 
authentication message to the operator or administrator. 
 
C-1. Auditing Event Log for Customer 
C.1-1. Retrieve “user ID”, “access IP address” and "login time/logoff time". 
C.1-2. Store the retrieved event log into the ROM media so as not to modify the event 
log. 
 
C-2. Auditing Event Log for Operator and Administrator 
C.2-1. Retrieve “user ID”, “user type” and “access IP address”. 
C.2-2. If the login or logoff action occurs, "Login/logoff Time" is retrieved. 
C.2-3. If a customer information access action occurs, the action type 
"Create/Read/Write/Delete", the customer’s “account No.”, “object type” and "Access 
Time" are retrieved. 
C.2-4. If an employee information access action occurs, the action type 
"Create/Read/Write/Delete", the employee’s “user ID”, “object type” and "Access Time" 
are retrieved.  
C.2-5. Store the retrieved event log into the ROM media so as not to modify the event 
log. 
 
D1-1. Dynamic Information Policy 1 (Normal Procedure) 
D1.1-1. The online system notifies the dynamic policy engine that the system has been 
activated. 
D1.1-2. The dynamic policy engine server checks the event logs in the online system. 
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D1.1-3. The dynamic policy engine server retrieves the following data: “user ID”, “user 
type”, “check time”, “first access time”, “last access time”, and “number of accesses (up 
to the last access time)” for each user (employee). 
D1.1-4. Repeat D1.1-2 and D1.1.3 every certain specified minute. 
D1.1-5. At the end of day, the dynamic policy engine server processes the retrieved data 
from the event logs statistically according to the procedure for dynamic policy 1, and 
stores the statistical data. 
D1.1-6. On every certain specified day, the dynamic policy engine server determines the 
average number of accesses and standard deviation. The max number of accesses is 
determined for each warning level. 
 
D1-2. Dynamic Information Policy 1 (Detected illegal number of accesses) 
D1.1-1. The online system notifies the dynamic policy engine that the system has been 
activated. 
D1.2-2. The dynamic policy engine server checks the event logs in the online system. 
D1.2-3. The dynamic policy engine server retrieves the following data: “user ID”, “user 
type”, “check time”, “first access time”, “last access time”, and "number of accesses (up 
to the last access time)” for each user (employee). 
D1.2-4. Repeat D1.2-2 and D1.2.3 every certain specified minute. 
D1.2-5. If more than or equal to the average number of accesses plus 3 times of the 
standard deviation determined in the last period is detected in a number of accesses for an 
operator or administrator, the engine notifies the system that the “user ID” is at the 
warning level 1. 
D1.2-6. Repeat D1.2-2 and D1.2.3 every certain minute. 
D1.2-7. If more than or equal to the average number of accesses plus 4 times of the 
standard deviation determined in the last period is detected in a number of accesses for an 
operator or administrator, the engine notifies the system that the “user ID” is at the 
warning level 2. 
D1.2-8. Repeat D1.2-2 and D1.2.3 every certain minute. 
D1.2-9. If more than or equal to the average number of accesses plus 5 times of the 
standard deviation determined in the last period is detected in a number of accesses for an 
operator or administrator, the engine notifies the system that the “user ID” is at the 
warning level 3. 
D1.2-10. Repeat D1.2-2 and D1.2.3 every certain minute. 
D1.2-11. If more than or equal to the average number of accesses plus 6 times of the 
standard deviation determined in the last period is detected in a number of accesses for an 
operator or administrator, the engine notifies the system that the “user ID” is at the 
warning level 4. 
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D2-1. Dynamic Information Policy 2 (Normal Procedure) 
D2.1-1. The online system notifies the dynamic policy engine that the system has been 
activated. 
D2.1-2. The dynamic policy engine server checks the event logs in the online system. 
D2.1-3. The dynamic policy engine server retrieves the following data: “user ID”, “user 
type”, “last access time”, “check time”, and "number of accesses (from the Last Check 
Time)" for each user (employee). 
D2.1-4. The dynamic policy engine server retrieves the following data: “object type”, 
“object confidential”, “last access time”, “check time”, and "number of accesses (from 
the last check time)" to each object type (customer and employee information). 
D2.1-5. Repeat D2.1-2 to D2.1.4 every certain specified minute. 
D2.1-6. At the end of a day, the dynamic policy engine server processes the retrieved data 
from the event logs statistically according to the procedure for dynamic policy 2, and 
stores the statistical data. 
D2.1-7. On every certain specified day, the dynamic policy engine server determines the 
numeric audit level for every access combination of the subject and object. The numeric 
audit level may be simplified such as level A1, A2 and A3. 
 
D2-2. Dynamic Information Policy 2 (Filtering Event Logs) 
D2.2-1. The online system notifies the dynamic policy engine that the system has been 
activated. 
D2.2-2. The dynamic policy engine server checks the event logs in the online system. 
D2.2-3. The system requires the dynamic policy engine server to filter the event logs with 
A3 audit level. 
D2.2-4. The dynamic policy engine server filters the event logs using the required audit 
level for the system. 
 
E-1. Limited Access to Customer Credit Account 
E.1-1. The online system shows the main menu to handle the customer information via 
web site or LAN. 
E.1-2. The operator or administrator consults customer information with its “account 
No.”. This event will be recorded. 
E.1-3. The system detects that the operator or administrator reaches warning level 1 of 
the dynamic policy 1. 
E.1-4. The system notices the operator or administrator that its number of accesses has 
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reached the warning level 1. 
E.1-5. The system notices the manager. 
E.1-6. Repeat E.1-2. 
E.1-7. The system detects that the operator or administrator reaches warning level 2 of 
the dynamic policy 1.  
E.1-8. The system notices the operator or administrator that its number of accesses has 
reached the warning level 2. 
E.1-9. The system notices the manager if access can be permitted. If access is allowed, 
the customer information corresponding to the “account No.” is shown to the operator or 
administrator. If not, the warning window is shown and the operator is advised to contact 
the manager. 
E.1-10. Repeat E.1-2. 
E.1-11. The system detects that the operator or administrator reaches warning level 3 of 
the dynamic policy 1. 
E.1-12. The system notices the operator or administrator that its number of accesses has 
reached the warning level 3. 
E.1-13. Repeat E.1-9. 
E.1-14. Repeat E.1-2. 
E.1-15. The system detects that the operator or administrator reaches warning level 4 of 
the dynamic policy 1. 
E.1-16. The system notices the operator or administrator that its number of accesses has 
reached the warning level 4. 
E.1-17. The system notices the manager and forces the operator or administrator to be 
disconnected from the system. If the operator or administrator needs to access the system, 
contact with a manager or other person in charge will be required. 
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5-2. Structural System Model corresponding to the information policies 
 
5-2-1. Class Description 
 
A class in the sample system is created based on the abovementioned use case 
and scenario. As the first step, objects are identified from the scenarios in a use case, and 
then, the objects will be grouped into a class. The following table shows identified 
objects and the class of each use case. 
 
Use Case Identified Objects Class Explication 
- Customer 
- Operator 
- Administrator 
User instance 
 
 
Enter customer, operator, and 
administrator information and 
request into the computers 
- Customer information 
- Employee information 
User information 
instance 
Store customer and employee 
information 
- Access control matrix Access control matrix 
instance 
Provide right of access for 
customer, operator and 
administrator 
A) 
Operatin
g 
Custome
r Credit 
Account 
- Authentication window 
- Authentication data prompt
Authentication instance Allow customer, operator, and 
administrator to access stored 
customer and employee 
information 
- Customer 
- Operator 
- Administrator 
User instance 
 
 
Enter customer, operator, and 
administrator authentication 
information on their computers. 
- Customer information 
- Employee information 
User information 
instance 
Store customer and employee 
authentication information 
B) 
Authenti
cation 
and 
Authoriz
ation 
 
 
- Authentication window 
- Authentication data prompt
Authentication instance Authenticate access customer, 
operator, and administrator with 
stored customer and employee 
information 
C) 
Auditing 
Event 
Log 
- Event log 
 
Event log instance Audit any event log regarding 
operating customer account 
- Retrieved data from event 
logs 
Dynamic policy 
variable instance 
Retrieve data for dynamic policy 1 
from event logs 
- Statistical data 
 
 
Dynamic policy 
statistical process 
instance 
Statistical process with the 
retrieved data for dynamic policy 
1 
D1) 
Dynamic 
Informati
on Policy 
1 
- Procedure 
 
Dynamic policy 
procedure instance 
Procedure to determine a warning 
level of each user 
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 - Control variables 
- Warning level 
Dynamic policy 
instance 
Control dynamic policy 1 and 
store a warning level of each user 
- Retrieved data from the 
event log 
Dynamic policy 
variable instance 
Retrieve data for dynamic policy 2 
from event logs 
- Statistical data 
 
 
Dynamic policy 
statistical process 
instance 
Statistical process with the 
retrieved data for dynamic policy 
2 
- Procedure 
 
Dynamic policy 
procedure instance 
Procedure to determine audit level 
of each combination of user and 
object 
D2) 
Dynamic 
Informati
on Policy 
2 
- Control variables 
- Audit level 
Dynamic policy 
instance 
Control dynamic policy 2 and 
store a audit level of each 
combination of user and object 
- Warning level 
- Number of accesses 
Limit access control 
instance 
Control and notify warning to 
customer, operator, and 
administrator 
E) 
Limited 
Access 
to 
Custome
r Credit 
Account 
- Customer 
- Operator  
- Administrator 
- Manager 
User instance 
 
 
Customer, operator, and 
administrator are notified by a 
warning on their computers 
Table 42: Identified Objects and Class Table 
With the above table, the identified objects are grouped into 10 classes in the 
online credit card system. The classes’ descriptions are shown in the following table. The 
classes are re-useable for similar systems. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 43: Class Description for the Security System Model 
 
5-2-2. Class Diagram 
 
The following diagram is a class diagram of the sample system. Please consult 
Class
UserPC
Userinf
DynP
DVariable
DStat
DProc
ACM
EvLog
Authent
LimitAcc
Authenticating class
Limited access control class
Retrieving variables class for the dynamic information policy
Procedure class for the dynamic information policy
Statistical value class for the dynamic information policy
Event log class
Description
User (Customer, Operator, Administrator) entity class
User's (Customer, Operator, Administrator)'s information class
Dynamic Information Policy class
Access control matrix class
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references62 for basic rules regarding the class diagram. Activity control matrix (ACM) 
class controls the access between “UserPC” and “UserInf.” The static information policy 
is applied for this control. Every access and log on/off action will be recorded. According 
to dynamic policy, every certain specified minute, the rule engine server checks the event 
logs. If anomalous activity is detected, “LimitAcc” class will be activated. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 23: Class Diagram for the Security System Model (Part I) 
                                                 
62 UML 2 for Dummies, Michael Jesse Chonoles, Page 20 –32 / UML 2.0 in a Nutshell, Dan Pilone, Neil 
Pitman, Page 32 –38 
UserPC
- user ID
- name
- web access password
- access IP address
- access thread ID
- login time
- expiration time
- other information
- retrieve authentication information
- send authentication data
- show other information
- modify other information
- send modified information
- show warning level
Userinf
- user ID
- name
- web access password
- access IP address
- access thread ID
- login time
- expiration time
- other information
- open database
- close database
- read authentication data
- read other information
- write other information
- issue thread ID/login time/expire time
- send activating signal
1 authenticating >
DynP
- check interval time
- estimate policy period
- retrieving variable type
- procedure type
- statistic method type
- target value
- defined rule
- retrieve variable
- statistical process
- execute procedure
- execute defined rule
EvLog
- user ID
- user type
- access IP address
- action type
- object type
- access time
- Store user events
one write and read only
1,n
Authent
- re-try numer of times
- window Size
- attempting number of times
- show authentication window
- match input authentication
data with its stored data
LimitAcc
- manager address
- user ID[i]
- notifying time
- warning level
- get warning level
- notify the warning level to user
- notify the warning level to manager
- pause to show user information
- resume to show user information
1
0,n
1,n 0,n
0,n
1
0,n
1,2
1
0,n
1
1,2
1 1
0,n
0,n
< authenticating
^ control access
control show >
store log >
< censor
filter >
< apply policy
get >
notify v
ACM
- subject
- object
- item
- state
- security level
- load access control matrix
- access control
- release access control matrix
< control
access >
< show
control >
1 1
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The following additional class diagram is for the dynamic policy class. The 
dynamic policy consists of the “Dvariable” class (retrieve and store variables), “Dstat” 
class (day statistical process), and “Dproc” class (determine target value for controlling 
the dynamic policy). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 24: Class Diagram for the Security System Model (Part II) 
5-2-3. Object Description 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 44: Object Description for the Security System Model 
DynP
- check interval time
- estimate policy period
- retrieving variable type
- statistic method type
- procedure type
- target value
- defined rule
DProc 
- procedure value
- procedure coefficient
- execute procedure
DVariable
- variables
- retrieve variable
DStat 
- statistical value
- cross table process
- statistical process
- execute defined rule
0,n
1
0,n
1
Class Object
UserPC Admin
UserPC Opertr
UserPC Custm
Userinf Employ
Userinf Custm
DynP Policy1
DynP Policy2
Dvariable Policy1
Dvariable Policy2
Dproc Policy1
Dproc Policy2
Dstat Policy1
Dstat Policy2
EvLog EvLog
Authent Authent
LimitAcc LimitAcc
Authenticating user (customer, Operator, Adminstrator) object
Limited access control object corresponding to dynamic information policy 1
Description
System administrator object for the credit card online system 
Oprator object for the credit card online system 
Customer object for the credit card online system 
Retrieving variable from event log in the system object for dynamic information policy 1
Procedure for dynamic information policy 2 object to determine audit level
Statistical value to use for procedure of dynamic information policy 1
Statistical value to use for procedure of dynamic information policy 2
Event log object for the system
Procedure for dynamic information policy 1 object to determine max number of access
Employee information
Customer information and credit card statement
Dynamic information policy 1 object
Dynamic information policy 2 object
Retrieving variable from event log in the system object for dynamic information policy 2
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The previous table shows objects in the sample system. The below objects are 
identified through the aforementioned scenarios. See the “table 42: Identified Objects and 
Class Table”. Some objects have the same name as their respective classes. For example, 
object “EvLog” has the same name as class “EvLog”. This means that “EvLog” class has 
only one “EvLog” object. 
 
5-2-4. Object Diagram 
 
UserPC class object 
“Administrator”, “Operator”, and “Customer” objects inherit their attributes and methods 
from “UserPC” class. On the “Customer” object window, only own account is shown. On 
the “Operator” object window, all customer account information is shown. On the 
“Administrator” object window, any user involved, customer, operator, and administrator 
information are shown. 
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Figure 25: Object Diagram :: UserPC Class 
 
UserInf class object 
“Customer Information” Object and “Employee Information” object inherit from 
“UserInf” class. Customer authenticates his/her “account No.”, “password for the 
account” and “web access password” while employee authenticates his/her “user ID”, 
“web access password” and “biometric information” 
 
 
 
 
UserInf Class
- user ID
- name
- web access password
- access IP address
- access thread ID
- login time
- expiration time
- retrieve authentication information
- send authentication data
- show other information
- modify other information
- send modified information
- show warning level
UserPC.Custm
- account No.
- password for account
- home address
- telephone No.
- social security No.
- amount
- show account information
- modify account information
UserPC.Admin
- biometical information (admin)
- user ID[i]
- name[i]
- department[i]
- biometical information[i]
- account No.[i]
- show account information
- show employee information
- modify employee information
- list account informration
- list employee information
UserPC.Opertr
- biometical information
- department
- user ID[i] (customer)
- name[i] (customer)
- account No.[i]
- home address[i]
- telephone No.[i]
- social security No.[i]
- amount[i]
- show account information
- modify account information
- list account informration
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Figure 26: Object Diagram :: UserInf Class 
 
ACM (Access Control Matrix) object 
 
ACM class object has the following access control matrix. This 
matrix will be loaded into the system working memory when 
the system initiates. This access control matrix has updated 
from the access control matrix presented in the previous 
chapter. “Print” and “Delete” access right is added for this 
access control matrix. 
Figure 27: Object Diagram :: ACM Class 
 
ACM
- subject
- object
- item
- state
- security level
- load access control matrix
- access control
- release access control 
matrix
UserInf Class
- user ID
- name
- web access password
- access IP address
- access thread ID
- login time
- expiration time
- open database
- close database
- read authentication data
- issue thread ID/login time/expire time
- send activating signal
UserInf.Custm
- account No.
- password for account
- home address
- telephone No.
- social security No.
- amount
- account status
- read account information
- write account information
- read list account informration
UserInf.Employee
- user type
- biometical information
- department
- read employee information
- write employee information
- read list employee informration
 98
Table 45: Load Access Control Matrix for the Security System Model 
Level
unregistered registered prohibited
unclassified -- -- --
unclassified -- write --
unclassified -- read --
protected apend delete/apend --
protected apend delete/apend --
confidential -- write --
confidential -- write --
confidential -- write --
confidential -- read --
confidential -- -- --
unclassified write read/print read/print
unclassified write read/print read/print
unclassified write read/print read/print
protected -- delete --
protected -- delete --
confidential write read/print read/print
confidential write read/print read/print
confidential write read read
confidential -- read read
confidential write write/print write/print
unclassified -- read/print read/print
unclassified -- read/print read/print
unclassified -- read/print read/print
protected -- -- --
protected -- -- --
confidential -- -- --
confidential -- -- --
confidential -- -- --
confidential -- -- --
confidential -- write/print write/print
confidential --
confidential
confidential --
protected
confidential --
protected --
confidential --
confidential --
confidential --
protected delete/apend
confidential --
protected write
confidential write/print
confidential write/print
confidential write/print
protected delete/apend
confidential write/print
protected write
StateItem
name
Employee Information
name
user ID
web access password
Customer
department
biometric information
social security No.
user ID
name
web access password
Customer Information
account status
account status
social security No.
account No.
user ID
Customer
Operator
Administrator
telephone No.
Operator
Administrator
web access password
user type
user ID
biometric information
department
biometric information
name
department
web access password
user ID
password (account)
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Figure 28: Object Diagram :: Dynamic Policy Class 
 
Dynamic policy class object 
The objects relating to dynamic policy are shown in the above figure. Two dynamic 
information policies are accounted for in the system model. Any dynamic policy consists 
of variable object, statistical process object, and procedure object. The variable object 
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1
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retrieves and stores necessary items from the event log. The statistical process object 
processes the retrieved variables to generate statistical values everyday. The procedure 
object defines some target values for controlling the dynamic policy. For example, in the 
previous chapter, the number of accesses for each user is retrieved and stored. The 
retrieved value will be the number of accesses per day through the statistical process 
object. Afterward, the average and standard deviation of the number of accesses during 
certain periods are calculated through the procedure, and then the max number of 
accesses for each user for next period will be estimated. Similarly, the dynamic 
information policy 2 is also exerted through the dynamic policy 2 objects on the previous 
page. 
 
Entire Object Diagram 
The whole object diagram is shown on next page. Because of limited page size, attributes 
and methods of each object are omitted. It is clear how the objects relate each other. For 
example, the dynamic policy 1 checks the event log every certain minute, and the certain 
value determine with three objects, “DVariable.Policy1”, “DStat.Policy1” and 
“DProc.Policy1”. If the anomaly activity is detected, the dynamic policy 1 will be applied, 
and “LimitAcc” is activated. For the dynamic policy 2, the certain value will be 
determined with the same fashion as the dynamic policy 1. Afterward, applying the 
dynamic policy 2, the event log will be filtered and show only higher important event log. 
Access between “UserPC” and “UserInf” is controlled by the ACM (access control 
matrix) object. 
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Figure 29: Object Diagram for the Security System Model 
 
5-3. Behavioral System Model corresponding to the information policies 
 
Behavioral system model shows how objects act in the system and communicate 
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the other objects. Each behavioral system diagram has particular purpose. “Activity 
Diagram” will be presented from the behavioral diagrams provided in UML.  
 
5-3-1. Activity Diagram 
 
User Login 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 30: Activity Diagram for User Login (Part I) 
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Figure 31: Activity Diagram for User Login (Part II) 
Activity diagrams show how the object acts for certain function. The first 
activity diagram is for user login function. “UserPC” class, “Authent” class and “EvLog” 
classes are related to this function. The activity diagram is divided with three classes. The 
process belongs to its class. Its attribute and method also belong to its class. This design 
is introduced in UML from its version 2.0. The activity diagram shows the scenario in 
case of occurring valid login, invalid login. The scenario auditing event log is also 
included. 
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User Access 
Figure 32: Activity Diagram for User Access (Part I) 
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The second activity diagram is for user access. “UserPC” class, “ACM” class 
and “EvLog” class are related to this function. The activity diagram is divided by three 
columns, which are “Operator”, “Administrator”, and “Customer” besides of the related 
classes. It is very useful to compare a role with other roles and it helps the developer to 
understand the interface among the objects. At every access to the customer or employee 
information, “ACM” class is called, and then according to the access control matrix, the 
system allows the user to access the information. Every access event is recorded. 
Figure 33: Activity Diagram for User Access (Part II) 
The below sub-activity diagram shows how the system verify that the user hold 
the same login information such as “user ID”, “access IP address”, “access thread ID”, 
and “login time” as the system for the user.  
 
Dynamic Policy 1 
The next activity diagram is for dynamic policy 1. Many classes are related to the 
function. “DynP.Policy1” object checks the event log every certain minute. Its descendent 
object retrieves some necessary variables and generates statistical value. After certain 
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period, the max number of accesses each warning level will be determined based on the 
procedure defined in the previous chapter. When the anomaly number of accesses is 
detected, the defined rule will be applied correspond to the warning level. This detection 
is provided by “LimitAcc” object. The following activity diagram shows this process 
flow clearly.  
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Figure 34: Activity Diagram for Dynamic Policy 1 (Part I) 
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Figure 35: Activity Diagram for Dynamic Policy 1 (Part II) 
 
Dynamic Policy 2 
The next activity diagram is for dynamic policy 2. “DynP.Policy2” object and “EvLog” 
object are related to the function. At every certain minute, the “DynP.Policy” object 
checks the event log, and its descendent objects retrieve the variable for the dynamic 
policy. Through the “DVariable.policy2” object, every user will have two values, 
determining the frequency of access and occupation rate among other users, to assess the 
unusual use level. For the same fashion for the object, the frequency of access to the 
object is delivered for each object. 
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Figure 36: Activity Diagram for Dynamic Policy 2 (Part I) 
As the same fashion as the dynamic policy 1, the statistical value generated 
everyday, and the audit level is determined through the “DProc.Policy2” object. The audit 
level will be determined every combination of user[i] and object[o]. Any event log 
always includes subject (who access) and object (whom accessed), so audit level value 
should be a linear value with the frequency of access, occupation rate among other users, 
and the frequency of access to the object. Audit level can be expressed as: 
L(i, o):  Event log = certain i access certain o 
 
As a result, each event log will be deployed with the audit level. Using current 
audit level, only higher important event log will be shown. 
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Figure 37: Activity Diagram for Dynamic Policy 2 (Part II) 
The equation to calculate the audit level is already presented in the previous 
chapter. The audit level is determined with k1, k2, p1, p2, and p3. The coefficient k1 and 
k2 may be different from each system since the system goal, or system engineer and 
stakeholder policy are different at every system. For this thesis, delivered value for k1 is 
0.0012, and the value for k2 is 0.065. The coefficient value is determined with 200 
sample event logs. Finally, audit level should be rated with A1, A2, or A3 to be simplified 
the audit level assessment. 
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5-4. Systems Verification 
 
The verification process is one of the most important processes for systems 
engineers. During the progress of the thesis, it was revealed usage of dynamic 
information policy reduces information risks. Through an analysis of recent security 
breaches, two countermeasures are recognized, and based on the analysis dynamic 
information policies and security mechanisms are developed. This section aims to verify 
whether the information policies and security mechanisms reduce the threat of 
information risk. 
 
5-4-1. Test Data 
 
It is desirable to use realistic test data containing customer access event logs to 
verify the security mechanism. Test data are provided in commercialized publications in 
Japan. For instance, J-sys software63 released a test data generator, ER/DataGen64. This 
tool generates test data based on ER (entity relationship) diagrams 65 , database 
specification such as table name and field name, defined items such as customer name 
and account number, and malicious activity scenarios. Another company, Aglaia Co.66 
provides customized test data through a consultation and briefing. Aglais Co. has kindly 
                                                 
63 J-sys software co., ltd. homepage, http://www.jsys.co.jp  
64 ER/DataGen Catalog http://www.jsys-products.com/download/catalog/ERDataGen_200502.pdf  
65 Entity-Relationship Diagrams (ERD), http://www.umsl.edu/~sauter/analysis/er/er_intro.html  
66 Aglaia Co. Homepage, http://aglaia.cc/profile.html 
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provided simple test data used for information leak tests for the research purpose. The 
following specification is used to generate the test data. 
 
 Entity-Relationship Diagram and Table Structure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Items 
 
 
 
 
 
 Malicious Scenario 
- On Feb. 17, 2003, “User3” stole 30 customers’ account balance information 
during a lunch break (12:00PM – 13:00PM). 
- On Feb. 18, 2003, “User3” stole 35 customers’ credit history during a lunch 
break (12:00PM – 13:00PM). 
Figure 38: Required Material to Generate Test Data 
1
2
3
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Tsutomu Maebashi
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Subject
1
2
3
4
5
6
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Objet 2
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List Name
Max List Num
Object 1
Account No.
Account Name
User Birth Date
Object 4
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Balance 1
Balance 2
Object 6
History ID
Account No.
Trans Date
Debt Flag
Debt Date
Debt Amount
Withdraw Date
Withdraw Amount
Object 3
Address ID
Account No.
Address
Telephone No.
∞
∞
∞
∞
1
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Two malicious activities by user3 must be detected by static and dynamic policies. It 
results in reducing information risk. 
 
5-4-2. Data Analysis 
 
The test data are analyzed with the aforementioned security mechanism based on 
a dynamic information policy in chapter 4. The following steps are shown in the security 
mechanism. 
 Step 1. Identify necessary variables 
 Step 2. Statistical process 
 Step 3. Performing procedure 
 
Data analysis for each dynamic policy is shown as follows. 
 
Dynamic Information Policy 1: (Censor not only contents but also the amount) 
 
Step 1: Identify necessary variables 
Access date, access time, user ID, and number of accesses every 10 minutes are tracked. 
The following table shows the number of accesses accumulated every hour. It would be 
most desirable to show the accumulated number every 10 minutes. However, this has 
been reduced for lack of space. 
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Figure 39: Datasheet of Number of Accesses by User 1, 2, and 3 
 
Step 2: Statistical Process 
Amounts of number of accesses for users from Feb. 10, 2003 to Feb. 18, 2003 are totaled 
every day. The following table is the totaled number of accesses. 
 
Figure 40: Datasheet of Totaled Number of Accesses each Day 
Malicious activities occurring on Feb. 17, 2003 and Feb. 18, 2003 will be detected based 
1 Yukiko Tanaka 10:00 11:00 12:00 13:00 14:00 15:00 16:00 17:00 18:00 19:00
02/10/2003 0 3 7 14 23 32 47 68 72 72
02/11/2003 7 13 15 20 48 61 61 62 70 73
02/12/2003 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 9 10 10
02/13/2003 1 3 5 15 20 28 37 70 70 70
02/14/2003 4 10 14 20 25 32 35 50 68 69
02/17/2003 2 13 13 16 16 17 28 45 50 50
02/18/2003 9 11 11 16 21 35 50 54 59 60
2 Tsutomu Maebashi 10:00 11:00 12:00 13:00 14:00 15:00 16:00 17:00 18:00 19:00
02/10/2003 4 8 16 25 32 48 51 64 68 68
02/11/2003 7 17 17 23 49 56 59 63 73 74
02/12/2003 0 4 9 9 16 25 38 60 77 77
02/13/2003 3 6 9 12 20 32 37 70 70 70
02/14/2003 3 16 27 30 43 54 55 60 74 75
02/17/2003 6 19 21 32 33 37 50 72 76 76
02/18/2003 6 10 10 12 24 36 59 71 82 84
3 Shinichi Sekine 10:00 11:00 12:00 13:00 14:00 15:00 16:00 17:00 18:00 19:00
02/10/2003 1 5 13 21 28 38 45 58 60 60
02/11/2003 7 10 12 25 48 59 60 62 68 69
02/12/2003 0 5 9 9 19 30 43 65 77 77
02/13/2003 3 7 8 16 24 28 37 54 55 55
02/14/2003 5 10 12 17 29 42 44 49 60 62
02/17/2003 4 16 40 47 53 67 79 98 101 101
02/18/2003 5 14 57 60 66 78 96 105 108 108
User Name 02/10/2003 02/11/2003 02/12/2003 02/13/2003 02/14/2003 02/17/2003 02/18/2003
1 Yukiko Tanaka 72 73 10 70 69 50 60
2 Tsutomu Maebashi 68 74 77 70 75 77 84
3 Shinichi Sekine 60 69 77 55 62 101 108
Average Access 67 72 55 65 69 76 84
Total Access 200 216 164 195 206 228 252
Average 70
Total 1461
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on number of accesses in the dy (Feb. 10, 2003 to Feb. 14, 2003: 5days) period.  
 
Step 3: Performing Procedure 
The procedure developed in chapter 4 is performed. Please see the detailed explanation 
for this procedure on page 60 to 6267. The results of this procedure are shown as follows. 
Ave: Average of number of accesses 
σ: Standard Deviation of number of accesses 
MAX#W1: Max number of accesses in Warning level 1 
MAX#W2: Max number of accesses in Warning level 2 
MAX#W3: Max number of accesses in Warning level 3 
MAX#W4: Max number of accesses in Warning level 4 
Figure 41: Datasheet of Procedure Process for Dynamic Information Policy 1 
Finally, the following activities are detected with the above procedure and 
defined rule in the procedure. 
- Feb. 17, 2003 17:10:00, user3 access is detected, and a warning message is sent to 
user3 
- Feb. 17, 2003 17:20:00, user3 access is detected, and manager approval is required. 
- Feb. 18, 2003 16:40:00, user3 access is detected, and warning message is sent to 
user3. 
- Feb. 18, 2003 16:50:00, user3 access is detected, and manager approval is required. 
- Feb. 18, 2003 18:00:00, user3 access is detected, and manager approval is required. 
- Feb. 18, 2003 19:00:00, user2 access is detected, and warning message is sent to 
user2. 
 
                                                 
67 Please see 4-3-1: Dynamic Information Policy 1 about definition of each 
User Name Ave σ Ave+2σ Ave-2σ Re_Ave Re_σ MAX # W1 MAX # W2 MAX # W3 MAX # W4
1 Yukiko Tanaka 59 24.44 108 10 59 24.44 132 157 181 205
2 Tsutomu Maebashi 73 3.31 79 66 73 3.31 83 86 89 93
3 Shinichi Sekine 65 7.66 80 49 65 7.66 88 95 103 111
Acceptable renge
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The dynamic policy provides a chance to alert a manager or security manager of user3’s 
malicious activity. When the malicious activities are recognized, it will be easy to identify 
a suspect. Moreover, a warning message and the requirement of manager approval 
threaten user3. User3 might not attempt to steal confidential customer data. 
 
Dynamic Information Policy 2: (Improve accountability to trace any insider hacker’s 
action) 
 
Step 1: Identify necessary variables 
Access date, access time, user ID, access frequency of a subject, access occupation rate, 
and access frequency to an object are identified every hour. The data table containing the 
above-identified data is as follows. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 42: Datasheet of Frequency of Access of User 
1 Yukiko Tanaka 10:00 11:00 12:00 13:00 14:00 15:00 16:00 17:00 18:00 19:00 Max Total
02/10/2003 0 3 4 7 9 9 15 21 4 0 72
02/11/2003 7 6 2 5 28 13 0 1 8 3 73
02/12/2003 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 1 0 10
02/13/2003 1 2 2 10 5 8 9 33 0 0 70
02/14/2003 4 6 4 6 5 7 3 15 18 1 69
02/17/2003 2 11 0 3 0 1 11 17 5 0 50
02/18/2003 9 2 0 5 5 14 15 4 5 1 60
73
2 Tsutomu Maebash10:00 11:00 12:00 13:00 14:00 15:00 16:00 17:00 18:00 19:00 Max Total
02/10/2003 4 4 8 9 7 16 3 13 4 0 68
02/11/2003 7 10 0 6 26 7 3 4 10 1 74
02/12/2003 0 4 5 0 7 9 13 22 17 0 77
02/13/2003 3 3 3 3 8 12 5 33 0 0 70
02/14/2003 3 13 11 3 13 11 1 5 14 1 75
02/17/2003 6 13 2 11 1 4 13 22 4 0 76
02/18/2003 6 4 0 2 12 12 23 12 11 2 84
84
3 Shinichi Sekine 10:00 11:00 12:00 13:00 14:00 15:00 16:00 17:00 18:00 19:00 Max Total
02/10/2003 1 4 8 8 7 10 7 13 2 0 60
02/11/2003 7 3 2 13 23 11 1 2 6 1 69
02/12/2003 0 5 4 0 10 11 13 22 12 0 77
02/13/2003 3 4 1 8 8 4 9 17 1 0 55
02/14/2003 5 5 2 5 12 13 2 5 11 2 62
02/17/2003 4 12 24 7 6 14 12 19 3 0 101
02/18/2003 5 9 43 3 6 12 18 9 3 0 108
108
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Figure 43: Datasheet of Occupancy Rate of User 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 Yukiko Tanaka 10:00 11:00 12:00 13:00 14:00 15:00 16:00 17:00 18:00 19:00 Ave Max
02/10/2003 0% 27% 20% 29% 39% 26% 60% 45% 40% 0% 60%
02/11/2003 33% 32% 50% 21% 36% 42% 0% 14% 33% 60% 60%
02/12/2003 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 15% 3% 0% 100%
02/13/2003 14% 22% 33% 48% 24% 33% 39% 40% 0% 0% 48%
02/14/2003 33% 25% 24% 43% 17% 23% 50% 60% 42% 25% 60%
02/17/2003 17% 31% 0% 14% 0% 5% 31% 29% 42% 0% 42%
02/18/2003 45% 13% 0% 50% 22% 37% 27% 16% 26% 33% 50%
60%
2 Tsutomu Maebash10:00 11:00 12:00 13:00 14:00 15:00 16:00 17:00 18:00 19:00 Ave Max
02/10/2003 80% 36% 40% 38% 30% 46% 12% 28% 40% 0% 80%
02/11/2003 33% 53% 0% 25% 34% 23% 75% 57% 42% 20% 75%
02/12/2003 0% 44% 56% 0% 41% 45% 50% 42% 57% 0% 57%
02/13/2003 43% 33% 50% 14% 38% 50% 22% 40% 0% 0% 50%
02/14/2003 25% 54% 65% 21% 43% 35% 17% 20% 33% 25% 65%
02/17/2003 50% 36% 8% 52% 14% 21% 36% 38% 33% 0% 52%
02/18/2003 30% 27% 0% 20% 52% 32% 41% 48% 58% 67% 67%
64%
3 Shinichi Sekine 10:00 11:00 12:00 13:00 14:00 15:00 16:00 17:00 18:00 19:00 Ave Max
02/10/2003 20% 36% 40% 33% 30% 29% 28% 28% 20% 0% 40%
02/11/2003 33% 16% 50% 54% 30% 35% 25% 29% 25% 20% 54%
02/12/2003 0% 56% 44% 0% 59% 55% 50% 42% 40% 0% 59%
02/13/2003 43% 44% 17% 38% 38% 17% 39% 20% 100% 0% 100%
02/14/2003 42% 21% 12% 36% 40% 42% 33% 20% 26% 50% 50%
02/17/2003 33% 33% 92% 33% 86% 74% 33% 33% 25% 0% 92%
02/18/2003 25% 60% 100% 30% 26% 32% 32% 36% 16% 0% 100%
71%
1 Accoun No., Nam10:00 11:00 12:00 13:00 14:00 15:00 16:00 17:00 18:00 19:00 Max Total
(level 1) 02/10/2003 2 0 2 6 5 8 9 9 2 0 43
02/11/2003 6 5 0 6 21 5 0 1 4 0 48
02/12/2003 0 3 5 0 6 5 8 11 8 0 46
02/13/2003 2 2 0 5 3 7 6 20 0 0 45
02/14/2003 4 5 5 7 4 9 2 4 14 1 55
02/17/2003 4 7 2 5 1 5 12 18 3 1 58
02/18/2003 3 4 0 3 3 15 17 6 1 0 52
58
2 Account List (low10:00 11:00 12:00 13:00 14:00 15:00 16:00 17:00 18:00 19:00 Max Total
(level 1) 02/10/2003 0 0 4 5 4 7 4 13 2 0 39
02/11/2003 1 3 0 7 17 6 3 0 3 0 40
02/12/2003 0 2 0 0 1 7 5 11 6 0 32
02/13/2003 4 4 0 7 4 5 4 19 1 0 48
02/14/2003 2 4 2 2 10 8 1 9 9 1 48
02/17/2003 1 7 0 5 3 3 4 11 2 0 36
02/18/2003 5 4 0 1 4 9 10 8 7 0 48
48
3 Address, Telepho 10:00 11:00 12:00 13:00 14:00 15:00 16:00 17:00 18:00 19:00 Max Total
(level 1) 02/10/2003 1 2 4 3 7 11 4 10 3 0 45
02/11/2003 3 5 0 4 9 10 0 1 7 4 43
02/12/2003 1 0 0 0 4 3 3 11 7 0 29
02/13/2003 0 1 1 1 3 5 6 9 0 0 26
02/14/2003 1 5 3 2 5 5 0 4 6 0 31
02/17/2003 3 4 0 1 1 5 9 8 3 0 34
02/18/2003 4 1 0 1 7 5 14 4 3 0 39
45
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Figure 44: Datasheet of Frequency of Access to an Object 
 
Step 2: Statistical Process 
Access frequency of user1 to 3 and max of occupation rate (% / h)68 of the users from 
Feb. 10, 2003 to Feb. 18, 2003 are totaled every day. The following table is a cross table 
of the above data. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
68 Please see 4-3-2: Dynamic Information Policy 2 about statistical variables 
5 Balance 10:00 11:00 12:00 13:00 14:00 15:00 16:00 17:00 18:00 19:00 Max Total
(level 2) 02/10/2003 1 3 5 5 3 5 3 9 2 0 36
02/11/2003 6 5 2 2 11 5 1 2 4 0 38
02/12/2003 0 1 2 0 2 2 6 7 7 0 27
02/13/2003 1 1 2 3 5 4 4 13 0 0 33
02/14/2003 1 5 4 2 7 4 2 2 7 1 35
02/17/2003 2 9 0 2 1 4 8 7 3 0 36
02/18/2003 5 5 41 2 3 6 9 4 5 1 81
81
4 Password (unvisib10:00 11:00 12:00 13:00 14:00 15:00 16:00 17:00 18:00 19:00 Max Total
(level 2) 02/10/2003 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 3
02/11/2003 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
02/12/2003 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
02/13/2003 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 0 3
02/14/2003 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
02/17/2003 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 2
02/18/2003 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 4
4
6 Account History 10:00 11:00 12:00 13:00 14:00 15:00 16:00 17:00 18:00 19:00 Max Total
(level 2) 02/10/2003 1 5 5 5 4 4 5 4 1 0 34
02/11/2003 4 1 1 4 19 5 0 3 6 1 44
02/12/2003 0 3 1 0 4 3 4 12 2 0 29
02/13/2003 0 1 3 5 5 3 3 20 0 0 40
02/14/2003 4 5 3 1 3 5 1 6 7 1 36
02/17/2003 2 9 24 8 1 1 3 13 1 0 62
02/18/2003 3 1 0 3 5 3 6 3 2 2 28
62
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Figure 45: Datasheet of Totaled Number of Accesses and Maximum Occupancy each Day 
In addition, access frequency to object 1 to 6 in the same period as the other statistical 
variables are totaled every day. The following table is shown the variables. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 46: Datasheet of Totaled Frequency of Access to an Object 
1 Yukiko Tanaka Total MAX
02/10/2003 72 60%
02/11/2003 73 60%
02/12/2003 10 100%
02/13/2003 70 48%
02/14/2003 69 60%
02/17/2003 50 42%
02/18/2003 60 50%
2 Tsutomu Maebashi Total MAX
02/10/2003 68 80%
02/11/2003 74 75%
02/12/2003 77 57%
02/13/2003 70 50%
02/14/2003 75 65%
02/17/2003 76 52%
02/18/2003 84 67%
3 Shinichi Sekine Total MAX
02/10/2003 60 40%
02/11/2003 69 54%
02/12/2003 77 59%
02/13/2003 55 100%
02/14/2003 62 50%
02/17/2003 101 92%
02/18/2003 108 100%
1 Accoun No., Name, Birth Max Total
(level 1) 02/10/2003 43
02/11/2003 48
02/12/2003 46
02/13/2003 45
02/14/2003 55
02/17/2003 58
02/18/2003 52
2 Account List (low level) Max Total
(level 1) 02/10/2003 39
02/11/2003 40
02/12/2003 32
02/13/2003 48
02/14/2003 48
02/17/2003 36
02/18/2003 48
3 Address, Telephone No. Max Total
(level 1) 02/10/2003 45
02/11/2003 43
02/12/2003 29
02/13/2003 26
02/14/2003 31
02/17/2003 34
02/18/2003 39
4 Password (unvisible) Max Total
(level 2) 02/10/2003 3
02/11/2003 3
02/12/2003 1
02/13/2003 3
02/14/2003 1
02/17/2003 2
02/18/2003 4
5 Balance Max Total
(level 2) 02/10/2003 36
02/11/2003 38
02/12/2003 27
02/13/2003 33
02/14/2003 35
02/17/2003 36
02/18/2003 81
6 Account History Max Total
(level 2) 02/10/2003 34
02/11/2003 44
02/12/2003 29
02/13/2003 40
02/14/2003 36
02/17/2003 62
02/18/2003 28
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Step 3: Performing Procedure 
The procedure developed in chapter 4 is performed. Please see a detail explanation for 
this procedure on page 67 to 71. The results of this procedure are shown as follows. 
Figure 47: Datasheet of Procedure Process for Dynamic Information Policy 2 
Using the above equation, an audit level for each combination of a subject and object are 
determined. At this moment, a delivered value (k1 = 0.0012, k2 = 0.065) in chapter 4 is 
used as coefficients k1 and k2. An audit level matrix is shown as follows. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 48: Audit Level Matrix in Test Data 
With the dynamic policy 2, a log size will be 903 records. The total test log size is 1461, 
so it is decreased by 38%. It is only a small contribution to reduce log size. Improvisation 
p1(i) p2(i) Max Total Level p3(o)
i = 1 73 60% o = 1 58 1 58
i = 2 84 64% o = 2 48 1 48
i = 3 108 71% o = 3 45 1 45
o = 4 4 2 8
o = 5 81 2 162
o = 6 62 2 124
i , o L i , o L i , o L
1, 1 7.3 1, 2 6.1 1, 3 5.7
2, 1 8.2 2, 2 6.8 2, 3 6.4
3, 1 10.2 3, 2 8.4 3, 3 7.9
i , o L i , o L i , o L
1, 4 1.0 1, 5 20.5 1, 6 15.7
2, 4 1.1 2, 5 23.0 2, 6 17.6
3, 4 1.4 3, 5 28.4 3, 6 21.8
L(i, o, dy) = k1*p1(i, dy)*p3(o, dy) + k2*p2(i, dy)*p3(o, dy)  
Estimate the audit level from Feb 10, 2003 to Feb 18, 2003. 
k1 and k2 are adjusted coefficients determined by security managers, 
stakeholders, or organization policy.  
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or revision is required in this case. Improvement will be shown in section 5-3-3: 
Improvement. 
 
5-4-3. Improvements 
 
Dynamic Policy 1: 
 
Some improvements may be required. For example, in the dynamic policy 1, it is 
required to revise the average number of accesses and standard deviation, which are 
factors to determine a warning level (1 to 4). Warning level for user 1 is determined based 
on the number of accesses from Feb. 10, 2003 to Feb. 14, 2003. On Feb. 12, 2004, the 
number of accesses is only 10. The number is taken into account in revising the average 
number of accesses and the standard deviation, even though it is not desirable since the 
number is quite small.  
*Number of accesses on Feb, 12, 2003 (10) is still ranges between 10 and 59. 
Figure 49: Datasheet of Number of Accesses on Feb. 12, 2003 
Moreover, if such a small number is taken into account in determining the number of 
accesses for each warning level, the number of each warning level will be too high to 
accept. 
 
User Name 02/12/2003 Ave σ Ave+2σ Ave-2σ Re_Ave Re_σ
1 Yukiko Tanaka 10 59 24.44095 10 59 59 24.44
Acceptable renge
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Figure 50: Datasheet of Procedure Process for User 1 
Another algorithm is required to determine an acceptable range. Quality management in 
systems69 presents a suitable idea to determine the acceptable range. In this book, the 
following equation is provided in order to determine a control limit.  
UCL = Average + 3*σ/√number of sample 
LCL = Average - 3*σ/√number of sample 
 
The above equation will be applied to determine the acceptable range. The result is as 
follows. 
Figure 51: Datasheet of Procedure Process after Improvement 
Using the aforementioned equation, the number of accesses on Feb. 12, 2003 will be out 
of the acceptable range, and average and standard deviation after revision will be the 
most suitable valuea to determine the number of accesses for each warning level. 
 
Another possible improvement is that the number of accesses for each warning 
level can have revision value k1 to k4. This allows systems to have a more suitable 
number of accesses each warning level. The following table is an example. 
 
                                                 
69 Quality Management in Systems, Guangming Zhang, University of Maryland, 1998, Page 24 – 26 
User Name Ave+3σ/√4 Ave-3σ/√4 Re_Ave Re_σ MAX # W1 MAX # W2 MAX # W3 MAX # W4
1 Yukiko Tanaka 96 22 71 1.58 76 77 79 80
2 Tsutomu Maebashi 78 67 73 3.31 83 86 89 93
3 Shinichi Sekine 77 53 65 7.66 88 95 103 111
Acceptable renge
User Name Ave σ Ave+2σ Ave-2σ Re_Ave Re_σ MAX # W1 MAX # W2 MAX # W3 MAX # W4
1 Yukiko Tanaka 59 24.44 108 10 59 24.44 132 157 181 205
Acceptable renge
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Figure 52: Example of Revision for Maximum Number of Accesses for each Warning 
Level 
The maximum number of accesses with revision is determined by k1*MAX#W1, 
k2*MAX#W2, k3*MAX#W3, and k4*MAX#W4. The dynamic information policy is 
very flexible to determine the number of accesses each warning level, and depends on 
developers’ experiments and systems environments. 
 
Dynamic Policy 2: 
 
Using delivered coefficients (k1 = 0.0012, k2 = 0.065) in chapter 4, the dynamic 
policy 2 contributes to reduce a log size by only 38%, since the coefficient values are not 
appropriate for the test data. The coefficients must be adjusted depending on certain 
experiments in a target system and security manager’s or stakeholder opinions so as to 
reach a suitable audit level for the target system. An audit level is basically 0 to 10. The 
coefficients values (k1 and k2) will be adjusted so that a combination of user 3 and object 
5, and a combination of user 3 and object 6 are an audit level 3 (> 8). An audit level 
matrix after this revision is as follows. 
MAX # W1 MAX # W2 MAX # W3 MAX # W4
Revision Value
k1 k2 k3 k4
1.00 1.00 0.98 0.97
76 77 77 78
83 86 88 90
88 95 101 108
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Figure 53: Audit Level Matrix in Test Data after Revision 
With these coefficients, log size will be 322, so it is decreased by 78%. The log size is 
considerably reduced, helping systems administrators and security managers to reduce 
the effort needed to analyze the event logs. However, it is desirable to have a certain 
mathematical model in order to determine the proper coefficient, yielding an audit level 
with a range between 0 and 10. 
 
5-4-4. Results 
 
Is the dynamic policy more powerful than static policy? This section shows a 
validation of this question through a demonstration using UPPAAL. State chart diagrams 
are developed with UPPAAL under the following conditions: 1) there is no policy, 2) 
static information policy is applied, and 3) dynamic information policy is applied for 
countermeasures 1 and 270. These diagrams are meta-layer 0. They are developed based 
on meta-systems model (meta-layer 1) shown in the previous sections, and involve 
                                                 
70 See the recognized countermeasure on page 37 in this thesis. 
k1 0.000555
k2 0.006
i , o L i , o L i , o L
1, 1 3 1, 2 2 1, 3 2
2, 1 3 2, 2 2 2, 3 2
3, 1 4 3, 2 3 3, 3 3
i , o L i , o L i , o L
1, 4 0 1, 5 7 1, 6 5
2, 4 0 2, 5 8 2, 6 6
3, 4 1 3, 5 10 3, 6 8
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objects such as user1 and user2, and data such as the number of accesses for user1 on Feb. 
18, 2003 and maximum number of accesses for a warning level 3 (101). These objects 
and data come from the aforementioned test data. All necessary objects and data are 
defined in the diagram in UPPAAL. Results of the information policies are discussed 
regarding the aforementioned countermeasures as follows. 
 
Countermeasure 1: Censor not only content but also amount 
 
No Information Policy 
The following figure is a state chart diagram without information policy. Defined objects 
and data in the state chart diagram are also shown. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 54: SCD of Security Mechanism without Policy for Countermeasure 1 
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Meta-Object Object Meta-Data Data (Feb. 18, 2003) 
User Name User1 (Yukiko Tanaka) User1 Number of Accesses 60 
User Name User2 (Tsutomu Maebashi) User2 Number of Accesses 84 
User Name User3 (Shinichi Sekine) 
UserPC 
User3 Number of Accesses 108 (65)* 
* “65” is necessary number of accesses; otherwise, “43” is unnecessary number of accesses. 
Table 46: Objects and Data for Security Mechanism without Policy for Countermeasure 1 
“User3” is an insider and stole 35 customers’ information on Feb. 18, 2003. It is desirable 
to detect this malicious activity. However, without an information policy, inspection of 
event occurring in the systems is never done. As a result, customer confidential 
information is stolen. It is demonstrated in the below figure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 55: SCD of Result without Policy for Countermeasure 1  
“User3” is in a state of “Leak”, which means that the information is leaked. For the next, 
a system with static information policy is shown. 
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Static Information Policy 1 
A static information policy does not change its policy even though a property and 
behavior change in a system. Each user may have own maximum and average number of 
accesses. However, the static policy cannot deliver the own limited number of accesses 
each user appropriately since the static policy does not provide updating limited number 
of access to the user if the user changes the frequency of his/her transactions. Thus, the 
limited number of accesses will be the same value for every user71. The state chart 
diagram is shown on the next page with its defined objects and data. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 56: SCD of Security Mechanism with Static Policy 1 
 
                                                 
71 The limited number of access may be delivered depend on user’s role or position; however, in this thesis, 
it is supposed that all users have the same role and position. 
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Meta-Object Object Meta-Data Data (Feb. 18, 2003) 
User Name User1 (Yukiko Tanaka) User1 Number of Accesses 60 
User Name User2 (Tsutomu Maebashi) User2 Number of Accesses 84 
User Name User3 (Shinichi Sekine) 
UserPC 
User3 Number of Accesses 108 (65)* 
N/A N/A Limited Number of Accesses 70** 
 * “65” is necessary number of access; otherwise, “43” is unnecessary number of access. 
 **”70” is calculated with the average number of accesses (65) + 5. 
Table 47: Objects and Data for Security Mechanism Static Policy for Countermeasure 1 
It is also desirable to detect malicious activities by “User3”. A system involving the static 
information is demonstrated on the next page. The demonstration shows the state when 
the malicious activity is detected. The static policy is also available to detect the 
information leak; however, the policy force “User2” to stop working. Even though 
“User2” does not finish working, the static policy detects a normal activity in “User2”. 
The demonstration shows that “User2” is in “Complaint” state, which means that “User2” 
is complaining to the system. As a result, the static policy is able to detect the malicious 
activity; however, the policy is not flexible, and weakens system availability. In addition, 
the defined limited number of accesses is not well-grounded value, and may be inaccurate 
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Figure 57: SCD of Result with Static Policy 1 
 
Dynamic Information Policy 1 
A dynamic information policy changes its policy when a property or behavior changes in 
a system. Each user will have own appropriate limited number of accesses based on 
history of number of accesses in the system. The dynamic information policy may deliver 
a default of limited number of accesses for a new user. Then, the policy deliver an 
updated number of accesses for the new user depend on a frequency of the new user’s 
transactions. In addition, the dynamic policy provides an available inspection to a user. 
Depend on a current number of accesses, the policy determines maximum number of 
accesses each warning level. The detail security mechanism is shown in the section 4-3-1: 
Sample Dynamic Policy 1. The state chart diagram with the dynamic information is 
shown on the next page. Defined objects and data are also presented additionally. 
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Figure 58: SCD of Security Mechanism with Dynamic Policy 1 
Meta-Object Object Meta-Data Data (Feb. 18, 2003) 
User Name User1 (Yukiko Tanaka) User1 Number of Accesses 60 
User Name User2 (Tsutomu Maebashi) User2 Number of Accesses 84 
User Name User3 (Shinichi Sekine) 
UserPC 
User3 Number of Accesses 108 (65) 
User1: 76 
User2: 83 Max number of accesses w1[i] User3: 88 
User1: 77 
User2: 86 Max number of accesses w2[i] User3: 95 
User1: 77 
User2: 88 Max number of accesses w3[i] User3: 101 
User1: 78 
User2: 90 
DynP.Policy1 DynamicPolicy1
Max number of accesses 
w4[i] User3: 108 
Table 48: Objects and Data for Security Mechanism Dynamic Policy 1 
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A system involving the dynamic information is demonstrated in the below figures. The 
figures show a state when an anomalous number of accesses are detected, and then a 
defined rule72 is executed corresponding to a warning level.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
72 See Table 25: Rule for each Warning Level for Sample Dynamic Information Policy 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 59-1: The State Detected with Warning Level 1 
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Figure 59-3: The State Detected with Warning Level 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 59-2: The State Detected with Warning Level 2 
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Figure 59: SCD of Result with Dynamic Policy 1 
The left upper figure shows when “User3” activity is detected with a warning level 1. The 
right upper and left bottom figures show when “User3” activity is detected with a 
warning level 2 and 3. Finally, the right bottom figure shows when “User3” activity is 
detected with a warning level 4. “User3” is disconnected from the system. Manager 
inspection will be required for “User3”, and an information leak will be discovered. 
“User1” and “User2” are able to finish their work without interruption of the dynamic 
policy.  
 
 As the above demonstration shows, the dynamic information policy 1 provides 
more accurate and available control than others. This mechanism should be taken into 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 59-4: The State Detected with Warning Level 4 
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account in developing system at the design stage in order to make the systems secure. 
 
Countermeasure 2: Improve accountability in order to trace any insider hacker’s actions 
 
The state chart diagram in UPPAAL requires defining objects and data. Necessary objects 
and data are shown in the following table. All objects and data are from the test data. 
Figure 60: Datasheet of Objects and Data from Test Data 
The upper table has “UserPC” objects and a log size per day from Feb. 10 2003 to Feb. 
18 2003, and the bottom table has “UserInf” objects and total frequency of access to an 
object from Feb. 10 2003 to Feb. 18 2003. The data in the above table will be defined in 
the state chart diagrams. 
 
No Information Policy 
The below figure is a state chart diagram without information policy. Defined objects and 
User Name 02/10/2003 02/11/2003 02/12/2003 02/13/2003 02/14/2003 02/17/2003 02/18/2003 Average
1 Yukiko Tanaka 72 73 10 70 69 50 60 58
2 Tsutomu Maebashi 68 74 77 70 75 77 84 75
3 Shinichi Sekine 60 69 77 55 62 101 108 76
70Average number of access per day
Object Name 02/10/2003 02/11/2003 02/12/2003 02/13/2003 02/14/2003 02/17/2003 02/18/2003 Average
1 Accoun No., Name, Birth 43 48 46 45 55 58 52 50
22% 22% 28% 23% 27% 25% 21% 24%
2 Account List (low level) 39 40 32 48 48 36 48 42
20% 19% 20% 25% 23% 16% 19% 20%
3 Address, Telephone No. 45 43 29 26 31 34 39 35
23% 20% 18% 13% 15% 15% 15% 17%
4 Password (unvisible) 3 3 1 3 1 2 4 2
2% 1% 1% 2% 0% 1% 2% 1%
5 Balance 36 38 27 33 35 36 81 41
18% 18% 16% 17% 17% 16% 32% 19%
6 Account History 34 44 29 40 36 62 28 39
17% 20% 18% 21% 17% 27% 11% 19%
885
Low
61%
576
39%
High
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data in the state chart diagram are also shown. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 61: SCD of Security Mechanism without Policy for Countermeasure 2 
Meta-Object Object Meta-Data Data (Feb. 18, 2003) 
User1 User ID 1 (Yukiko Tanaka) 
User2 User ID 2 (Tsutomu Maebashi) EvLog 
User3 User ID 3 (Shinichi Sekine) 
Object 1 Frequency of access N/A 
 Security level N/A 
Object 2 Frequency of access N/A 
 Security level N/A 
Object 3 Frequency of access N/A 
 Security level N/A 
Object 4 Frequency of access N/A 
 Security level N/A 
Object 5 Frequency of access N/A 
 Security level N/A 
Object 6 Frequency of access N/A 
EvLog 
 Security level N/A 
N/A N/A Average log size per day 70 
N/A SecMng Condition GiveUp 
Table 49: Objects and Data for Security Mechanism without Policy for Countermeasure 2 
Event logs are not filtered without policy. It is required for a security manager or other 
systems administrator to analyze entire event logs. Total log size is 1470 (70*7*3) for a 
 136
week. The log size can be much larger depending on the number of operators. As a result, 
the security manager may give up or leave to check the event logs because of the large 
amount of work. See the below figure.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 62: SCD of Result without Policy for Countermeasure 2 
Static Information Policy 2 
It is desirable to show only important logs regarding information leak. The following 
conditions can be used to recognize the important log: 
9 The log involving a user who has an anomalous number of accesses 
(Whenever an information leak occurs, there are numerous accesses by a certain user) 
9 The log involving a user who has high occupancy in a certain interval 
(Insider may try to steal information in the absence of other personnel in the company, at 
this time; user occupancy will be much higher) 
9 The log involving an object which has a high frequency of access 
(Whenever an information leak occurs, there are numerous accesses to a certain object) 
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9 The log involving a highly confidential object 
(A highly confidential object involves high information asset) 
However, the static information policy cannot recognize a user and object behavior. 
Therefore, the static information policy recognizes only a level of confidential 
information since the confidential level is static. The state chart diagram in the static 
information policy is shown as follows with its defined objects and data. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 63: SCD of Security Mechanism with Static Policy 2 
Meta-Object Object Meta-Data Data (Feb. 18, 2003) 
User1 User ID 1 (Yukiko Tanaka) 
User2 User ID 2 (Tsutomu Maebashi) EvLog 
User3 User ID 3 (Shinichi Sekine) 
Object 1 Frequency of access N/A 
 Security level 1: Low 
Object 2 Frequency of access N/A 
 Security level 1: Low 
Object 3 Frequency of access N/A 
 Security level 1: Low 
Object 4 Frequency of access N/A 
 Security level 2: High 
Object 5 Frequency of access N/A 
 Security level 2: High 
EvLog 
Object 6 Frequency of access N/A 
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  Security level 2: High 
N/A N/A Average log size per day 70 
N/A SecMng Condition Tired 
Table 50: Objects and Data for Security Mechanism Static Policy for Countermeasure 2 
The static information policy filters event logs with an object’s security level. The policy 
will remove unclassified information (security level is “Low”). According to the test data 
analysis in the previous section, log size is decreased by 61%. Accountability in the 
systems has been improved. However, the filtered event logs still involve unimportant 
logs. The following figure shows a result of filtering with the static information policy.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 64: SCD of Result with Static Policy 2 
As a result of simulation, a security manager object still feels tired. It may still be 
desirable to improve the filtering of event logs.  
 
Dynamic Information Policy 2 
The following figure is a state chart diagram with dynamic information policy. The 
dynamic information policy is able to recognize a user and object behavior.  
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Figure 65: SCD of Security Mechanism with Dynamic Policy 2 
Table 51: Objects and Data for Security Mechanism Dynamic Policy 2 
The event logs are filtered with a user’s frequency of accesses, occupancy rate of 
Meta-Object Object Meta-Data Data (Feb. 18, 2003) 
User1 User ID 1 (Yukiko Tanaka) 
 Frequency of access 58 (maximum: 73) 
 Occupancy rate 60% 
User2 User ID 2 (Tsutomu Maebashi) 
 Frequency of access 75 (maximum: 84) 
 Occupancy rate 64% 
User3 User ID 3 (Shinichi Sekine) 
 Frequency of access 76 (maximum: 108) 
EvLog 
 Occupancy rate 71% 
Object 1 Frequency of access 50 (24%) 
 Security level 1: Low 
Object 2 Frequency of access 42 (20%) 
 Security level 1: Low 
Object 3 Frequency of access 35 (17%) 
 Security level 1: Low 
Object 4 Frequency of access 2 (1%) 
 Security level 2: High 
Object 5 Frequency of access 41 (19%) 
 Security level 2: High 
Object 6 Frequency of access 41 (19%) 
EvLog 
 Security level 2: High 
N/A SecMng Condition Complete 
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accesses, and an object’s frequency of accesses besides security level of an object.  All 
event logs regarding “User1” are filtered since the importance is less than that of other 
users.  Low security level logs are also removed, as well as the static information policy.  
In addition, the frequency of access to the object 4 is so low that object 4’s log is 
eliminated.  As a result, the log size is decreased by 78% with the dynamic information 
policy.  The next figure shows the result of filtering with the dynamic information in the 
systems.  A security manager or systems administrator is therefore able to complete 
his/her work. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 66: SCD of Result with Dynamic Policy for Countermeasure 2 
 As the above demonstration shows, the dynamic information policy 2 is the most 
suitable policy to improve accountability.  This mechanism should be taken into account 
in developing a system at the design stage in order to make the system secure as well as 
the information dynamic policy 1. 
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 All diagrams are developed with UPPAAL, which simulates the abovementioned 
security mechanisms. A UPPAAL data file whose file type is XML involves the diagram. 
The data file name and its diagram name are as follows. 
- leakNoPolicy1.xml: Security Mechanism for countermeasure 1 without policy 
- leakStpolicy1.xml: Security Mechanism for countermeasure 1 with a static 
information policy 
- leakDypolicy1.xml: Security Mechanism for countermeasure 1 with a dynamic 
information policy 
- leakNoPolicy2.xml: Security Mechanism for countermeasure 2 without policy 
- leakStpolicy2.xml: Security Mechanism for countermeasure 2 with a static 
information policy 
- leakDypolicy2.xml: Security Mechanism for countermeasure 2 with a dynamic 
information policy 
 
The following table shows an overview of the aforementioned policies. It makes 
difference between the policies clearly. 
Countermeasure 1:  
 Without Policy Static Information Policy Dynamic Information Policy 
Methodology No detection Define static value of detection 
Deliver appropriate value 
of detection 
Estimation Involves High Risk Reduces risk, but system availability worsen 
Reduces risk with high 
availability 
 
Countermeasure 2: 
 Without Policy Static Information Policy Dynamic Information Policy 
Methodology No filtering Filter by security level Filter by user and object behavior 
0% 61 % reduction of effort 78 % reduction of effort 
Estimation Results in high Risk Results in less risk Results in less risk than static 
Table 52: Validation of Information Policies 
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In this section, security mechanisms in the meta-system model developed in the 
previous section are verified thorough the demonstration of UPPAAL. In addition, the 
addressed question at the beginning of this section is also answered. It is validated that a 
dynamic information policy provides more accuracy and available control in systems, and 
contributes to reducing the risk of information leak more effectively than other methods. 
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6. Conclusions 
 
Many aspects and processes of security system modeling are shown in this thesis. 
The first step was to analyze 20 current security breaches, and assess the risk level for 
each security breach utilizing the risk management assessment technique. Three severe 
security breaches were then chosen to be cases for further analysis. The second step 
included developing the information policies. It was apparent that the static information 
policy utilized currently for computer network security is not a strong enough policy for 
overcoming current security threats. A more comprehensive policy is required for such 
systems. In this thesis, the dynamic information policy was also introduced as the more 
powerful policy to prevent the greater security breaches. Two dynamic information policy 
samples were presented. One of these is for handling the number of accesses to the object 
for each user depending on the frequency with which the user accesses the object. The 
other is for differentiating the audit importance level among large numbers of events 
logged in the system. The policy contributes to reducing network or security 
administrators’ role in analyzing the event logs. Then, the system model and its security 
mechanisms were developed using UML. The system design with UML is described by 
graphical language. It is very understandable for anyone from programmers to users and 
stakeholders. Use of UML also revealed that some components might be re-useable for 
other systems. Finally, security mechanisms based on defined dynamic information 
policies are verified with realistic test data containing customer information access events. 
This proves the security mechanism will work in real systems. In addition, the system 
model design developed in this thesis is validated with UPPALL. Through a 
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demonstration using UPPAAL, the power of the dynamic information policies and their 
suitability are presented.  
 
The processes presented in this thesis should be invoked at the beginning of the 
system design. It is desirable to apply the aspects and processes to any system required to 
be secure either by the system engineer or other users and stakeholders. Moreover, the 
system model is developed by UML. It is suitable to update for new security threats. The 
work in this thesis contributes to systems engineering by developing the security aspects 
of systems working with confidential information such as personnel credit/bank account 
information, governmental information, and national defense information. 
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7. Future Effort 
 
It is desirable to develop a more dynamic policy to ensure that systems will be secure and 
prevent new security threats. Moreover, completing system design and verification are 
also desirable. Providing a complete system design package with verification for all 
scenarios of the system design is beyond the scope of this thesis and separate studies may 
be undertaken on this topic. In further studies, the JAVA language may help to develop 
commercial security enforcement components for networked systems. 
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APPENDIX A: Summary of Security Breach 
 
[SB-01] Boeing Co privileged documents 
Business Week , June 28, 2004 
Boeing Co. took out full-page ads in several newspapers Monday to acknowledge that 
some of its employees used privileged documents from rival aerospace company 
Lockheed Martin to win a $1.88 billion federal rocket contract. 
 
[SB-02] Hacker penetrates T-Mobile systems 
Security Focus Jan 11 2005 
A sophisticated computer hacker had access to servers at wireless giant T-Mobile for at 
least a year, which he used to monitor U.S. Secret Service e-mail, obtain customers' 
passwords and Social Security numbers, and download candid photos taken by Sidekick 
users, including Hollywood celebrities, Security Focus has learned.  
 
[SB-03] Hacker Posts Credit Card Info in December 2002 
Wired News Report Page, Jan. 10, 2003 
In December 2002, an attacker identifying himself as a 19-years-old Russian named 
“Maxim” broke into the CDUniverse web store operated by eUniverse Inc. and copied 
more than 300,000 credit card numbers. Maxim then sent a fax to eUniverse threatening 
to post the stolen credit card on the Internet if the store didn’t pay him $100,000. On 
December, when the company refused to bow to the blackmail attack, the hacker 
distributed up to 25,000 of the stolen numbers on the hacker web site “Maxus Credit Card 
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Pipeline” during the last two weeks. 
 
[SB-04] Identity Thieves Can Lurk at Wi-Fi Spots 
USA TODAY, Feb 2005 
Thieves are using wireless devices to impersonate legitimate Internet access points to 
steal credit card numbers and other personal information, security experts warn. So-called 
evil-twin attacks don't require technical expertise. Anyone armed with a wireless laptop 
and software widely available on the Internet can broadcast a radio signal that 
overpowers the hot spot. Then, masquerading as the real thing, they view the activities of 
wireless users within several hundred feet of the hot spot.  
 
[SB-05] Intuit plugs leaks to Double Click 
CNET News.com, March 2, 2002 
The leakage was discovered by Richard Smith, an increasingly famous Internet security 
consultant, who said the problem is not limited to Intuit but appears at sites across the 
Web. So far, he has noticed similar problems at nearly 15 sites, including Travelocity.com 
and Buy.com. In October, Smith alerted AltaVista that it was sending people's home 
addresses to DoubleClick, an Internet advertising firm. Intuit was at first unaware of the 
problem and didn't quite understand it, said Smith. Once the company had more 
information, it began to address the problem. 
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[SB-06] More Than 145,000 People Face Identity Theft Threat 
LOS ANGELES, Feb. 17, 2005 
About 145,000 people nationwide are being notified that their personal information may 
have been stolen by thieves who fraudulently signed up with a company that collects 
consumer data. ChoicePoint Inc. announced Wednesday that it was sending warning 
letters to 110,000 possible victims beyond the 35,000 in California, where a unique state 
law requires such disclosure.  
 
[SB-07] Leaked 24,632 customers’ information NTT Docomo, Japan 
MSN News, Feb 14, 2005 
Recognized suspect stole 24,632 customers’ information from terminals in secured room 
in NTT Docomo. Only 254 people are authorized to access to the computer in the room. 
The room authenticates with iris identification system. 227 people have been 
authenticated after the stolen data generated.  
 
[SB-08] Raytheon Company published employment policy 
Massachusetts, February 1, 2002 
On February 1, 2002, Raytheon filed suit against 21 employees it alleges posted or 
discussed confidential corporate information on a Yahoo! Message board, in violation of 
their employment contracts and Raytheon's published employment policy, and claiming, 
in addition, that this conduct constituted a misappropriation of Raytheon's trade secrets. 
To identify the "John Does" Raytheon obtained a court order allowing its counsel to take 
out-of-state discovery from Yahoo, AOL, Earthlink and various other ISPs, seeking 
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documents and information identifying the 21.  
 
[SB-09] Security Breach at Buy.com   
Wired News, Oct. 12, 2002 
A security hole on buy.com's website exposed the personal information of customers who 
returned products to the company. For several hours on Thursday, the buy.com website 
allowed determined visitors to peruse the names, addresses, and phone numbers of 
customers. Wired News verified that the problem affected at least hundreds, and perhaps 
thousands, of buy.com customers who have sent products to the company's North Wales, 
Pennsylvania, warehouse. The security breach works like this: buy.com's Microsoft NT 
server provides customers who want to make a return with a unique URL -- including a 
customer number -- so they can easily print a mailing label. The label includes return 
addresses and phone numbers. 
 
[SB-10] Medical Privacy Breach in University of Michigan Medical System 
The Detroit News, February 2002 
In many places, legal protections are granted for medical records. Many such regulations 
have various loopholes that patients might be surprised to discover. Of course, there is 
also the risk of exposure of the information accidentally, as happened in 2002 with the 
University of Michigan health system. A student trying to find information about a doctor 
followed a link and found files with thousands of private patient records, including names, 
addresses, phone numbers, Social Security numbers, job status, and treatments. All of 
these data were available on the public web. 
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[SB-11] Leaked over 100,0000 customer information of the store in Rakuten Internet 
market. 
Mainichi News, April 2005 
On April 21 2005, 2,500 customers information included the customer home address, 
home telephone number, credit card account number, purchased products information and 
other the customer private information. Rakuten provides many virtual stores on the 
Internet; the company is the biggest virtual market in Japan. Ex-employee stole and sold 
the information with 30 US$ per a customer to a suspect. Rakuten has over 10,000 virtual 
stores. It is thought that over 100,000-customer‘s information may have been 
compromised according to the suspect’s testimony. 
 
[SB-12] Leaked the nuclear plant security information through “Winiy” in the Internet. 
Mainichi News, February 2005 
The economic ministry the nuclear safety committee reported that some documents of the 
nuclear plant security in the local inspection agency of the committee were leaked onto 
the Internet through the file transfer application “Winiy”. The leaked documents are not 
included technical and confidential information, and personnel information. The local 
agency employees brought the documents to their home to work. Then, the documents 
were leaked through their personal computer into the Internet with “Winiy”. The ministry 
warned its employees not to work with the documents on the computer that installed any 
file transfer application, and told them not to keep any work documents in their hard disk. 
Moreover, any document must be inspected before they bring it out from the local 
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agency. 
 
[SB-13] Lost a computer back-up tape holding 200,000 client account data of Bank of 
America. 
Enterprise IT Plante.Com, March 3, 2005 
A computer back-up tape holding 200,000 client accounts in Bank of America was lost. 
Hackers stole 1.4 million customer credit card numbers from shoe retailer DSW. The 
bank said in February that it lost tapes containing the account information of more than a 
million federal government employees -- including members of the Senate now 
considering legislation to curb the problem. “The bank decided to notify all customers 
whose data was on the tapes. Letters were also sent to some customers who were not on 
the tapes, so they could either protect themselves or stop worrying” said Bank of America 
spokeswoman Shirley Norton. Since the tapes were lost in December 2004, no cases of 
fraud due to the lost data have emerged, she said. 
 
[SB-14] Leaked 5,000 personnel student information in an elemental school in Shizuoka, 
Japan. 
IT Hoken.Com, April 21, 2005  
It is reported that 5,000 personnel student information including student name, home 
address, telephone number, and grade was leaked. It is suspected that the information was 
leaked from disposed computers in the elemental school. The school entrusts the disposal 
to a disposal trader in its prefecture.  
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[SB-15] Stolen documents with personnel information from a business car of water works 
in Kanagawa, Japan. 
IT Hoken.Com, August 16, 2005  
Waterworks in Kanagawa reported that documents with 60 persons were stolen from its 
business car on the street in Sagamihara-shi. The documents involve a leaked water pipe 
location, resident’s name, and telephone number. It also has a rough sketch of the houses. 
It is assumed that a deviate trader who pretended to be an employee of the company 
tricked residents by pretending to have the ability to repair a water leak. The company 
has given sincere apologies to these individuals and plans to take a more aggressive role 
in combating such security breaches in the future. 
 
[SB-16] Leaked 61,876 members’ information by sophisticated hacker attack from 
Adecco web site. 
Adecco web site, June 27, 2005 
An attacker broke into Adecco web sites, and stolen 61,876 members’ information from 
the site. Adecco provides a temporary personnel service through the web site. The 
member inscribes his/her name, home address, birth date, telephone number, e-mail 
address, and job history. The information did not obtain the member’s job history. The 
mainframe database system was not accessed, and 720,000 member’s information 
remains safe. An individual has been arrested for suspected illegal access to the web site. 
This attack came to light with checking access event logs from January 18, 2005 to June 
2, 2005.  
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[SB-17] Kitaguni bank issued accidentally other customers’ detailed account statement on 
ATM. 
IT Hoken.Com, August 4, 2005  
Kitaguni bank announced that documents with personnel information was lost on July 
2005. At the same time a customer’s detailed account statement was accidentally issued, 
copy of another customer’s account statement was also printed out on ATM from July 17 
PM 12:07 to July 19 AM 8:45 in Kamiyanai branch. Information printed out on the 
account statement involves customer name, account number, branch number and 
transaction record. It caused wrong implementation of detailed account statement process. 
The bank identified the customer who received the other customer’s detailed statement 
and collected them. 
 
 
[SB-18] Nagoya Toyota car dealer shop lost 138 personnel and 67 enterprise customers’ 
list. 
IT Hoken.Com, June 6, 2005  
Nagoya Toyota car dealer shop announced that 138 personnel information and 67 
corporations information list was lost. The list contains, customer address, name, 
telephone number, and car owner information. It is suspected that a car seller lost the list 
during working time. The shop enforces protection to personnel information and makes 
effort to prevent a recurrence. 
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[SB-19] Leaked member information by e-mail operation error 
IT Hoken.Com, July 9, 2004  
Anesb Sunrise Co. announced that member information was sent accidentally by e-mail 
handle error when an operator was sending goods guidance to customers. The e-mail 
involved 10,000 customers’ name, e-mail address, and Anesb card member account 
number. No confidential information was released at end.  
 
 
[SB-20] Softbank leak extortionist won't serve time  
The Japan Times;; July 10, 2004 
On July 7, 2004, the information of 900,000 clients of Yahoo! BB in Softbank, which is 
one of the largest high-speed Internet connection services, was leaked by an 
ex-employee’s misuse of its database system. The leaked information almost spread to the 
Internet. The information involves customer name, home address, telephone number, 
member account number, credit card account number, and expiration data. The company 
paid $10 to each client as a self-imposed penalty for this lapse in security. Total financial 
losses reached $9 million. 
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